Kelp, Christoph

International Journal of Philosophical Studies

English

Duncan Pritchard has recently argued against robust virtue epistemology on the grounds that it gets caught up in a fatal double bind: There is a type of case suggesting that the central robust virtue theoretic condition on knowledge is too strong to be necessary for knowledge as well as a type of case suggesting that it is too weak to be sufficient for knowledge. He does concede to the robust virtue epistemologist that his argument will be fully convincing only if it really is a double bind the view gets caught up in, i.e. if robust virtue epistemology faces both types of case. This paper shows that Pritchard’s argument fails to fulfil its promise. I consider the two major ways of interpreting the virtue theoretic condition and argue that while it is plausible that for each interpretation of this condition one problematic type of case arises, for neither interpretation both problematic types of case arise. In consequence, by his own lights, Pritchard’s argument turns out unconvincing.status: publishe

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Pritchard on Virtue Epistemology

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Pritchard on virtue epistemology

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      Kelp, C. (2009) Pritchard on virtue epistemology. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 17(4), pp. 583-587.     There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it.    http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/140929/            Deposited on: 15 May 2017                       Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow http://eprints.gla.ac.uk Pritchard on Virtue EpistemologyChristoph Kelp∗AbstractDuncan Pritchard has recently argued against robust virtue epistemol-ogy on the grounds that it gets caught up in a fatal double bind: There isa type of case suggesting that the central robust virtue theoretic conditionon knowledge is too strong to be necessary for knowledge as well as a typeof case suggesting that it is too weak to be sufficient for knowledge. Hedoes concede to the robust virtue epistemologist that his argument will befully convincing only if it really is a double bind the view gets caught upin, i.e. if robust virtue epistemology faces both types of case. This papershows that Pritchard’s argument fails to fulfil its promise. I consider thetwo major ways of interpreting the virtue theoretic condition and arguethat while it is plausible that for each interpretation of this condition oneproblematic type of case arises, for neither interpretation both problem-atic types of case arise. In consequence, by his own lights, Pritchard’sargument turns out unconvincing.1 Pritchard’s ArgumentIn a number of recent papers Duncan Pritchard has launched a highly infuentialattack on a view that he calls robust virtue epistemology (RVE).1 The centralthesis of RVE is the following:∗Centre for Logic and Analytic Philosophy, University of Leuven, Kardinaal Mercierplein2, 3000 Leuven, Belgium1Christoph Kelp Pritchard on Virtue Epistemology(RVECT) One knows that p iff the truth of one’s belief that p–alternatively,one’s cognitive success–is because of the exercise of cognitive ability.If it can be made to work, RVE will be a very powerful theory of knowledge. Itpromises to provide the key to the solution of a number of pressing problemsin epistemology such as the Gettier problem and the problem of the value ofknowledge.2However, Pritchard argues that RVE is not viable. More specifically, Prit-chard adduces two types of case in the first one of which, intuitively, the subjecthas knowledge but does not attain cognitive success because of the exercise ofcognitive ability, whilst in the second one the subject attains success becauseof ability but, intuitively, does not know. Notice that Pritchard admits that onits own each type of case would not be enough to make a fully convincing caseagainst RVE. After all, if the only problem RVE faces were that there is a typeof case in which the subject attains success because of ability but intuitivelydoesn’t know (doesn’t attain success because of ability but intuitively knows),the defender of RVE "might reasonably take the heroic route of denying theintuition in this [type of] case" [Pritchard Forthcomingb, 10].3 However, ifRVECT fails to predict in accordance with intuition in both types of case thereis strong reason to believe that something is fundamentally wrong with RVE.After all, combined the two types of case would pull the defender of RVE inopposite directions–one type of case suggesting that RVECT is too strong to benecessary, the other that it is too weak to be sufficient for knowledge.2 ... Fails to ConvinceIn what follows, I will provide reason to believe that Pritchard’s argument failsto show that RVE is caught up in the double bind that would seal the caseagainst the view. If so, then, by his own lights, Pritchard’s argument against2Christoph Kelp Pritchard on Virtue EpistemologyRVE fails to be fully convincing.Let’s start by looking at Pritchard’s central cases. The first case is theinfamous case of Henry in Fake Barn County. Looking out of the window whilstdriving along the road, Henry sees what happens to be the only real barn in afield otherwise full of fake barns and forms a belief that he is looking at a barn.Plausibly, Henry’s cognitive success is because of the exercise of his ability tospot barns. This point can be further reinforced by considering the followingcase: Archie is shooting at the only normal target at a range otherwise full oftargets fitted with forcefields that would repel any shot fired at them. WhenArchie, who is a skilled archer, exercises his arching ability and hits the targetright in the centre, certainly his athletic success is due to his arching ability. Butnow notice that the case of Archie is formally analogous to the case of Henrywith the only normal target at the range taking the place of the only real barn inthe field and the forcefield targets taking the place of the fake barns. Given thatthe two cases are analogous, if Archie attains (athletic) success because of hisarching skill, it is plausible that Henry also attains (cognitive) success becauseof his barn-spotting ability. At the same time, intuitively, Henry’s belief thathe is looking at a barn does not qualify as knowledge. So we now have a case inwhich the subject attains cognitive success because of the exercise of cognitiveability but intuitively does not know.In Pritchard’s second case the protagonist, Jenny, arrives in an unknown cityand asks the first passerby she encounters for directions to a famous landmark.Her informant is a knowledgeable resident of the city who provides her withimpeccable directions. Intuitively, the beliefs about how to get to the landmarkJenny forms on the basis of her informant’s testimony qualify as knowledge.However, it would seem that in this case Jenny does not attain cognitive successbecause of the exercise of cognitive ability. If anything, her success is due to3Christoph Kelp Pritchard on Virtue Epistemologyher informant’s ability. So, we also have a case in which the subject intuitivelyhas knowledge but does not attain cognitive success because of the exercise ofcognitive ability.In order to see why Pritchard’s argument fails to show that RVE gets caughtup in the fatal double bind I would like to take a closer look at the term ’becauseof’ that RVECT features. There are two major proposals as to how this term isto be interpreted. The first one is due to John Greco [Greco 2003]. He claimsthat success is because of the exercise of ability if the exercise of ability bestexplains the success. As opposed to that, the second proposal, due to ErnestSosa [Sosa 2007], has it that success is because of the exercise of ability if thesuccess manifests ability. As I am about to show, on each of these interpretationsof ’because of’, RVECT will be unable to analyse one of Pritchard’s types ofcase in accordance with intuition but on neither of them RVECT will be unableto do so for both. Thus, we will see not only that there are some interpretationsof RVECT that will avoid the double bind that, according to Pritchard, is fatalfor RVE but also that on none of the major interpretations of RVECT, RVEactually is caught up in it.Let’s first consider Greco’s interpretation of ’because of’. Is it plausiblethat in Jenny’s case, her cognitive success is best explained by the exercise ofcognitive ability? It seems that the answer to this question is ’no’. After all, itis plausible that what best explains Jenny’s cognitive success is the fact that herinformant is as knowledgeable about the city as he is. So, on this interpretationof ’because of’, RVECT will be unable to analyse cases of this type in accordancewith intuition. But what about the case of Henry: Is it plausible that hiscognitive success is best explained by the exercise of his barn-spotting ability?Certainly not: In Fake Barn County what best explains his cognitive successis the fact that he happens to look at the only real barn in a field otherwise4Christoph Kelp Pritchard on Virtue Epistemologyfull of fakes.4 So, RVECT will predict in accordance with intuition in this case.Pritchard’s argument fails to show that, on Greco’s interpretation of ’becauseof’, RVE is caught up in the fatal double bind.As regards Sosa’s interpretation of ’because of’ things are exactly the otherway around. It is plausible that Henry’s cognitive success is because of theexercise of his barn-spotting ability if ’because of’ is interpreted in Sosa’s way.After all, Henry is brought into cognitive contact with the fact that he is lookingat a barn through the exercise of his barn-spotting ability. In this way, hisbarn-spotting ability seems to be manifest in his cognitive success. So, RVECT,interpreted in Sosa’s way, fails to predict in accordance with intuition in thistype of case. However, it is far from clear that in the case of Jenny, her cognitivesuccess does not manifest cognitive ability. As Pritchard himself notices, Jennyexhibits "quite a lot of cognitive ability if one examines the case a little moreclosely." [Pritchard Forthcomingb, 9] For instance, Pritchard points out thatJenny would not just have asked anyone–she wouldn’t have asked a dog, a lamppost, a child etc.–and she would not have believed just anything–she wouldhave spotted obviously false directions as such etc. Moreover, it is plausiblethat Jenny also exercises cognitive abilities requisite to interpret her informant’sspeech act with respect to propositional content–that she has to walk down FleetStreet, not Elm Street, for instance–as well as force–that it was a speech actof informing her that she has to walk down Fleet Street rather than advisingher to go there to get further information, say. Once one spells out Jenny’scognitive involvement in more detail, however, even if it remains true that hercognitive success is not best explained by the exercise of these cognitive abilities,it becomes more and more plausible that her cognitive success does manifestcognitive ability in the sense required by Sosa’s interpretation of ’because of’.If this is correct, RVECT, interpreted in Sosa’s way, will predict in accordance5Christoph Kelp Pritchard on Virtue Epistemologywith intuition in this type of case.We thus see that on neither of the two major interpretations of the term’because of’ at issue in RVECT that can be found in the literature, RVE getscaught up in the double bind that Pritchard regards as fatal for the view. Inconsequence, by his own lights, Pritchard has failed to make a convincing caseagainst RVE. Of course, it remains to be shown which interpretation of RVECTthe defender of RVE should go for. But whether it be Greco’s or Sosa’s orperhaps yet a different one, what is of importance is that RVE does remain alive option in the theory of knowledge.References[Greco 2003] Greco, J. 2003. ’Knowledge as Credit for True Belief’ in De-Paul, M. and Zagzebski, L. (eds.) Intellectual Virtue: Perspec-tives from Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford: OUP.[Greco Forthcoming] Greco, J. Forthcoming. ’The Value Problem’ in Haddock,A., Millar, A. and Pritchard D. (eds.) The Value of Knowledge,Oxford: OUP.[Pritchard 2007a] Pritchard, D. 2007a. ’The Value of Knowledge’ in Zalta, E.(ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.[Pritchard 2007b] Pritchard, D. 2007b. ’Recent Work on Epistemic Value’ inAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 44: 85-110.[Pritchard 2008a] Pritchard, D. 2008a. ’Greco on Knowledge: Virtues, Con-texts, Achievements’ in The Philosophical Quarterly 58: 437-47.6Christoph Kelp Pritchard on Virtue Epistemology[Pritchard 2008b] Pritchard, D. 2008b. ’Radical Scepticism, Epistemic Luckand Epistemic Value’ in Proceedings and Addresses of the Aris-totelian Society (suppl. vol.) 82: 19-41.[Pritchard 2008c] Pritchard, D. 2008c. ’Knowledge and Final Value’ in Had-dock, A., Millar, A. and Pritchard, D., The Value of Knowl-edge, manuscript.[Pritchard Forthcominga] Pritchard, D. Forthcominga. ’Apt Performance andEpistemic Value’ in Philosophical Studies.[Pritchard Forthcomingb] Pritchard, D. Forthcomingb. ’Knowledge, Under-standing and Epistemic Value’ in Think.[Pritchard Forthcomingc] Pritchard, D. Forthcomingc. Knowledge. New York:Palgrave Macmillan.[Sosa 1991] Sosa, E. 1991. Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays inEpistemology. Cambridge: CUP.[Sosa 2007] Sosa, E. 2007. A Virtue Epistemology. Apt Belief and Reflec-tive Knowledge, Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.[Zagzebski 1996] Zagzebski, L. 1996. Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into theNature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge.Cambridge: CUP.Notes1See for instance [Pritchard 2007a], [Pritchard 2007b], [Pritchard 2008a], [Pritchard 2008b],[Pritchard 2008c], [Pritchard Forthcominga], [Pritchard Forthcomingb], [Pritchard Forthcomingc].2For RVE and the Gettier problem see e.g. [Sosa 1991], [Greco 2003] and [Zagzebski 1996].For RVE and the value of knowledge see e.g. [Greco Forthcoming] and [Pritchard 2008a].7Christoph Kelp Pritchard on Virtue Epistemology3It is worth noting that this point can be reinforced by Pritchard’s own argument that ifRVE turns out to not to be viable, we will have to make provision for some radical revisionsin the theory of knowledge (most notably with respect to the putative value of knowledge-seee.g. [Pritchard 2007a, §4] and [Pritchard 2008c]). Unless we have strong reason to believe thatRVE is fundamentally flawed, we might well opt for holding on to RVE even at the expenseof some pre-theoretical intuitions.4Notice that Pritchard sometimes claims that Henry’s cognitive success is best explainedby the exercise of his barn-spotting ability (e.g. in [Pritchard Forthcomingc, 47]). That,however, just doesn’t seem right. Perhaps Pritchard is driven to this claim by an intuitionthat in Archie’s case, the corresponding athletic success is best explained by Archie’s archingability. Even so, it seems that intuition speaks strongly against the idea that Henry’s cognitivesuccess is best explained by his barn-spotting ability. If intuition gives a different verdict inthe case of Archie, a defender of RVE could exploit this fact to his advantage to argue that,contrary to first appearances, perhaps the two cases aren’t analogous after all.8

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