1\. Introduction 5 2\. Mapping Divergent Outcomes: Initial Misfit and Policy
Change in Ukraine’s Shareholders’ Rights and Technical Standards 7 2.1
Shareholders‘ Rights 8 2.2 Technical Standards 8 3\. Puzzling Policy Change in
Ukraine 9 3.1 Misfit and Adaptational Costs 9 3.2 Institutionalization of EU
Rules 10 3.3 Policy-Specific Conditionality 11 3.4 Multiplex and Dyadic
Capacity-Building 12 4\. Policy Change in Ukraine’s Shareholders’ Rights 13
5\. Policy Change in Ukraine’s Technical Standards 18 6\. Alternative
Explanations 21 7\. Conclusion 23 Literature 25Why is regulatory convergence towards EU rules more successful in some policy
fields than in others within one EU neighboring country? By comparing
Ukraine’s convergence towards EU rules in the field of shareholders’ rights
and technical standards, I challenge prominent explanations for policy change
outside the EU that emphasize misfit and adaptational costs, the
institutionalization of EU rules or policy-specific conditionality. In order
to deal with the shortcomings of these explanations, it is necessary to
disaggregate incentives and capacities of various domestic actors within the
particular policy fields. I argue that regulatory convergence in EU
neighboring countries is more likely if external actors combine the
application of policy-specific conditionality, such as access to the European
market, with multiplex capacity-building measures that diversify demand among
domestic state regulators and firms and empower them to make their claims