This paper discusses the main strands of Turkey’s post-Cold War foreign policy in its post-Soviet Black Sea neighbourhood of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine with a focus on the period of Justice and Development Party rule (2002-2018). Based on the analysis of Turkey’s rhetorical stance towards the region’s countries and its actual interaction across five sectors –trade, energy, security, education/culture and migration –our findings demonstrate that the foreign policy rhetoric with its strong emphasis on historical ties, economic and energy cooperation and support for regional countries’ territorial integrity is not matched by Turkey’s observable engagement.An important factor for the mismatch between rhetoric and engagement is that relations with the region are seen at least partly through the prism of Turkey’s more salient relations with Russia. While not a priority region, Turkey’s policy towards this space gained momentum after 2002 when the Turkish government increasingly voiced regional ambitions and sought to leverage its neighbourhood for a more prominent global role.Accordingly, Turkey’s engagement with the six countries varies depending on cultural proximity, diaspora ties and the country’s potential to serve Turkey’s regional ambitions. Relations with Azerbaijan are therefore the most intense while those with Belarus the most aloof. In terms of sectoral engagement, economic links but also culturaland educational ties are promoted most actively and consistently. Turkey is more ambiguous with regard to security and pays little attention to migration.A substantial contribution to relations with the post-Soviet neighbourhood is on the other hand madeby Turkish non-state actors, especially the business community
