Diamond, Sheila M.

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The Linacre QuarterlyVolume 74 | Number 2 Article 8May 2007Response to Todd Bindig's "Confusion aboutSpeciesism And Moral Status"Sheila M. DiamondFollow this and additional works at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnqRecommended CitationDiamond, Sheila M. (2007) "Response to Todd Bindig's "Confusion about Speciesism And Moral Status"," The Linacre Quarterly: Vol.74: No. 2, Article 8.Available at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq/vol74/iss2/8Response to Todd Bindig's "Confusion about Speciesism And Moral Status" by Sheila M. Diamond, MSN, S.T.L. The author is a candidate for the STD. at the John Paul II Institute in Rome. Todd Bindig takes a provocative position in his essay "Confusion about Speciesism and Moral Status". He proposes that we, as Catholic believers, can find some common ground with the position taken by Peter Singer against "speciesism". Bindig offers some tweaking to the meaning of the term "species" to create grounds for agreement. He argues that Singer is correct; species is morally irrelevant if it is founded merely on one's reproductive community and historical origin. Bindig offers some very imaginative scenarios for recategorizing human beings in a plurality of species possibilities, i.e. the existence of another planet where beings exactly like human beings exist, but from diverse origins and within a separate reproductive community. Unfortunately, the supposed confusion over the acceptable definition of the term "species" is irrelevant to Singer's arguments. Singer is not confused about his understanding of speciesism. Speciesism is a "morally indefensible preference for members of our own species" (53), that is, human beings over non-human animals. He proposes that the moral status of "persons" cannot be limited to human beings alone, but must include non-human animals as well, if we are not to be accused of the sin of "speciesism". According to Singer, ethical decision making must be based on equal consideration of interests. These interests cannot be limited to such irrelevant criteria as intelligence or rationality, as these would be "as arbitrary as skin color". He maintains that, instead, we base ethical decisions on sentience, that is, a balance of pain vs. pleasure: classical utilitarianism, he claims. Hence, since pigs, horses, and chickens are as likely to experience pain as adult humans there can be no moral justification for not weighing their interests equally. Personhood achieves meaning based on a being's capacity to feel pain. Hence, according to Singer, most of us are regularly 156 Linacre Quarterly feasting on the flesh of persons! Only a speciesist could justify his own taste for another being's flesh as sufficient reason to slaughter innocent chickens. Singer repeatedly likens this to the southern slave owner of times past who wantonly scourged other beings merely because they bad skin color not like his own. Speciesists are no different than racists. Bindig places himself among strange bedfellows here, since he seems to accept a Singeresque premise, that, while infants and retarded human beings do not actually possess characteristically human traits, apes, dogs and several other animals "seem to have the ability to utilize rational thought and to will." Traditional western philosophy reserves rationality and free will as exclusive to human beings. Singer posits the chance that human beings, since they have mental capacities, can possibly suffer more than animals when they are threatened with anticipated pain or death. Tltis mental suffering must be accounted for when weighing interests. However, it is precisely this possibility of mental suffering which the newborn infant or mentally retarded adult does not experience, which, for Singer, may make them better candidates for experimentation than, say, a dog which may indeed suffer anxiety and terror at being confined in a strange place. "Sometimes animals may suffer more because of their more limited understanding." Even with no intention of harm on the part of its captors, "we cannot explain (to an animal) that we are not threatening its life ... an animal cannot distinguish an attempt to overpower and confine from an attempt to kill: the one causes as much terror as the other." Newborn infants and mentally retarded adults, on the other hand, probably don't recognize differences in their smTmmdings so cannot be said to be suffering any mental anguish. This line of argumentation gives Singer reasons for prefening the use of human infants, "orphans perhaps", or retarded humans for experimentation, to the use of animals "since infants and retarded humans would have no idea of what was going to happen to them." (Practical Ethics, 52-53) Bindig makes the mistake of assuming that by "intuition" most of us are rightly reluctant to call other things, such as higher mammals, "persons". This is precisely the point which Singer exploits: "intuition" has become so obscured in our modem culture that many are not reluctant to call non-human beings "persons". It is not uncommon to find terms such as "vegetable" applied to human life, or "blob of cells", or "potential human", while at the same time "Cats are people too" reads a familiar bumper sticker. Divine design is put forth by Bindig to account for human beings being set apart from everything else in creation. And lightly so, Divine design is the reason. Unfmtunately, Singer rejects the entire Judeo-Cluistian tradition along with any notion of "Divine design". According to Singer, the ethical tradition of the sanctity of human life is a "farce" based on a now outdated religious authority. This tradition appears valid "only while we are intimidated into May, 2007 157 uncriti ally accepting that all human life ha orne pecial dignity or worth. On challenged, the traditional thic crumples (Writ in s, 16 ). Th "ri e of better under tanding' in mod m thought promi e a better ethi , one 'that do · n t need t be propped up by u·ansparent fiction no one can really beli ve· an -thic that is m re com pas ionate and more re p n ive to wbat p oplc decide for thernselve (ibid). Th tenn per on a it i. u ed today ha a di tinctly Chri tian hi. tory. Jn th early Church th Christian understanding of a Triune G d wa chaJleng d by claim · defending monoU1ei m again t multiple (three) god . In order to explain the doctrine of the Trinity Church fathers employed th language f the th at r. ' Prosopon and "per ona' were term · which referred to a ma k worn by an actor in lh theater. The actor' · character was recognized by th mask that he donn d. One actor could play many part · u ing different rna. k. or pro ·opon/per one. One God three Per ons. Th evolution of the m aning of p r on i · unique to we ·tern philo ophy and .. pecifically Chri. lian bi tory. Ev n today United Nations documenter will w icl the u e of the word per on" in favor of ' individual' b caw e Eastern n n-Chri tian culture d not . hare our understanding of the term. It is the Christian tradition alone which has brought the term into useful meaning. Hence, Peter Singer's reinvention of the term is related to his a-histmical viewpoint. Only human beings are pers n ' , that i beiJlg of rational nature with an immortal . pirltual s ul. Only they are creatures capable of eeking and kn wing both U1eir Creator and through Him them elve . Only buman being belong to the pecie · of rati nal ub ranee and therefore the genu of Per on . Their statu. a 1 er on render their live of inftnite value, over that of every oU1er creature. Thi: value is related to tl1eir capacity for rational thought even if by defect, that capacity will never be fully developed or ha cea. ed to be operative. Th p · r on is de tined to live ~ r verbyrea nofthatwhi hi mostpe1fectofhim;hi pirituaJ.oul(of a rational natur ). That which i. piritual cann t be de tr yed. 'The truth of tl1e immortality of the . oul i. . imuJtaneou ly the truth of the inde tructibility of th per ·on. 1 Reference l. Karol Wojtyla, "Catholic Thoughtfi'om Lublin: Person and Community," translated by Theresa Sandok, OSM, (Peter Lang: New York, 1993), p. 175. Bibliography: Singer, Peter "Practical Ethics" Cambridge University Press. Melbourne, 1979. "Writings on an Ethical Life" (HarperCollins: New York, 2000). 158 Linacre Quarterly 

Response to Todd Bindig\u27s  Confusion about Speciesism And Moral Status

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Response to Todd Bindig\u27s Confusion about Speciesism And Moral Status

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