Petersen, Keith S.

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Journal of the Arkansas Academy of ScienceVolume 7 Article 211955Non Recognition of Red China: Reasons andRealizationsKeith S. PetersenUniversity of Central ArkansasFollow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaasPart of the Asian History Commons, and the Chinese Studies CommonsThis article is available for use under the Creative Commons license: Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-ND 4.0). Users are able toread, download, copy, print, distribute, search, link to the full texts of these articles, or use them for any other lawful purpose, without asking priorpermission from the publisher or the author.This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of the Arkansas Academyof Science by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact scholar@uark.edu, ccmiddle@uark.edu.Recommended CitationPetersen, Keith S. (1955) "Non Recognition of Red China: Reasons and Realizations," Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science: Vol.7 , Article 21.Available at: http://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaas/vol7/iss1/21Ii75NON-RECOGNITION OF RED CHINA: REASONS AND RATIONALIZATIONSKEITH S. PETERSEHArkansas State Teachers CollegeIn 1949 the Nationalist government of China, under the leadership of ChiangK i-shek, was driven off the China mainland to an uncertain island refuge on For--a by its long-time civil war enemy, the Chinese Communists. These Chinese Redssubsequently proclaimed at Peiping September 29, 1949 that they were the new Com-munist government of China, the so-called Peoples' Republic. Party Chairman MaoTse-tung became Chairman of the Central Peoples' Government. His regime, threedays later, made a formal request for recognition by the foreign governments thathad consulates at Peiping--including the United States.Some nations extended recognition immediately. The United States, amongothers, did not. There were no reasons, in particular, for the refusal to act atthis early date--except time, to wait to see what would happen.But what sort of thing was to be looked for in that waiting period? Thebasis of the impending recognition decision apparently was a matter of some dif-ference of opinion. Twenty-five consultants, including scholars, businessmen, andpoliticians, met October 6-8, 1949, at Washington to advise the State Departmenton its Red China recognition problem. Thirteen of these consultants favoredrecognition in time, three were opposed to recognition, and nine were noncommital.A clear ma jority thus recommended that the United States recognize Red China, butonly at a later and more appropriate time.The representatives of the State Department agreed that recognition of RedChina by the United States would have to wait. But there was less agreement onwhat the United States was waiting for. The advisors were waiting to see if theMao Tse-tung regime was actually in control of China; the Department was waitingto see how the Mao Tse-tung regime behaved.Itbehaved badly. It repudiated the Nationalist United Nations delegationand announced that it would re-examine all Nationalist treaties, deciding in duecourse which it would keep and which it would scrap. A new revolutionary govern-ment might be expected to do this to its predecessor, but the predecessor in thisinstance was still recognized by the United States. Consequently, such precipi-tous action was not calculated to win American favor.More directly and dramatically, the Peiping regime brought pressure to bearon individual American officials and citizens in China. Itcaused the arrest ofUnited States Consul-General Angus Ward at Mukden October 24. Ward and others onhis staff were arrested for alleged assault on a Chinese employee. A month laterMukden Vice Consul William Stokes was taken into court and questioned about hisalleged espionage activity.Red China was trying to force the American hand. It would not be forced.When Peiping finally repudiated the Nationalist delegation in the United Nations,as itdid November 16, the United States immediately announced its support ofthe Nationalist delegation. That same day, in a press conference, Secretary ofState Dean Acheson gave his reasons. The arrest of Angus Ward, Acheson said, hadkilled any chance of early recognition of Red China. In short, bad behavior wasthe reason.Then for a while, tensions seemed to relax. Angus Ward and the others, sen-tenced to various terms, were released and deported November 24. India becamethe first non-Communist country to recognize the Peiping government December 30,1949. Britain followed suit seven days later. The West seemed to be moving towardrecognition. The following week, on January 12,Secretary Acheson spoke on AsiaticPolicy to the National Press Club in Washington. He complained bitterly againstthe Soviet Union, to be sure, for "detaching" Manchuria and other areas fromPull text of these conversations in U. S. Department of State, Transcript of Round TableDiscussion on American Policy Toward China Held in the Department of State, October 6, 7,a"d 8, 1949. (Confidential classification cancelled).2•St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 17 November, 1949.75Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 7 [1955], Art. 21Published by Arkansas Academy of Science, 1955"76 ARKANSAS ACADEMY OF SCIENCEIactual Chinese control, but his speech was in general conciliatory of the Peipingregime. 3 The State Department still was waiting and watching.Itdid not have to wait long. Two days later, January 14, the Chinese Commu-nists forcibly took over the consulates of the United States, France, and TheNetherlands, in Peiping. IfRed China seriously were seeking American recogni-tion--this is open to possible doubt--this was not the way to do it. The UnitedStates reacted quickly and angrily. It closed all its China consulates and or-dered all American officials out. Administration Spokesman Senator Tom Connallyof Texas endorsed this action. "The Chinese Communist government," he explainedin a statement released to the press that night, "is seeking recognition. But nonation is entitled to recognition when it does not respect international law anddoes not respect the representatives of other governments and the rights of theircitizens."* Itwas less a lawyer's theoretical complaint than a demand for a mini-mum of common decency and the ordinary mutual conveniences of diplomacy.The Netherlands, apparently pressured in part by this consulate seizure,extended recognition to the offending Peoples' Republic March 27, 1950. The Unit-ed States did not, and Red China's early opportunity for recognition was lost.The basic standard for continuing non-recognition was still, in the main, badbehavior.It was in this atmosphere of angry suspension, on June 25, 1950, that Com-munism launched its lightning invasion of South Korea. For the moment, all otherproblems were pushed aside. Through the summer of 1950 hard-pressed and under-manned South Korean, American, and other United Nations forces were pushed backto the "Pus an perimeter." The tide turned with the Inchon landings of mid-Septem-ber and by early October the 38th parallel had been recrossed. The general feel-ing in the West was that the war was over. In General Douglas MacArthur's phrase,the boys would be"home for Christmas."^Chinese Communists ,however , had other ideas. Peiping' s premier, Chou En-lai,had warned October 1 that Red China would"not supinely tolerate seeing theirneighbors being savagely invaded by imperialists." In late October, Chinese"volunteers" began to take the field. On November 26, in overwhelming numbers,the Chinese"volunteers" launched a crushing counterof fensive. Two days laterMacArthur was forced to report to the United Nations: "We face an entirely newwar." 7 And the United Nations lost it. Or at least, it did not win it. The ex-planation and the symbol of this frustration was Communist China. This was notmere misbehavior. This was war. And in war, one must hate the enemy. Consequent-ly, the recognition issue became clouded with ideology.Assistant Undersecretary of State Dean Rusk addressed the 25th anniversarydinner meeting of the China Institute of America May 18, 1951. It was both atirade and a turning point. Said Rusk:We do not recognize the authorities in Peiping for what they pre-tend to be. The Peiping regime may be a colonial Russian government--a Slavic Manchukuo on a larger scale. Itis not the government of China.Itdoes not pass the first test. It is not Chinese.Itis not entitled to speak for China in the community of nations.It is entitled only to the fruits of aggression upon which itis nowwillfully,openly and senselessly embarked.3 Full text in U. S. Department of State, Bulletin xxii:551 (23 January, 1950), 111-118.4 New York Times, 15 January, 1950.5 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 26 November, 1950.6 Arkansas Gazette, 2 October, 1950.7 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 29 November, 1950.See, for example, the melancholy prophecy of the idealist, Woodrow Wilson, immediately priorto America's entrance into World War I:"Anation couldn't put its strength into a war andkeep its head level; it had never been done." Quoted in Morison and Commager, The Growth ofthe American Republic (3rd edition, New York, 1942) II,468-9.76Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 7 [1955], Art. 21http://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaas/vol7/iss1/21NON-RECOGNITION OF RED CHINA 77IWe recognize the National Government of the Republic of China,even though the territory under its control is severely restricted. Webelieve it more authentically represents the views of the great bodyof the people of China, particularly their historic demand for inde-pendence from foreign control. 9It was the difference between the free and the un-free. Furthermore, Ruskadded, ifin spite of their Russian Communist masters"the Chinese people decidefor freedom, they shall find friends among all the peoples of the earth who haveknown and love freedom." This was a thinly veiled threat to wage eternal waragainst the Communist government of China until it was overthrown.Future Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, from the same platform, wasless subtle. The Mao Tse-tung regime was without doubt, in his estimation, a"puppet regime" and any opposition to it should receive encouragement and, byinference, assistance from the United States. 10 This would appear to be the ker-nel of the famous"liberation" idea that Dulles expounded so actively during the1952 presidential campaign and since.The thinking expressed here by Rusk and Dulles continues in United Statespolicy. Satelliteism, or subservience to Moscow in particular, was united withbad behavior in a new double standard of non-recognition. These were the mainthemes. But other propositions, sometimes incidentally revealed, are also worthyof attention. For example, November 25, 1949, nearly two months after the proc-lamation of the Peoples' Republic of China, a new government was installed bycoup d'etat in Panama--a bloodless revolution engineered by the national chiefof police, his third such action in six days. Three weeks later the United Statesrecognized this government. Why? Because the transition had been realized withoutany" foreign intervention." 1J Thus the means were apparently less important thanthe pedigree. By extension, this standard also applied to Red China, which was,of course, not recognized.Also, in October 1951, when his qualifications as United States delegate tothe United Nations were being investigated by a subcommittee of the Senate For-eign Relations Committee, Ambassador-at-large Phillip Jessup was asked his opin-ion on the question of recognizing the Mao Tse-tung regime. He recalled an Ache-son Formula of recognition "more than two years ago": That a government controlthe country it claims to control, that it recognize its international obliga-tions, and that it rule with the acquiescence of the people who are ruled. 12"Under the present circumstances," Jessup concluded without further elaboration,"we cannot recognize Communist China." It was not clear here which counts werebeing held against Peiping. Certainly there was little doubt about its controlof China; if anything, this test should have worked hardship only on the Nation-alists who were in effective control of approximately one- third of one per centof the territory usually included in the Chinese political unit. The fact thatthe Communists did not' recognize their international obligations was mostly arepetition—none the less valid--of the bad behavior charge. The prerequisite ofruling with the acquiescence of the people was an added item in the general ide-ological complaint which has received new emphasis since 1950.Altogether, then, the continuing indictment which is the basis for non-rec-ognition of the Peoples' Republic of China seems to include: That ithas misbe-haved, that it was established through"foreign intervention," that it is notentitled" to speak for China (because of its apparent status as a "colonialRussian government"), and that it does not rule "with the acquiescence of thepeople who are ruled."An argument that the final standard—acquiescence-- is entirely unreal can"e demonstrated easily by reference to the American policy toward other new andquestionably democratic regimes during the period covered by these events. FromComplete text in State Department Bulletin xxivW Ibld.621 (28 May, 1951), 843 ff.St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 15 December, 194912 New York Times, 13 October, 1949.St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 6 October, 1951.77Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 7 [1955], Art. 21Published by Arkansas Academy of Science, 1955•=78 ARKANSAS ACADEMY OF SCIENCEISeptember 1949 to the present, the United States has extended recognition, almostimmediately, to governments by coup d'etat in Panama, as already noted, in SyriaDecember 17, 1951, in Cuba March 27, 1952, and in Bolivia June 2, 1952.This contrary practice seems to cast additional doubt on the validity ofthe"colonial Russian government," or satellite charge--if what is meant here isthat this further proves that the government in question is without popular sup.port. The same might be said concerning"foreign intervention" in the initiativestages of any regime. If the complaint is, however, against Russian dominationand Russian intervention in particular, then there is also obvious conflict withthe original and continued recognition of all firmly established Russian satel-lite states and, indeed, of Russia herself. And yet, in October 1952, when Re-publican Senator William Knowland of California called, logically, for the break-ing of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in retaliation for their havingdemanded the recall of United States Ambassador to Moscow George F. Kennan, Sec-retary Acheson refused to undertake such action. Acheson based his decision onthe grounds that it"would be a step of the utmost seriousness with worldwideconsequences.*If there is any point innot recognizing the existence of thingsRussian, then there is much un-recognizing to be done.Misbehavior, and American displeasure with it,seems to be the one sincerelyvalid count against Communist China. But it is important to realize that non-recognition based on this reasoning, places the United States in a serious di-lemma. It cannot easily trade recognition for China's good behavior if goodbehavior is the precondition of the United States and recognition is the pre-condition for the Chinese Reds. As Correspondent Thomas J. Hamilton points outin a recent newspaper dispatch from United Nations, New York, the United Nationsprobably cannot get a general truce in Korea without recognizing Communist China,nor can the United Nations readily extend that recognition without first gettinga general truce. 5The additional problem of dealing with realities, regardless of preference,was revealed strikingly last spring by a diplomatic dilemma of a different sort.The United States, Great Britain, and France submitted to the United Nations Dis-armament Commission May 28, 1952, a proposal for limiting the size of armiesamong the great powers. A ceiling of 700,000 or 800,000 men was to be fixed forBritain and France and of 1,500,000 for the United States, the Soviet Union,and--" China."The last designated party was nowhere otherwise defined in theplan. Since the Nationalist government on Formosa has, by the most optimisticestimates, no more than 500,000 men under arms, its adherence to such agreementwould have been meaningless. When questioned later about which one of the twoChinas was meant, Western representatives differed in opinion somewhat, at leastin degree. French Delegate Jules Moch was quoted as saying that "nobody hadthought of Formosa" in this connection. 16 Great Britain's Sir Gladwyn Jebb"madeit obvious that he had Communist China in mind."^ American delegates, however,according to reputable report, "displayed a great reluctance to state flatlythat 'China' was Communist China. They were afraid that direct mention of Commu-nist China might involve them in the problem of recognition. In their corridorexplanations they preferred to say that they were talking about whatever Chinawas in command of the troops on the Chinese mainland." 18This was sheer fantasy. Ifthe United States is currently unwilling or un-able to call a fact a fact, even when, as in this instance, it was in its ownobvious best interests to do so, it will find the real world, at least in Asia,increasingly difficult to deal with. We must keep in mind that misbehavior isthe only defensible standard on which our non- recognition of the Peoples' Repub-lic of China is based. Ifwe can bargain it away, which apparently was our in-tention in withholding recognition in the first place, for better behavior, as14 New York Times, 8 October, 195215 Ibid., 13 January, 1953.16 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 31 May, 1952.17 A. M. Rosenthal dispatch to the New York Times, 29 May, 1952.18 Ibid.78Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 7 [1955], Art. 21http://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaas/vol7/iss1/211NON-RECOGNITION OF RED CHINA79•possibly in Korea, or for achievement of our best interests, as in disarmament,e must be prepared to do so, regardless of extraneous ideological overtones. Wemust remember when and if the time for hard bargaining comes, particularly inKorea--and the writer is not predicting that it necessarily willcome- -that wordsare not meanings and symbols are not realities.United States non-recognition of the Peoples' Republic of China has beenimposed since 1949, and thus far ineffectually, as a sanction. The sanction hasbeen employed legitimately only against misbehavior. If it works at all, whichit may not, the United States must be willing to abandon it in return for theresults it was designed to achieve.79Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 7 [1955], Art. 21Published by Arkansas Academy of Science, 1955

Non Recognition of Red China: Reasons and Realizations

UARK (University of Arkansas )

Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science Volume 7 Article 21 1955 Non Recognition of Red China: Reasons and Realizations Keith S. Petersen University of Central Arkansas Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaas  Part of the Asian History Commons, and the Chinese Studies Commons Recommended Citation Petersen, Keith S. (1955) "Non Recognition of Red China: Reasons and Realizations," Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science: Vol. 7 , Article 21. Available at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaas/vol7/iss1/21 This article is available for use under the Creative Commons license: Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-ND 4.0). Users are able to read, download, copy, print, distribute, search, link to the full texts of these articles, or use them for any other lawful purpose, without asking prior permission from the publisher or the author. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact scholar@uark.edu. Ii75NON-RECOGNITION OF RED CHINA: REASONS AND RATIONALIZATIONSKEITH S. PETERSEHArkansas State Teachers CollegeIn 1949 the Nationalist government of China, under the leadership of ChiangK i-shek, was driven off the China mainland to an uncertain island refuge on For--a by its long-time civil war enemy, the Chinese Communists. These Chinese Redssubsequently proclaimed at Peiping September 29, 1949 that they were the new Com-munist government ofChina, the so-called Peoples' Republic. Party Chairman MaoTse-tung became Chairman of the Central Peoples' Government. His regime, threedays later, made a formal request for recognition by the foreign governments thathad consulates at Peiping--including the United States.Some nations extended recognition immediately. The United States, amongothers, did not. There were no reasons, in particular, for the refusal to act atthis early date--except time, to wait to see what would happen.But what sort of thing was to be looked for in that waiting period? Thebasis of the impending recognition decision apparently was a matter of some dif-ference of opinion. Twenty-five consultants, including scholars, businessmen, andpoliticians, met October 6-8, 1949, at Washington to advise the State Departmenton its Red China recognition problem. Thirteen of these consultants favoredrecognition in time, three were opposed to recognition, and nine were noncommital.A clear ma jority thus recommended that the United States recognize Red China, butonly at a later and more appropriate time.The representatives of the State Department agreed that recognition of RedChina by the United States would have to wait. But there was less agreement onwhat the United States was waiting for. The advisors were waiting to see if theMao Tse-tung regime was actually in control of China; the Department was waitingto see how the Mao Tse-tung regime behaved.Itbehaved badly. It repudiated the Nationalist United Nations delegationand announced that it would re-examine all Nationalist treaties, deciding in duecourse which it would keep and which it would scrap. A new revolutionary govern-ment might be expected to do this to its predecessor, but the predecessor in thisinstance was still recognized by the United States. Consequently, such precipi-tous action was not calculated to win American favor.More directly and dramatically, the Peiping regime brought pressure to bearon individual American officials and citizens in China. Itcaused the arrest ofUnited States Consul-General Angus Ward at Mukden October 24. Ward and others onhis staff were arrested for alleged assault on a Chinese employee. A month laterMukden Vice Consul William Stokes was taken into court and questioned about hisalleged espionage activity.Red China was trying to force the American hand. It would not be forced.When Peiping finally repudiated the Nationalist delegation in the United Nations,as itdid November 16, the United States immediately announced its support ofthe Nationalist delegation. That same day, in a press conference, Secretary ofState Dean Acheson gave his reasons. The arrest of Angus Ward, Acheson said, hadkilled any chance of early recognition of Red China. In short, bad behavior wasthe reason.Then for a while, tensions seemed to relax. Angus Ward and the others, sen-tenced to various terms, were released and deported November 24. India becamethe first non-Communist country to recognize the Peiping government December 30,1949. Britain followed suit seven days later. The West seemed to be moving towardrecognition. The following week, on January 12,Secretary Acheson spoke on AsiaticPolicy to the National Press Club in Washington. He complained bitterly againstthe Soviet Union, to be sure, for "detaching" Manchuria and other areas fromPull text of these conversations in U. S. Department of State, Transcript of Round TableDiscussion on American Policy Toward China Held in the Department of State, October 6, 7,a"d 8, 1949. (Confidential classification cancelled).2•St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 17 November, 1949.75Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 7 [1955], Art. 21Published by Arkansas Academy of Science, 1955"76 ARKANSAS ACADEMY OF SCIENCEIactual Chinese control, but his speech was in general conciliatory of the Peipingregime. 3 The State Department still was waiting and watching.Itdid not have to wait long. Two days later, January 14, the Chinese Commu-nists forcibly took over the consulates of the United States, France, and TheNetherlands, in Peiping. IfRed China seriously were seeking American recogni-tion--this is open to possible doubt--this was not the way to do it. The UnitedStates reacted quickly and angrily. It closed all its China consulates and or-dered all American officials out. Administration Spokesman Senator Tom Connallyof Texas endorsed this action. "The Chinese Communist government," he explainedin a statement released to the press that night, "is seeking recognition. But nonation is entitled to recognition when it does not respect international law anddoes not respect the representatives of other governments and the rights of theircitizens."* Itwas less a lawyer's theoretical complaint than a demand for a mini-mum of common decency and the ordinary mutual conveniences of diplomacy.The Netherlands, apparently pressured in part by this consulate seizure,extended recognition to the offending Peoples' Republic March 27, 1950. The Unit-ed States did not, and Red China's early opportunity for recognition was lost.The basic standard for continuing non-recognition was still, in the main, badbehavior.It was in this atmosphere of angry suspension, on June 25, 1950, that Com-munism launched its lightning invasion of South Korea. For the moment, all otherproblems were pushed aside. Through the summer of 1950 hard-pressed and under-manned South Korean, American, and other United Nations forces were pushed backto the"Pus an perimeter." The tide turned with the Inchon landings of mid-Septem-ber and by early October the 38th parallel had been recrossed. The general feel-ing in the West was that the war was over. In General Douglas MacArthur's phrase,the boys would be"home for Christmas."^Chinese Communists ,however , had other ideas. Peiping' s premier, Chou En-lai,had warned October 1 that Red China would"not supinely tolerate seeing theirneighbors being savagely invaded by imperialists." In late October, Chinese"volunteers" began to take the field. On November 26, in overwhelming numbers,the Chinese"volunteers" launched a crushing counterof fensive. Two days laterMacArthur was forced to report to the United Nations: "We face an entirely newwar." 7 And the United Nations lost it. Or at least, it did not win it. The ex-planation and the symbol of this frustration was Communist China. This was notmere misbehavior. This was war. And in war, one must hate the enemy. Consequent-ly, the recognition issue became clouded with ideology.Assistant Undersecretary of State Dean Rusk addressed the 25th anniversarydinner meeting of the China Institute of America May 18, 1951. It was both atirade and a turning point. Said Rusk:We do not recognize the authorities in Peiping for what they pre-tend to be. The Peiping regime may be a colonial Russian government--a Slavic Manchukuo on a larger scale. Itis not the government of China.Itdoes not pass the first test. It is not Chinese.Itis not entitled to speak for China in the community of nations.It is entitled only to the fruits of aggression upon which itis nowwillfully,openly and senselessly embarked.3 Full text in U. S. Department of State, Bulletin xxii:551 (23 January, 1950), 111-118.4 New York Times, 15 January, 1950.5 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 26 November, 1950.6 Arkansas Gazette, 2 October, 1950.7 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 29 November, 1950.See, for example, the melancholy prophecy of the idealist, Woodrow Wilson, immediately priorto America's entrance into World War I:"Anation couldn't put its strength into a war andkeep its head level; it had never been done." Quoted in Morison and Commager, The Growth ofthe American Republic (3rd edition, New York, 1942) II,468-9.76Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 7 [1955], Art. 21https://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaas/vol7/iss1/21NON-RECOGNITION OF RED CHINA 77IWe recognize the National Government of the Republic of China,even though the territory under its control is severely restricted. Webelieve it more authentically represents the views of the great bodyof the people of China, particularly their historic demand for inde-pendence from foreign control. 9It was the difference between the free and the un-free. Furthermore, Ruskadded, ifin spite of their Russian Communist masters"the Chinese people decidefor freedom, they shall find friends among all the peoples of the earth who haveknown and love freedom." This was a thinly veiled threat to wage eternal waragainst the Communist government of China until it was overthrown.Future Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, from the same platform, wasless subtle. The Mao Tse-tung regime was withoutdoubt, in his estimation, a"puppet regime" and any opposition to it should receive encouragement and, byinference, assistance from the United States. 10 This would appear to be the ker-nel of the famous"liberation" idea that Dulles expounded so actively during the1952 presidential campaign and since.The thinking expressed here by Rusk and Dulles continues in United Statespolicy. Satelliteism, or subservience to Moscow in particular, was united withbad behavior in a new double standard of non-recognition. These were the mainthemes. But other propositions, sometimes incidentally revealed, are also worthyof attention. For example, November 25, 1949, nearly two months after the proc-lamation of the Peoples' Republic of China, a new government was installed bycoup d'etat in Panama--a bloodless revolution engineered by the national chiefof police, his third such action in six days. Three weeks later the United Statesrecognized this government. Why? Because the transition had been realized withoutany"foreign intervention." 1J Thus the means were apparently less important thanthe pedigree. By extension, this standard also applied to Red China, which was,of course, not recognized.Also, in October 1951, when his qualifications as United States delegate tothe United Nations were being investigated by a subcommittee of the Senate For-eign Relations Committee, Ambassador-at-large Phillip Jessup was asked his opin-ion on the question of recognizing the Mao Tse-tung regime. He recalled an Ache-son Formula of recognition "more than two years ago": That a government controlthe country it claims to control, that it recognize its international obliga-tions, and that it rule with the acquiescence of the people who are ruled. 12"Under the present circumstances," Jessup concluded without further elaboration,"we cannot recognize Communist China." It was not clear here which counts werebeing held against Peiping. Certainly there was little doubt about its controlof China; if anything, this test should have worked hardship only on the Nation-alists who were in effective control of approximately one- third of one per centof the territory usually included in the Chinese political unit. The fact thatthe Communists did not' recognize their international obligations was mostly arepetition—none the less valid--of the bad behavior charge. The prerequisite ofruling with the acquiescence of the people was an added item in the general ide-ological complaint which has received new emphasis since 1950.Altogether, then, the continuing indictment which is the basis for non-rec-ognition of the Peoples' Republic of China seems to include: That ithas misbe-haved, that it was established through"foreign intervention," that it is notentitled" to speak for China (because of its apparent status as a "colonialRussian government"), and that it does not rule "with the acquiescence of thepeople who are ruled."An argument that the final standard—acquiescence-- is entirely unreal can"e demonstrated easily by reference to the American policy toward other new andquestionably democratic regimes during the period covered by these events. FromComplete text in State Department Bulletin xxivW Ibld.621 (28 May, 1951), 843 ff.St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 15 December, 194912 New York Times, 13 October, 1949.St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 6 October, 1951.77Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 7 [1955], Art. 21Published by Arkansas Academy of Science, 1955•=78 ARKANSAS ACADEMY OF SCIENCEISeptember 1949 to the present, the United States has extended recognition, almostimmediately, to governments by coup d'etat in Panama, as already noted, in SyriaDecember 17, 1951, in Cuba March 27, 1952, and in Bolivia June 2, 1952.This contrary practice seems to cast additional doubt on the validity ofthe"colonial Russian government," or satellite charge--if what is meant here isthat this further proves that the government in question is without popular sup.port. The same might be said concerning"foreign intervention" in the initiativestages of any regime. If the complaint is, however, against Russian dominationand Russian intervention in particular, then there is also obvious conflict withthe original and continued recognition of all firmly established Russian satel-lite states and, indeed, of Russia herself. And yet, in October 1952, when Re-publican Senator William Knowland of California called, logically, for the break-ing of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in retaliation for their havingdemanded the recall of United States Ambassador to Moscow George F. Kennan, Sec-retary Acheson refused to undertake such action. Acheson based his decision onthe grounds that it"would be a step of the utmost seriousness with worldwideconsequences.*If there is any point innot recognizing the existence of thingsRussian, then there is much un-recognizing to be done.Misbehavior, and American displeasure with it,seems to be the one sincerelyvalid count against Communist China. But it is important to realize that non-recognition based on this reasoning, places the United States in a serious di-lemma. It cannot easily trade recognition for China's good behavior if goodbehavior is the precondition of the United States and recognition is the pre-condition for the Chinese Reds. As Correspondent Thomas J. Hamilton points outin a recent newspaper dispatch from United Nations, New York, the United Nationsprobably cannot get a general truce in Korea without recognizing Communist China,nor can the United Nations readily extend that recognition without first gettinga general truce. 5The additional problem of dealing with realities, regardless of preference,was revealed strikingly last spring by a diplomatic dilemma of a different sort.The United States, Great Britain, and France submitted to the United Nations Dis-armament Commission May 28, 1952, a proposal for limiting the size of armiesamong the great powers. A ceiling of 700,000 or 800,000 men was to be fixed forBritain and France and of 1,500,000 for the United States, the Soviet Union,and--" China."The last designated party was nowhere otherwise defined in theplan. Since the Nationalist government on Formosa has, by the most optimisticestimates, no more than 500,000 men under arms, its adherence to such agreementwould have been meaningless. When questioned later about which one of the twoChinas was meant, Western representatives differed in opinion somewhat, at leastin degree. French Delegate Jules Moch was quoted as saying that "nobody hadthought of Formosa" in this connection. 16 Great Britain's Sir Gladwyn Jebb"madeit obvious that he had Communist China in mind."^American delegates, however,according to reputable report, "displayed a great reluctance to state flatlythat 'China' was Communist China. They were afraid that direct mention of Commu-nist China might involve them in the problem of recognition. In their corridorexplanations they preferred to say that they were talking about whatever Chinawas in command of the troops on the Chinese mainland." 18This was sheer fantasy. Ifthe United States is currently unwilling or un-able to call a fact a fact, even when, as in this instance, it was in its ownobvious best interests to do so, it will find the real world, at least in Asia,increasingly difficult to deal with. We must keep in mind that misbehavior isthe only defensible standard on which our non- recognition of the Peoples' Repub-lic of China is based. Ifwe can bargain it away, which apparently was our in-tention in withholding recognition in the first place, for better behavior, as14 New York Times, 8 October, 195215 Ibid., 13 January, 1953.16 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 31 May, 1952.17 A. M. Rosenthal dispatch to the New York Times, 29 May, 1952.18 Ibid.78Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 7 [1955], Art. 21https://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaas/vol7/iss1/211NON-RECOGNITION OF RED CHINA79•possibly in Korea, or for achievement of our best interests, as in disarmament,e must be prepared to do so, regardless of extraneous ideological overtones. Wemust remember whenand if the time for hard bargaining comes, particularly inKorea--and the writer is not predicting that it necessarily willcome- -that wordsare not meanings and symbols are not realities.United States non-recognition of the Peoples' Republic of China has beenimposed since 1949, and thus far ineffectually, as a sanction. The sanction hasbeen employed legitimately only against misbehavior. If it works at all, whichit may not, the United States must be willing to abandon it in return for theresults it was designed to achieve.79Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 7 [1955], Art. 21Published by Arkansas Academy of Science, 1955

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Non Recognition of Red China: Reasons and Realizations

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