In this dissertation, we explore the frontiers of theory of cryptography along two lines. In the first direction, we explore Lattice Cryptography, which is the primary sub-area of post-quantum cryptographic research.
Our first contribution is the construction of a deniable attribute-based encryption scheme from lattices. A deniable encryption scheme is secure against
not only eavesdropping attacks as required by semantic security, but also stronger coercion attacks performed after the fact. An attribute-based encryption
scheme allows ``fine-grained'' access to ciphertexts, allowing for a decryption access policy to be embedded in ciphertexts and keys. We achieve both properties
simultaneously for the first time from lattices.
Our second contribution is the construction of a digital signature scheme that enjoys both short signatures and a completely tight security reduction from lattices. As a matter of independent interest, we give an improved method of randomized inversion of the G gadget matrix, which reduces the noise growth rate in homomorphic evaluations performed in a large number of lattice-based cryptographic schemes, without incurring the high cost of sampling discrete Gaussians.
In the second direction, we explore Cryptographic Program Obfuscation. A program obfuscator is a type of cryptographic software compiler that outputs executable code with the guarantee that ``whatever can be hidden about the internal workings of program code, is hidden.'' Indeed, program obfuscation can be viewed as a ``universal and cryptographically-complete'' tool.
Our third contribution is the first, full-scale implementation of secure program obfuscation in software. Our toolchain takes code written in a C-like programming
language, specialized for cryptography, and produces secure, obfuscated software.
Our fourth contribution is a new cryptanalytic attack against a variety of ``early'' program obfuscation candidates. We provide a general, efficiently-testable
property for any two branching programs, called partial inequivalence, which we show is sufficient for launching an ``annihilation attack'' against
several obfuscation candidates based on Garg-Gentry-Halevi multilinear maps