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Marquette Universitye-Publications@MarquettePhilosophy Faculty Research and Publications Philosophy, Department of1-1-1998Review of Essays on Plato and Aristotle by J. L. AckrillOwen GoldinMarquette University, owen.goldin@marquette.eduPublished version. Bryn Mawr Classical Review, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1998). Permalink. © 1998 Bryn MawrCommentaries. Used with permission.Bryn Mawr Classical Review 98.4.01J. L. Ackrill, Essays on Plato and Aristotle. Oxford: Clarendon Press,1997. Pp. viii + 229. $60.00. ISBN 0-19-823641-7.Reviewed by Owen Goldin, Marquette University.J. L. Ackrill ranks with Gregory Vlastos and G. E. L. Owen as one of the mostimportant figures responsible for the upsurge of interest in ancient Greek philosophyamong Anglo-American philosophers of the second half of this century. At its best,this tradition of the study of ancient philosophy has marked by attention to thearguments actually employed by ancient philosophers, a concern for clarity andprecision, and a respectful stance towards the ancients as serious fellowphilosophers, studied neither as historical curiosities nor authoritative sages. It hassometimes been criticized for what have been perceived as inherent limitations:inattention to the philosophical literary features of the texts, and a presupposition thatthe ancient philosophers were primarily preoccupied with only those questions on thecurrent Anglo-American philosophical agenda.1 But recent decades have shown thatthe Anglo-American approach has the resources by which it can move beyond anysuch limitations, and have confirmed the richness and depth of the tradition in thestudy of ancient philosophy in which Ackrill, Vlastos, and Owen have played suchan important role.Ackrill is the sole surviving member of this triumvirate. He has influencedgenerations of scholars in ancient philosophy in his teaching at Oxford and in hisserving as editor of the Clarendon translations and commentaries of Aristotle (ofwhich his translation, with notes, of the Categories and On Interpretation is anoutstanding representative), as well as through the introductory Aristotle thePhilosopher and a handful of highly influential papers, most of which date from1955-1975. Aristotle the Philosopher is primarily a collection of short discussions ofselected passages and themes which serve as intriguing invitations to closer study. Itis mostly in Ackrill's papers that one sees the close philosophical analysis and carefulexegesis that has become the model for so many working in ancient philosophy. Thepresent volume collects fourteen of these papers. They are united not be theme butthrough having either Plato or Aristotle as their focus. More often than not Ackrill isnot attempting to convince the reader of a particular interpretation or philosophicalpoint, but is raising questions and indicating problems that had been hithertoneglected. He has been enormously successful in this regard. These seminal papersremain required reading for those working in the field and are almost invariably citedin contemporary discussions of the themes that they discuss.The only new paper is a short preface in which Ackrill reflects on the half centuryduring which the study of ancient philosophy has flourished in the English speakingworld. He notes that the field has undergone a healthy broadening of areas of interestand an increase in the philosophical sophistication. Less welcome have been theBryn Mawr Classical Review 98.4.01 http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/1998/98.4.01.html1 of 4 5/10/2018, 1:05 PMpressures leading to too many quickly produced papers, and a general weakening ofbasic philological skills among many of those studying ancient philosophical texts.There are six essays on Plato. "Anamnesis in the Phaedo: Remarks on 73c-75c"discusses Plato's argument that concept acquisition is possible only because theimperfect particulars remind the one who perceives them of the Forms of which theyare images. Plato assumes that if the perception of A leads to thinking of B, Areminds the percipient of B. Ackrill calls this into question, for while one can bereminded only of what one knows, the perception of A can call to mind the thoughtof something not previously known. Hence one cannot appeal to concept acquisitionto show that the soul existed prior to the body. Here, and elsewhere in the argument,Plato implicitly imports the assumption of some of the very teachings at issue."Language and Reality in Plato's Cratylus" presents a paraphrase and analysis of adialogue whose focus is the relations holding among mind, language, and reality.Ackrill wisely holds back from the temptation to immediately subject the dialogue tothe battery of conceptual distinctions familiar from twentieth century philosophy oflanguage. Instead, Ackrill works through the issues in the dialogue's own terms. Onlywhen puzzles arise within the context of the argument as developed by Plato himself,does Ackrill show where and how the contemporary distinctions come to play.Ackrill's strategy gives intrinsic philosophical value to the study of Plato, insofar asit allows us to see the value of contemporary innovations that might otherwise betaken for granted. The same general strategy is followed in "Plato on False Belief:Theaetetus 187-200." This paper carefully analyzes Plato's discussion of howcognitive error is possible. In his tracing of the arguments, Ackrill shows thatunresolved puzzles could be solved by less reliance on overly simple models ofknowledge, and by employing Frege's distinction between sense and reference."SUMPLOKE EIDON" remains a definitive rebuttal of Ross's and Cornford's viewthat at Sophist 259e4-6 Plato says that every logos involves a kind of mixing ofForms. Ackrill shows that Plato is rather saying that logos is made possible bycertain relations of incompatibility and entailment, relations which are the subject ofphilosophical study. Whether Ackrill is wrong to de-emphasize the ontologicalimplications of the passage remains a matter of dispute. "Plato and the Copula:Sophist 251-259" offers a definitive argument against Cornford's view that blendingis a symmetrical relation that holds among pairs of Forms that enter intocombination. Ackrill argues that within the Sophist, Plato brings out the distinctionbetween various uses of the verb to be: the copula, identity, and existence. Theresearch of Kahn and Owen2 on the semantics of EI)=NAI in philosophical Greek isgenerally acknowledged as having refuted the view that Plato recognizes (or evenemploys) the "is" of existence. Here, as elsewhere, I would have welcomed a notefrom Ackrill indicating whether he still maintains the views held in his earlier papers,and, if so, how he thinks the prominent challenges to these view are to be addressed."In Defence of Platonic Division" counters Ryle's dismissal of the method of divisionas a serious philosophical strategy. Ackrill shows how Plato gives division animportant role, not as a means of generating conclusions, but as a device by whichone can clarify the relations that hold among concepts.There are eight essays concerning Aristotle. "Aristotle's Theory of Definition"Bryn Mawr Classical Review 98.4.01 http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/1998/98.4.01.html2 of 4 5/10/2018, 1:05 PMremains one of the best introductions to Posterior Analytics 2.8-10. Ackrill's carefuland incisive essay goes to the heart of the exegetical and philosophical issues that areat stake in interpreting Aristotle's difficult account of the relations holding betweenthe stages of scientific inquiry into phenomena, the explanations at which onearrives, and the definitions by which these explanations are expressed. "Change andAristotle's Theological Argument" clarifies the structure of Aristotle's argument inPhysics 8 for an unmoved mover. Ackrill explains how Aristotle takes the existenceof a world of change as a given on which any inquiry into physics must rest.Aristotle argues for the existence of a deity as a precondition of such change."Aristotle's Distinction between Energeia and Kinesis" closely examines the relevanttexts in which the two kinds of actuality are distinguished. Ackrill points to what hetakes to be a fundamental confusion. By Aristotle's test (does "x-es" entail "hasx-ed"?) walking is an energeia, but walking to Reading is not. Likewise, by the sametest enjoying is an energeia, but enjoying a symphony is not. But in each case, are wenot talking about the same action, albeit differently described? "Aristotle's Definitionof Psuche" points to a crucial difficulty in Aristotelian hylomorphism. Is the matterof a living thing the organized body, or a mass of undifferentiated stuffs? If it is theformer, then the matter of a living body, which has the potentiality for the inherenceof form, cannot exist prior to the form, and it is not clear how Aristotle can solve theproblem of how the generation of a substance is possible. If it is the latter, then it isnot clear why Aristotle defines soul as the form of a body so organized as to engagein life activities. Ackrill's essay has been an impetus for much recent research inAristotelian metaphysics. Gill and Whiting have persuasively argued that Aristotle isclear on the distinction between two kinds of matter: matter, which exists prior tosubstantial generation, and functional matter, which is the proper substrate for theform of a living body and provides the preconditions for the actualization of the life-faculties.3"Aristotle on Eudaimonia" deals with a central issue in the study of Aristotelianethics: how do we reconcile Aristotle's account of eudaimonia as a life of virtuous,practical activity with Aristotle's account of eudaimonia as primarily found intheoretical thought? Ackrill clearly and persuasively argues for an inclusivist readingof Aristotle's ethical thought. When Aristotle tells us that good actions are for thesake of eudaimonia, he means that they serve as its constituents. Aristotle need notbe read as positing one single activity that is the final end of human life, to which allother ends serve as mere means. In "Aristotle on 'Good' and the Categories" Ackrillargues that in NE 1.6 Aristotle does not account for the equivocity of "good" byappeal to the fact that the predicate "good" can belong to any of the ten categories.He is rather making a more general point: that there are many kinds of features thatone would mention in explaining why "good" is predicated of a thing. Aristotle isindicating that there is a conceptual diversity in goodness. "Aristotle on Action"examines conceptual difficulties involved with the notion of voluntary action. Ackrillshows how Aristotle's account of what makes an action voluntary is in many casesinconclusive. Much seems to depend on how the action is described, and it is notclear which of the possible descriptions is to have priority. Ackrill points to asignificant difficulty, but surely this is an example of the sort of imprecision thatAristotle takes to mark ethics in general (NE 1.3.1094b11-27). Such matters are notultimately to be solved through logical analysis but by virtue of the well-trained eyeBryn Mawr Classical Review 98.4.01 http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/1998/98.4.01.html3 of 4 5/10/2018, 1:05 PMof the phronimos. "An Aristotelian Argument about Virtue" indicates defects in theargument of NE 3.5.1113b3-14, in which Aristotle argues that, because the exercisesof the virtues are up to us, the virtues, too, are up to us. Ackrill notes that Aristotlehas at his disposal better arguments to the effect that it is reasonable to hold peopleaccountable for their character.Although many of these papers are otherwise easily available, their collection in asingle volume is to be welcomed. The book serves as a fitting testimonial to thecareer of one who has had a key role in shaping the study of ancient philosophy as itis pursued today.    NOTES1. Ackrill himself has been criticized on just this point. Thus E. Halper, in "Ackrill,Aristotle, and Analytic Philosophy," Ancient Philosophy Vol. 2 No. 2 (1982), pp.142-151, criticizes Aristotle the Philosopher for Ackrill's assumption that Aristotle isan ordinary language philosopher. "... Aristotle is not self-consciously engaged inlinguistic or conceptual analysis... Rightly or wrongly, he thinks that he is makingclaims about the world" (148). But Ackrill nowhere claims that either he or Aristotleis interested in language for its own sake. Rather, he takes Aristotle to (correctly)believe that an investigation of how we normally talk about reality is a necessaryprerequisite for resolving metaphysical issues which concern the world itself.  2. C. Kahn, "The Greek Verb 'To Be' and the Concept of Being," Foundations ofLanguage 2 (1966), pp. 245-65 and The Verb "Be" in Ancient Greek (Dordrecht,Neth., 1973); G. E. L. Owen, "Plato on Not-Being," in Plato I: Metaphysics andEpistemology, ed. G. Vlastos (Garden City, NY, 1970, repr. South Bend, IN, 1978),pp. 223-67, repr. in G. E. L. Owen, Logic, Science, and Dialectic, ed. M. C.Nussbaum (Ithaca, NY, 1986), pp. 104-37.  3. M. L. Gill, Aristotle on Substance: The Paradox of Unity (Princeton, 1989), pp.126-138; J. Whiting, "Living Bodies," in M. C. Nussbaum and A. O. Rorty, edd.,Essays on Aristotle's De Anima (Oxford, 1992), pp. 75-91.Bryn Mawr Classical Review 98.4.01 http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/1998/98.4.01.html4 of 4 5/10/2018, 1:05 PM

Review of \u3cem\u3eEssays on Plato and Aristotle\u3c/em\u3e by J. L. Ackrill

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Review of \u3cem\u3eEssays on Plato and Aristotle\u3c/em\u3e by J. L. Ackrill

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