Estos comentarios examinan las instituciones democráticas transnacionales que, en un artículo publicado en este mismo volumen de la RLFP, Osvaldo Guariglia defiende como forma de limitar a los dos grupos oligárquicos que amenazan a las democracias contemporáneas. Este examen plantea dudas sobre dos aspectos de esa defensa. En primer lugar, sobre su fundamento conceptual –el derecho humano a la democracia– y, en segundo lugar, sobre su carácter democrático, especialmente cuando es evaluada desde una perspectiva de democracia radical.These comments analyze the transnational democratic institutions that, in an article published in this volume of RLFP, Guariglia defends as a limit to the two oligarchic groups that menace the contemporary democracies. This analysis raises doubts concerning two features of Guariglia’s defense. First, it questions his conceptual foundations –the human right to democracy– and, second, it questions its democratic nature, which is problematic when it is assessed from the viewpoint of radical democrat views.Fil: Garcia Valverde, Facundo. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentin

Garcia Valverde, Facundo

English

CONICET Digital

C e n t r o  d e  I n v e s t i g a c i o n e s  F i l o s ó f i c a sISSN 2250-8619 • Vol. II • Nº 2 • 2013 • Buenos Aires • Argentina COMMENTS TO OSVALDO GUARIGLIA’S“DEMOCRACY UNDER SIEGE”Facundo García ValverdeISSN  2250-8619Vol. II  Nº 2 (2013)  — pp. 1-9Comments to osvaldo GuariGlia’s “demoCraCy under sieGe”Facundo García ValVerdeNational Research Council of ArgentinaBuenos Aires UniversityPolitical Philosophy GroupResumenEstos comentarios examinan las instituciones democráticas transnacionales que, en un artículo publicado en este mismo volu-men de la RLFP, Osvaldo Guariglia defiende como forma de limitar a los dos grupos oligárquicos que amenazan a las democracias con-temporáneas. Este examen plantea dudas sobre dos aspectos de esa defensa. En primer lugar, sobre su fundamento conceptual –el dere-cho humano a la democracia– y, en segundo lugar, sobre su carácter democrático, especialmente cuando es evaluada desde una perspec-tiva de democracia radical.Palabras clave: Democracia – Justicia global – Participación políticaAbstRActThese comments analyze the transnational democratic institu-tions that, in an article published in this volume of RLFP, Guari-glia defends as a limit to the two oligarchic groups that menace the contemporary democracies. This analysis raises doubts concerning two features of Guariglia’s defense. First, it questions his conceptual foundations –the human right to democracy– and, second, it ques-tions its democratic nature, which is problematic when it is assessed from the viewpoint of radical democrat views. Key words: Democracy – Global justice – Political participation2 F. García ValVerde - Comments to Democracy…  Comments to Democracy…  - F. García ValVerde 3Vol. II Nº 2  (2013) Vol. II Nº 2 (2013)In an article published in this volume of RLFP, Osvaldo Guariglia begins with an acute diagnosis of the threats to democracy posed by two oligarchic groups. On the one hand, decentralized economic groups which have the immediate capacity to endanger the stability of the policies chosen from a democratic government. On the other hand, populist sectors and political parties which combine political realism, dogma-tism and a direct and confessional relation between the Lea-der and the masses, in order to destroy the checks and balan-ces that limit the permanent accumulation of power.Facing this dismal diagnosis, Guariglia proposes that “the cure for democracy is more democracy”. I agree with that. However, I have some doubts that I would like to explore here concerning this solution. First, I will analyze if the solution is duly justified and second I will explore if that solution is really democratic. Concerning the conceptual issues, the argument is mainly supported on the existence of a human right to democracy. That human right is, according to the author, more deman-ding and more enforceable in societies which already have a democratic constitution. The reasons for the validity of this human right are elements contained in the articles 1, 19 and 21 of the Declaration of Human Rights enacted by United Nations and in a growing tendency to defend the priority of the International Law over the domestic law.Nevertheless, the issue is not so simple. The immediate question after this argument is how this priority is justified. Guariglia would not be able to answer to this question by clai-ming that International Law affirms a set of rights which bet-ter protects human rights as this would be question begging. I think that Guariglia would argue, instead, that a human right to democracy is a precondition for assuring human rights in general. If this is his more fundamental argument, he would confer a privileged status to the human right to democracy but that would have to be more fully justified.Another conceptual doubt arises from the distinction posed by Joshua Cohen between the right to democracy as an ele-ment of a just society and a right to democracy as a human right. If this distinction is plausible, which I think it is, I would like to ask what difference this premise makes in terms of his argument. In other words, my question is: how could Guariglia defend democracy as a solution to the two oligarchic menaces mentioned without endorsing Cohen’s view? If Guariglia followed Cohen´s strategy, he could not defend the solution he opposes to the attack of economic and populist oligarchies and his diagnosis would be even more obscure. The solution that the author argues for is to create transnational democratic institutions, proposed initially for regional blocs such as Mercosur, Unasur, the European Community, and so on, that should not become mere business clubs and political leaders assemblies but remain bounded to common deliberati-ve spaces and civic participation.The human right to democracy premise seems to be neces-sary in order to exert democratic control on these transnatio-nal institutions which should also be responsive to the citizens´ claims. In other words, if the human right to democracy did not exist, these transnational institutions would neither need to be responsive to democratic inputs nor to their democratically elected leaders. The explicit problem with this is that even if the limitation to oligarchic powers were one of the main public and explicit goals of these institutions, nothing would assure that that goal would be achieved without an extensive politi-cal participation and especially without a genuine interest in deliberative interaction. I think this argument that Guariglia could potentially formulate is interesting but at the same time it sounds too instrumental. So, his foundation of the human right to democracy seems to be incomplete. In respect to the democratic character of Guariglia’s propo-sal, I would like to explore now some tensions in it, but let me first use a real example of a transnational institution. Let us consider, for instance, the newest transnational institution in Latin America which Guariglia generously qualifies as empty: 4 F. García ValVerde - Comments to Democracy…  Comments to Democracy…  - F. García ValVerde 5Vol. II Nº 2  (2013) Vol. II Nº 2 (2013)Unasur. The 14th article of its Constitutive Treaty states: “Poli-tical consultation and coordination among the Member States of UNASUR will be based on harmony and mutual respect, strengthening regional stability and supporting the preserva-tion of democratic values and the promotion of human rights.”As we all know, one of leaders and founders of Unasur, Venezuela, has recently initiated the process of withdrawal from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, one of the institutions that had more ample and beneficial effects in the history of the fight against the bloodiest dictatorships in the continent and the effective exercise of human rights. No criti-cal public declarations have been made so far regarding this issue, neither by Unasur itself, nor by the Member States or their presidents.This constitutes, then, an example of a transnational ins-titution which publicly recognizes human rights as well as democratic values but in practice allows a state member to free itself from an important and recognized instrument for the effective and transnational protection of human rights. No doubt, we have to be prudent on this evaluation: Unasur is a rising institution with little influence and political impact except for some political declarations and for the expulsion of Paraguay after the unfair and speed trial to ex-president Lugo. Venezuela’s decision can still be reversed and we still do not know if it is not just a way of putting political pressure on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights rather than a move to free the country from its surveillance. Guariglia could obviously say that this example confirms his argument: when transnational institutions are not res-ponsive to open and egalitarian deliberations from citizens-hip, they are free to interpret the protection and promotion of human rights in any way they want, even if these are clearly opposed to a real protection. However, an important tension arises in this argument and I would like to explore it in some depth. Guariglia firmly belie-ves in the republican principle of separation of powers as a way to limit the accumulation of power. Thus, answering to the factual existence of huge and concentrated powers –the populist leader who formally or informally concentrates full public and economic power– Guariglia believes that the crea-tion of new political agents is enough to control these powers. Since most traditional nation-states are incapable of perfor-ming this task, these new agents should have enough power and should also be transnational. The problem illustrated by the UNASUR affair is, never-theless, that the creation of transnational entities is not sufficient to defend a plural, fair and deliberatively arranged domestic democracy, nor to build a transnational communica-tive power developed from deliberative and inclusive proces-ses or to secure the fulfillment of human rights. If this is so, the creation of these new transnational ins-titutions may entail serous risks. The reason for this is that the creation of these bureaucratic-political authorities may interpose even larger barriers to citizen inputs. It is known that as long as political power concentrates in an institution, an egalitarian distribution of power decreases; bigger insti-tutions amount to a decrease in democratic control. Is it not this the field for populist leaders who pretend to speak in the name of those excluded from institutions? Isn’t it the same risk foreseen by Kant when he condemned a world govern-ment as necessarily despotic? In other words, I think this solution to the menaces to democracy rightly identified by Guariglia may show clear deficits in terms of democratic con-trol. In view of these considerations, let me ask: Who would be in charge of controlling and monitoring these transnatio-nal institutions?Although Guariglia acknowledges that these institutions should be responsive enough to the claims of citizens and to their interests and that they should create the conditions to the generation of a communicative transnational power, his main solution is essentially institutional. But he never explains how to build more powerful channels of interaction 6 F. García ValVerde - Comments to Democracy…  Comments to Democracy…  - F. García ValVerde 7Vol. II Nº 2  (2013) Vol. II Nº 2 (2013)between citizens and these institutions and how to empower citizens.Perhaps Guariglia could reply to this worry in the following way: it is much more realistic to build new transnational insti-tutions than to build, maintain and be confident in the correct functioning of spread transnational channels for communica-tive power. It is much more realistic to create new institutions than to change the citizens’ public practices. How could anyo-ne, Guariglia may ask, realistically believe in the communica-tive power of sincerely concerned citizens and in their capaci-ty to control and limit the faceless corporative and economic power or the single, unique and dogmatic populist leader? Be this as it may, I would like to point out some radical democrat proposals which I am sympathetic to and then consider if they are compatible with Guariglia’s solution. James Bohman distinguishes two kinds of reactions to hyper-globalized societies (2007: 19-57). The first, named gra-dualist, seeks the creation of institutions analogous to nation-states and attempts to give them sufficient power to enfor-ce the required laws. In last stance, gradualists pretend to expand the demos constitutive of democracy. The second, dee-med transformationalist, sees the challenges posed by demo-cracy as requiring a deeper and structural transformation of democracy, one which includes replacing the political subject of demos for the more decentralized and transnational demoi.James Bohman rejects gradualist proposals –I think Boh-man would include Guariglia’s proposals within this class of conceptions– on the basis that a deep social, structural and cultural modification in the nature of the public sphere is taking place. This modification in terms of the public sphere allows new forms of publicity and the transnationalization of communicative and deliberative power. While in the past the public sphere was defined by national frontiers, now multiple public and decentralized spaces seem to exist. This decentrali-zed public spheres are not unified by a nation but agents who engage in reflexive and democratic activity; in being respon-sive to others, participants must first actively constitute and maintain it as a public sphere. Bohman’s fundamental claim is that these transnational demoi should have enough capacity to include subjects and concerns in the international political agenda or –according to the conception defended by Dryzek- to contest decisions the decisions of transnational institutions, such as European Community and World Trade Organization (Dryzek 2005, 2006). In short, although this radical democrat solution may allow and promote vigorous interactions among new transnational demoi and formal institutions, Guariglia does not take this solution into account unless it is mediated by his preferred transnational institutions. In the same spirit, Regina Kreide (2012: 25-6) gives more concrete steps in the specification of this kind of radical and transnational democracy, arguing that the mere concept of popular sovereignty should be redefined to include effecti-vely all the affected by a decision taken by transnational and international organisms and, at the same time, avoid its con-finement to national borders. I just mention the three reforms proposed by Kreide: to increase the formal participation of citizens in international organizations in order to convert them into effectively representative organizations; to promote institutional efforts to force institutions acting at the inter-national level (such as the WTO and the NATO) to be res-ponsive to democratic decisions taken by nation-states; and, lastly, to transnationally expand the existing legal guarantees of rights, through which the equality of the deliberating part-ners can be achieved independently of economic and political bargaining power.Given this very basic reconstruction of the radical approach, I would now like to explore its compatibility with Guariglia’s pro-posal. Let me first distinguish among several radical democra-tic positions. A demanding radical democratic position would defend a strong connection between formal institutions and informal spheres of communicative power. To this end it could, for example, demand an equal vote for every affected citizen 8 F. García ValVerde - Comments to Democracy…  Comments to Democracy…  - F. García ValVerde 9Vol. II Nº 2  (2013) Vol. II Nº 2 (2013)in decisions taken by transnational institutions, or demand effective and egalitarian participation of every affected per-son in the deliberative transnational forums, or demand that the leaders of transnational institutions (WTO, NATO, WHO, etc.) be elected by every citizen in the world. Another radical –albeit weaker– democrat proposal would require connecting formal institutions and informal spheres of communication by demanding a more direct interaction between citizens, groups of interests, etc., and transnational institutions, and a more inclusive and plural input to take political decisions. This pro-posal is weaker in so far as it preserves the actual priority of transnational institutions over informal publics; transna-tional institutions and public transnational spheres remain different, the former not limiting the latter. Would any of these radical democratic strategies be compa-tible with Guariglia’s proposal? I think that, given his concerns regarding populism, he would find the demanding position too dangerous. After all, what would preserve these transnational institutions from the menaces registered in domestic politics? If this reasoning is correct, then Guariglia should be explicit about which sense of the polysemous term “democracy” he is using. In conclusion, unless Guariglia provides an additional argument to reject the stronger radical position, it is doubt-ful that his transnational position could achieve the desired balance between oligarchic and populist menaces. On one side, if real participation from citizens is not secured in that transnational institutions, nothing prevents the creation of a new transnational oligarchy, different but oligarchic at last. On the other side, if that transnational institutions are not responsive to democratic input, new fields for populist claims are built. In this comment, I have made two main points. First, I rai-sed some doubts about the justification of the human right to democracy and how Guariglia used it to defend transnatio-nal institutions. Second, I have proven that the transnational solution proposed by Guariglia in response to oligarchic and populist menaces could be criticized by a demanding radical democrat position. reFerenCesBohman, J. (2007). Democracy Across Borders: From Demos to Demoi. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Dryzek, J. (2005). “Deliberative Democracy in Divided Socie-ties”, Political Theory 33: 218-42Dryzek, J. (2006). Deliberative Global Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press. Kreide, R. (2012). Repressed Democracy: Legitimacy Problems in World Society. Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía Política 1: 1-34.UNASUR (2008). Tratado Constitutivo, disponible en http://www.unasursg.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=290&Itemid=339Received: October 30, 2012.Accepted: February 24, 2013.

Comments to Osvaldo Guariglia’s “Democracy Under Siege”

LAReferencia - Red Federada de Repositorios Institucionales de Publicaciones Científicas Latinoamericanas

https://ri.conicet.gov.ar/bitstream/11336/26117/2/CONICET_Digital_Nro.1be29067-4955-445e-927a-33c887f4baa8_A.pdf

Comments to Osvaldo Guariglia’s “Democracy Under Siege”

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

CONICET Digital

LAReferencia - Red Federada de Repositorios Institucionales de Publicaciones Científicas Latinoamericanas