From Financial Liberalization to Banking Failure: Starting on the Wrong Foot?

Abstract

In this paper we attempt to identify the characteristics of banks that are most likely to be at the origin of a banking crisis following a financial liberalization (FL) process. We do this analysis in response to the observed fact that FL processes arse often followed by banking crisis that cost taxpayers large amounts of resources in rescue operations. To accomplish this objective we identify a sample of ''failed'' and ''healthy'' banks following a FL and then compare their financial data at the onset of FL. We also attempt to identify to what extent the quality of the loan portfolio and the management and risk- taking practices of banks affect the outcome. The results are surprisingly robust and they mean that it may be possible to identify with an anticipation of at least 4 years the banks that could be responsible for an eventual banking crisis! Further, both quality of loans and management and risk-taking practices play a role. The results suggest that banks that are more conservative and thus those that are less likely to incur in moral hazard, or are more capable of absorbing important macro shocks given their capitalization, are the ones that are more likely to remain solvent. The study is based on a sample of 82 banks from Greece, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand and Taiwan.Financial liberalization, Deregulation, Commercial banking, Systemic risk, Banking crises, Bank failure