Dietrich, Chris

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Oil and Weapons in Gaddafi's Libya - Not Even Pasthttps://notevenpast.org/oil-and-weapons-gaddafis-libya/[5/26/2020 9:24:43 AM]"The past is never dead. It's not even past." William FaulknerNOT EVEN PAST     THE PUBLIC HISTORIANMore from The Public HistorianBOOKSMore BooksDIGITAL HISTORYOil and Weapons in Gaddafi’sLibyaby Chris DietrichIn a recent Wikileaks revelation, a secret U.S. cable revealed that Senators John McCain and JoeLieberman promised to provide Muammar Gaddafi with military hardware in 2009.  McCain andLieberman were among the last high-level teams to have made such a promise, but they certainly weren’tthe first.  From the very beginning of the Gaddafi regime’s existence in 1969, western leaders haverationalized arms sales to oil-rich Libya.  Often, these justifications were cast in stark Cold War terms,however, archival evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom points towards a different,more pragmatic explanation. Libyan arms sales represented an opportunity to reinvest petrodollars inwestern businesses. Like 1TweetMaking History: Houston’s “Spirit of theConfederacy”May 06, 2020America for Americans: A History ofXenophobia in the United States byErika Lee (2019)April 20, 2020Más de 72: Digital Archive ReviewBOOKS FILMS & MEDIA THE PUBLIC HISTORIAN BLOG TEXAS ABOUTSTUDENTSOUR/STORIES15 MINUTE HISTORY Not Even Past 652 New Edit Post Howdy, Gilbert BorregoOil and Weapons in Gaddafi's Libya - Not Even Pasthttps://notevenpast.org/oil-and-weapons-gaddafis-libya/[5/26/2020 9:24:43 AM]More from Digital HistoryFILMS & MEDIAThis process began in the early 1960s, when Libyan oil emerged as a “safe alternative” to oil from thePersian Gulf.  Then ruled by a pro-American monarch, King Sayyid Muhammed Idris, Libya was firstsuggested as a reliable alternative in a May 1959 meeting of the National Security Council.  The PersianGulf, the NSC concluded, “was in a position to exert too much economic and political leverage againstWestern Europe.”  Libya’s newly-discovered reserves, on the other hand, were safely within the westernbloc and ready for development.  “The nub of the matter,” Vice President Richard Nixon said in thatmeeting, “was what to do about Libya.”  Encouraged by a Libyan petroleum law written by a Palestiniannationalist lawyer imposing limits on concession sizes, smaller companies jumped at the chance to enterLibya and production increased in the following decade.  At the same time, the State Department arguedfor the cultivation of closer political relations with all Arab oil producers, to help overcome the “ideologicalferment” of their pan-Arabism and make them more “interdependent with the West.”This policy was unsuccessful in Libya and on September 1, 1969 nationalist army officers deposed Idris.In an early report, the State Department described the new leader, 27-year-old Muammar Gaddafi, as “aman raised in the desert” with “the virtues and vices of a fundamentalist prophet” and “a strong sense ofmission.” No one predicted that Gaddafi’s sense of mission would convert Libya into a pariah state by theend of the next decade, when it embarked on its continuous and spiteful interference in global affairs,culminating in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103.  However, it was readily apparent by early 1970March 16, 2020Ayka (Dir: Sergei Dvortsevoy, 2018)Oil and Weapons in Gaddafi's Libya - Not Even Pasthttps://notevenpast.org/oil-and-weapons-gaddafis-libya/[5/26/2020 9:24:43 AM]More from Films & MediaTEXASMore from Texasthat Gaddafi’s Libyan Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) would actively employ its control over thecountry’s vast oil wealth to increase its arms sales.American arms-sale policy towards the new regime was initially cautious. The State Department reportedthat Libya showed no signs of “moderation in Middle Eastern affairs.” Gaddafi not only espoused armedconflict as the only means of settling Arab-Israeli problems, he also had just nationalized the holdings ofBritish Petroleum.  The State Department imposed a ban on all transfers, specifically cancellingpermission for a Spanish company to sell Libya F-5 fighter planes.The United States’ initial restraint soon wore away and the reality of arms profits superseded publicconcerns that the further militarization of the Arab world would retrench the Arab-Israeli conflict and giverise to what western officials had begun to describe as “international terrorism.”  In his first report on thestate of American foreign policy, President Nixon used aggressive Cold War rhetoric to present thisbroader policy to Congress.  “We repeatedly made clear to the Soviet leaders our decision to limit thearms race in the Middle East on a reciprocal basis,” he began. He continued: the Soviet Union hadresponded by stepping up the shipment of air defense missiles, aircraft, and combat crews to Egypt.  TheUnited States had no choice, Nixon concluded, but to “help maintain the military balance.”Military sales became immensely more profitable withoil price increases in the 1970s. After negotiationsbetween the members of OPEC and the multinationaloil companies, triggered by Gaddafi’s demands,ended in favorable conditions for OPEC, it becameclear that oil producing countries would have far morefunding for arms purchases, the CIA reported as earlyas March 1971.  After the 1973-1974 oil price shocks,these funds increased astronomically.Although official Libyan policy was to remain neutralin the Cold War, Soviet ships began to unload tanksand artillery there in 1970 hoping to establish Libyaas what one U.S. official described as “an arms depotand a training sanctuary for all the Arab confrontationstates.” In this Cold War context, the Nixonadministration supported western arms sales toLibya, including an unprecedented $400 million French sale in 1970.  U.S. policymakers believed suchsales would keep the lines open to clients within Soviet clutches. The State Department believed that ifthe French did not fill the vacuum left by the cancellation of U.S. and U.K. sales, “the Soviets would.”In this context, the State Department reconsidered its policy towards arms deals between Americancompanies and the Libyan RCC in 1972. After receiving a letter from the president of Lockheeddiscussing his concern that his Marietta, Georgia plant was threatened with closure, the department gavethe green light for the company to sell planes to Libya through Italy, reversing the Spanish F-5 decision.October 02, 2019A (Queer) Rebel Wife In TexasMarch 11, 2020Oil and Weapons in Gaddafi's Libya - Not Even Pasthttps://notevenpast.org/oil-and-weapons-gaddafis-libya/[5/26/2020 9:24:43 AM]As the French example demonstrated, the influx of petrodollars into the Libyan economy changed thescale of potential profits. The benefits of a new relationship with the Libyan government were clear to theBritish as well.  The British also sought to lessen Soviet influence in Libya, but concerns about thedomestic economy played the major role in the British decision sell more arms. In 1977, after the Defenseand Overseas Policy committee decided to relax military sales restrictions, writing that restrictions hadcaused the British to “lag well behind the Germans, French and Italians.”The British Army fought the decision.  Libyan support for the IRA, one official wrote, “completelyovershadowed” all other considerations. Given that “soldiers are being killed and wounded daily by theIRA,” he continued, “it would be indefensible…to supply equipment to the Libyans or worse to be seen totrain them.”  The Cabinet disregarded the army’s complaints.  The Defense Secretary, Fred Mulley, toldthe Foreign Secretary, David Owen, that arms would provide the “key factor” in helping other British firmssecure military and civil contracts in the growing petro-economy. The Secretary of State for Industry alsoapproved increased sales, noting that they were “most welcome to British Aerospace” and “a muchneeded fillip to British Shipbuilders.”In remarkably pragmatic considerations, the immediate prospects for lucrative business, not to mentionlong-term sales potential, made the risks acceptable to French, British, U.S. and other westernpolicymakers. While we should be careful not paint the current NATO support for Libya as a mono-causal“War for Oil”, it is clear the oil money has long played an important part in Libya’s relations with the west. It remains to be seen what role it will play in the future.Related Reading:Dirk Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya (2006)Doug Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 (2004)Nathan Citino, From Arab Nationalism to OPEC: Eisenhower, King Sa’ud, and the Making of U.S.-SaudiRelations (2010)Photo Credits:King Idris shaking hands with Vice-President Nixon,Mohamed Yousef el-Magariaf, “Libia bain al Madi wal Hadir: Safahat men at Tarikh as Siyasi”, Vol II, Markaz adDirasat al Libiya, Oxford, 2004 (public domain via Wikimedia Commons)President Nasser of Egypt (right) with the Leader of the Libyan Revolution, Muammar al-Gaddafi, 1969, al-Ahram (public domain via Wikimedia Commons)Posted August 31, 2011More 1900s, 2000s, Blog, Cold War, Middle East, Politics, Science/Medicine/Technology, United StatesOil and Weapons in Gaddafi's Libya - Not Even Pasthttps://notevenpast.org/oil-and-weapons-gaddafis-libya/[5/26/2020 9:24:43 AM]19th century 20th Century African American History american history Asia Asia & Middle East book review Brazil British Empire China Civil War Cold War Colonialism communism cultural history digital history Early Modern Europe Europe film gender history History of Science immigration India Islam Latin America Latin American History Mexico Not Even Past Public History race religion Russia slavery Texas Texas History Texas History Day Transnational Twentieth Century History United States US History USSR Womens History world history World War IINOT EVEN PAST is produced byThe Department of HistoryTHE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN We are supported by the College of Liberal ArtsAnd our READERSDONATECONTACTAll content © 2010-present NOT EVEN PAST and the authors,unless otherwise notedSign up to receive bi-weekly email updatesBOOKS FILMS & MEDIA THE PUBLIC HISTORIAN BLOG TEXAS

Oil and Weapons in Gaddafi’s Libya

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Oil and Weapons in Gaddafi’s Libya

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