Zero Determinant (ZD) strategies are a new class of probabilistic and
conditional strategies that are able to unilaterally set the expected payoff of
an opponent in iterated plays of the Prisoner's Dilemma irrespective of the
opponent's strategy, or else to set the ratio between a ZD player's and their
opponent's expected payoff. Here we show that while ZD strategies are weakly
dominant, they are not evolutionarily stable and will instead evolve into less
coercive strategies. We show that ZD strategies with an informational advantage
over other players that allows them to recognize other ZD strategies can be
evolutionarily stable (and able to exploit other players). However, such an
advantage is bound to be short-lived as opposing strategies evolve to
counteract the recognition.Comment: 14 pages, 4 figures. Change in title (again!) to comply with Nature
Communications requirements. To appear in Nature Communication
