We study the distribution of strategies in a large game that models how
agents choose among different double auction markets. We classify the possible
mean field Nash equilibria, which include potentially segregated states where
an agent population can split into subpopulations adopting different
strategies. As the game is aggregative, the actual equilibrium strategy
distributions remain undetermined, however. We therefore compare with the
results of Experience-Weighted Attraction (EWA) learning, which at long times
leads to Nash equilibria in the appropriate limits of large intensity of
choice, low noise (long agent memory) and perfect imputation of missing scores
(fictitious play). The learning dynamics breaks the indeterminacy of the Nash
equilibria. Non-trivially, depending on how the relevant limits are taken, more
than one type of equilibrium can be selected. These include the standard
homogeneous mixed and heterogeneous pure states, but also \emph{heterogeneous
mixed} states where different agents play different strategies that are not all
pure. The analysis of the EWA learning involves Fokker-Planck modeling combined
with large deviation methods. The theoretical results are confirmed by
multi-agent simulations.Comment: 35 pages, 16 figure