thesis
Selves, persons, individuals : a feminist critique of the law of obligations
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Abstract
This thesis examines some of the contested meanings of what it is to be a self,
person and individual. The law of obligations sets the context for this
examination. One of the important aspects of contemporary feminist philosophy
has been its move beyond highlighting inconsistencies in political and legal
theory, in which theoretical frameworks can be shown to rely upon an ambiguous
treatment of women. The feminist theorists whose work is considered use these
theoretical weaknesses as a point of departure to propose different conceptual
frameworks.
I start by analysing contemporary work on the self from within both
philosophy of science and feminist metaphysics to draw out common approaches
from these diverse positions. These themes are then discussed in the context of
the law. I then critically examine the concept of legal personhood in the work of
Drucilla Cornell and her proposals for the amendment of tort law. This is
juxtaposed with an analysis of the practical operation of tort law by adapting
François Ewald's work on risk and insurance to English law. I concentrate on
women's ambiguous position with regard to both risk and to the image of the
individual that is the subject of Ewald's critique.
This is followed by an examination of the changing position of women
with regard to 'possessive individualism', 'self-ownership' or 'property in the
person' in relation to contract law and social contract theory. There are a number
of different social contracts discussed in the thesis: Cornell's reworking of John
Rawls and the stories of Thomas Hobbes and of Carole Pateman. The final
'social contract' to be discussed is that of 'new contractualism', the employment
of contract as a technique of government. I argue that Pateman's critique of
possessive individualism continues to be relevant at a time when the
breadwinner/housewife model has broken down