Political life in Argentina is characterized by a particularly active culture of social protest.This is a key element to understanding political dynamics throughout the 21st century.Fil: Rebón, Julián. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. Instituto de Investigaciones "Gino Germani"; Argentin

Rebón, Julián

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The politics of protest in Argentinaopendemocracy.net/democraciaabierta/juli-n-reb-n/politics-of-protest-in-argentinaJulián Rebón 12 December 2018 (2018-12-12T10:51:33+00:00)Political life in Argentina is characterized by a particularly active culture of social protest.This is a key element to understanding political dynamics throughout the 21st century.EspañolStudent protest against Macri's reforms. Argentina 2018. Wikimedia Commons.The openMovements series invites leading social scientists to share their research resultsand perspectives on contemporary social struggles.The evolution of Argentina in the last few years highlights the dispute for territory betweenopposing social forces. There are three stages to this dispute which broadly describe theswings of the country's political pendulum.The first stage corresponds to the period marked by the crisis of 2001: it expresses thecollapse of the neoliberal hegemony of the 1990s. It includes President Fernando De laRúa's (1999-2000, Radical Civic Union-Alliance) resignation in December of that year and itstretches up to 2003, when a new elected government takes charge. 1/7The second stage corresponds to the cycle of the governments of the Justice Party (PJ)and the Front for Victory (FPV), beginning with the presidency of Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007), and then followed by that of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-2015).This is the cycle during which a critical relationship with the neoliberal legacy is attemptedthrough the promotion of a socio-economic model more closely related to the home marketand with a greater State role in the running of the economy and in managing socialprotections. Finally, the last stage begins with the inauguration of Mauricio Macri (Republican Proposal:Let's Change) in 2015 which, honoring the name of the electoral coalition, carries outpolicies contrasting with the previous cycle and resumes the neoliberal reform agenda.Disobedient crowdsIn Argentina, the 21st century began, in historical terms, with the so-called crisis of 2001.The mechanism of the crisis leading to the collapse of the neoliberal hegemony cannot bereduced to only its economic components; the impossibility of paying back a growingexternal debt, the multi-faceted resistance to adjustment plans and their socialconsequences must also be taken into account.It is particularly important to note that the social composition of this resistance, as it isusually the case in processes of resistance to neoliberalism, was multiple and varied. There were strikes, mobilizations and a growing wave of looting in shops, and the protestreached its highest point on December 19 and 20. The President declared a state of siegeon the night of the 19 to try and contain collective action. Far from its expected result, therewas a sudden surge of generalized civil disobedience. The challenge to the presidential move was a claim for his resignation: "Let’s throw themall out, let’s not leave a single one there" became the slogan of the mobilizations.Its epicenter was the middle layers of the population - the original social base of thegovernment: in several neighborhoods of Buenos Aires, the response to the President'sspeech announcing the state of siege was a massive banging of pots and pans andspontaneous demonstrations which spread rapidly throughout the city.The challenge to the presidential move was a claim for his resignation: "Let’s throw themall out, let’s not leave a single one there" became the slogan of the mobilizations. OnDecember 20, the mobilizations continued, although this time they were invoked by socialand political organizations. Violent police action to clear the vicinity of the governmentbuildings, led to intense clashes with demonstrators.In the end, the President was forced to resign due to lack of support and legitimacy tocontinue in office. The PJ, the main opposition party, imposed the terms of the succession.After a chaotic succession of several provisional presidents, Eduardo Duhalde, PJ senatorand a former presidential candidate who had been defeated by de La Rúa in 1999, assumedthe presidency. 2/7This frustration continued for several months. A tendency of autonomy in the streets couldbe noticed among different social groups. Neighborhood assemblies sought to extendcitizen outrage aiming at social change.Unemployed workers collectively took over the companies they used to work for before thecrisis, and the picket movement which had emerged in the late 1990s gathered strengthand widened its mobilization capacity. This was a time when the public space became thestage for assemblies and direct action. It was also the time for experimenting andsearching for alternative forms of production and culture.The protest posed a serious challenge to the provisional government. One of the ways inwhich the government responded was by using repression.The murder of two militants in a picket protest on June 26, 2002, unleashed a wave ofindignation and protest which prompted a change in the government’s strategy: it called forelections as a way out of the crisis of legitimacy. President Kirchner would be enshrinedinto government during these elections.The resistance to the processes of expropriation and exclusion, and the actionschallenging the existing political order, severely curtailed the viability of governmentpolicies and created the scenario which led to the fall of de la Rúa.Even though other political actors and political moves played a key role in his fall and inushering a political transition, the way in which it happened cannot be explained withoutthe presence of collective action in the streets – an action which had more to do withdismissing than establishing: it expressed a power of veto rather than the capacity to builda political alternative.These events during times of the crisis, however, left a deep imprint: a legacy of a newculture of battle with a strong tendency for direct action and disobedience to authoritywhich could be activated and recreated in the future. But, above all, they left the idea that the smoke of politics in the streets can always comeback dormant in the citizens’ collective memory. Collective action thus became establishedas a dismissing threat for the future.Mobilizations from “above”The political cycle of Néstor Kirchner’s and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s governmentsis marked by the imprint of the prevailing tendencies from the previous period, and belongswithin the wide range of experiences of Latin American progressive governments.The origin of Néstor Kirchner’s government was marked by the general crisis of 2001. Eventhough it did not represent the groups which had mobilized during the crisis, it sought torecompose the country’s social order by selectively retaking the claims of the socialstruggles of the previous period, and proposing a reformist agenda.In doing so, politics regained some space and some degree of autonomy in relation toeconomic power. Politically, it promoted openness and recognition for the mobilizedactors, and actively worked towards granting their demands. This is why the trade union3/7movement, the human rights movement and other social organizations gave thegovernment significant support throughout the cycle.As the cycle unfolded, the mobilization on the streets would not only originate from "below"– that is, from the popular sectors - but also from "above" – the more affluent sectors ofthe population.As the cycle unfolded, the mobilization on the streets would not only originate from "below"– that is, from the popular sectors - but also from "above" – the more affluent sectors ofthe population. The political and institutional regression of the ruling classes led to theemergence of mobilization processes to defend their interests.These interests manifested themselves for the first time clearly in 2008 in the so-called"farmers’ conflict". This conflict managed to politicize, mobilize and polarize society like noother throughout this cycle.In March of that year, the recently elected Cristina Fernández de Kirchner government,aimed at resolving a fiscal problem in the making, raised the rate of the withholding tax onthe export of several grains, especially soya, and linked its fluctuation to internationalprices.The main agribusiness corporate entities united against this measure, claimed for itsderogation, summoned their affiliates to refrain from commercializing grains and meat,and established road blocks to ensure the effectiveness of this decision.Thus, a social movement was created which, similarly to those developed by the popularsectors, focused on mobilization, direct action and assembly practice. The conflictexceeded however the agrarian sectors and mobilization spread to encompass social andpolitical opposition to the government, especially by the sectors which were feelingdissatisfied with its reformist measures.In an urban country such as Argentina, the conflict involved and aligned the population as awhole, paralyzed the country and depleted the supplies to the main urban centers.The government finally requested parliamentary approval of the withholding tax measure,but it was rejected in the Senate. A year later, at the general elections, support for thegovernment decreased markedly and it lost its parliamentary majority.The second great moment of the mobilizations from above is the cycle of pot-and-panbanging in 2012 after the overwhelming reelection of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner withmore than 54% of the popular vote the year before. These protests reached their highestexpression on September 13 and November 8, 2012, and April 18, 2013.Unlike the farmers’ conflict, there was no specific issue for them other than anger andopposition to the government. Unlike the pot-and-pan banging of 2001, its social base wasnot the government’s own; on the contrary, even though they were massive, they did notmanage to transcend the core of the social opposition to the government and the upper-middle strata of the population. 4/7The main impact of these outraged crowds was in keeping the social opposition to thegovernment mobilized and in wearing down its electoral triumph, thus hindering thepossibility of its consolidation of a hegemonic process up against a weak politicalopposition.The mobilizations from above fulfilled a function of social opposition. They reached a peakduring two non-electoral years in which the political opposition was particularly weak, in2008 and 2012.In 2015, the calendar moved the axis from social to political opposition, and the cycle cameto an end with the elections of that year which were won in a tight runoff by Mauricio Macri,who represented the most antagonistic political exponent to the Kirchner project.Popular resistance to neoliberal restructuringFrom the start, the Macri government has sought to implement a restructuring of Argentinecapitalism in a neoliberal sense economically and politically in terms of social discipline: aframework for developing a growing repressive policy of the popular sectors.One of the most significant obstacles to this restructuring program is social protest. Thetrade union movement, the movements of the people’s economy, human rightsorganizations, the renewed women’s movement, are the main components of the wideumbrella of resistance to government-driven sociopolitical reforms.A series of social protest in December 2017 clearly show, yet again, their political role. Afterits victory in the mid-term legislative elections in October, the government redoubled itscommitment to counter-reform, with employment, social security and taxation as its core.The pension reform, which consisted in changing the rate of pension increase, meaningcutting them, constituted the axis of resistance. On the day the reform was to be discussedin Congress, a massive mobilization by unions and social organizations outside ofCongress was fiercely repressed.But most of the protesters managed to reorganize and re-entered the square. In the end, thesession was adjourned as the opposition demanded.A few days later, broad social opposition to the reform manifested itself again in anothermassive mobilization before a new congressional session, including a general strike. Thedemonstration quickly turned into a confrontation between the security forces anddemonstrators in their hundreds who attacked the police columns with sticks and stones.The repression did not dampen the indignation and, at nightfall, Buenos Aires and othercities were shaken by pot-and-pan banging against the government’s pension reform.The protesters tried to remain in the square despite the repression until, finally, the intensityof police action managed to clear the area. Subsequently, the security forces went on ahunt for demonstrators in the city center and deployed unusual violence, of a kind unseensince December 2001.5/7But the repression did not dampen the indignation and, at nightfall, Buenos Aires and othercities were shaken by pot-and-pan banging against the government’s pension reform.Finally, the project with some minor changes was passed. The reform went ahead, but notwithout costs even among Macri voters. It also damaged the agreement principle existingbetween the government and the leadership of the country’s main trade union regardinglabor reform, which has forced the government to withdraw the proposal from beingdebated for the time being.The result of the conflict shows that social protest, in conditions of weakness of thepolitical opposition, is a key to channeling social unrest. It has created obstacles andforced some palliative changes to the government’s planned reforms but has been unableto halt the general trend of social change.The images of smoking barricades in Buenos Aires’s city center and of citizens protestingwith pots and pans in the neighborhoods, vividly recall some of the postcards of 2001 –they show the validity of protest as a citizens’ political vehicle in Argentina today, and alsothe difficulties to contain it through repression.Final thoughtsIn Argentina, in recent years, social protest has become an informal political mechanismwhich complements the classical institutions of representative democracy, for expressingdemands to the institutional political system.One of its central impacts in political terms is negative due to its main role is theobstruction of government actions. Given the weakness of political parties, particularlythose in the opposition, protest appears as a privileged form of social opposition at variousstages.This entails that mass protest cycles draw their strength from social sectors which are notthose who support the governmental alliances. In 2001, their dismissing character reachedsuch an intense peak precisely because a substantive part of the government's social basewas mobilized against it.On the other hand, the population’s tendency to protest makes protest a relevant factor tobe taken into account for implementing public policies. Protest as a likelihood significantlyaffects government decisions in several areas.To summarize, attesting the political relevance of the negative side of protest does notimply ignoring its impact in determining policies or incorporating new demands into thepublic agenda, and its role in other areas such as culture and unions. We have attempted toargue the strong relevance of one of its impacts.In our opinion, protest has resulted more in the dismissal of rather than the installation ofgovernments, in resisting policies that in ensuring their effective implementation. Butpushing aside the hierarchy of impacts, protest is, undoubtedly, one of the forms that thediscussion on the destiny of the nation has taken.6/7Above and beyond the current government’s resolve, it is a struggle which remains open,and has the streets as its privileged stage for expressing itself.About the authorJulián Rebón es miembro del Instituto de Investigaciones Gino Germani, Facultad deCiencias Sociales, Universidad de Buenos Aires, y del  Consejo Nacional de InvestigacionesCientíficas y Técnicas.Julián Rebón is a member of the Gino Germani Investigative Institute and the Faculty ofSocial Sciences at the University of Buenos Aires. He is also affiliated with the NationalCouncil of Scientific and Technical Investigation. 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The politics of protest in Argentina

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The politics of protest in Argentina

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