Hunt, Jonathan

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The Strangest Dream - Reykjavik 1986 - Not Even Pasthttps://notevenpast.org/strangest-dream-reykjavik-1986/[5/28/2020 8:58:54 AM]"The past is never dead. It's not even past." William FaulknerNOT EVEN PAST     THE PUBLIC HISTORIANMore from The Public HistorianBOOKSMore BooksDIGITAL HISTORYThe Strangest Dream – Reykjavik1986by Jonathan HuntCollege freshmen have no personal knowledge of the Cold War. Born after the Berlin Wall’s fall and theSoviet Union’s collapse, the threat of nuclear Armageddon seems far removed from their experiences, arelic of a bygone age. Yet, today, more countries than ever hold weapons whose scale of destruction candwarf that of every bomb used in World War II. As the Cold War nuclear arms race recedes fromcollective memory, it is important to remember why the world remains beneath the shadow of themushroom cloud.This October 11th and 12th, the world observed the 25th anniversary of the summit between U.S.President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev at Reykjavik, Iceland in 1986,where the leaders of the world’s superpowers contemplated the abolition of nuclear weapons. The talksremain the closest humanity has come to stopping the accumulation and proliferation of nuclear arms.Twenty-five years later, historians still debate the summit’s legacy. Even if the nuclear colossi hadadopted Gorbachev’s plan to disarm in three stages by 2000, only their fine example would have Like 0TweetMaking History: Houston’s “Spirit of theConfederacy”May 06, 2020America for Americans: A History ofXenophobia in the United States byErika Lee (2019)April 20, 2020Ticha: Digital Archive ReviewBOOKS FILMS & MEDIA THE PUBLIC HISTORIAN BLOG TEXAS ABOUTSTUDENTSOUR/STORIES15 MINUTE HISTORY Not Even Past 652 New Edit Post Howdy, Gilbert BorregoThe Strangest Dream - Reykjavik 1986 - Not Even Pasthttps://notevenpast.org/strangest-dream-reykjavik-1986/[5/28/2020 8:58:54 AM]More from Digital HistoryFILMS & MEDIAMore from Films & MediaTEXASMore from Texaspersuaded Great Britain, France, China, India, and Israel to join them. Reading the minutes of the fourmeetings at Reykjavik, it is also unclear if gravity bombs like the ones that destroyed Hiroshima andNagasaki would have been eliminated. Nevertheless, during those two autumn days, Reagan andGorbachev neared the brink of a nuclear-free world, only to turn back in defeat.It seems, ironically, that Reagan’s abhorrence of nuclear weapons scuttled the talks. As president,Reagan made research and development of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), an anti-missile shieldderisively known as “Star Wars,” a centerpiece of his strategic policy. Nuclear abolitionists condemned theproject as a multi-billion dollar boondoggle and a slippery slope toward normalizing the military use ofnuclear weapons. Strategists weaned on the Cold War doctrine of mutual assured destruction warned thatits construction could prompt the Soviet Union to launch a preemptive first strike. For Reagan, SDIrepresented a means by which to make nuclear weapons obsolete and an insurance policy if a “madman”ever got his hands on them. Gorbachev disagreed, and saw limits on SDI as indispensible if the USSRwas to trust its rival to disarm.At Reykjavik, Soviet and American negotiators smoothed over rough spot after rough spot, agreeing tolimits and sub-limits on an array of nuclear delivery systems—bombs, cruise missiles, sub-launched,medium-range, and intercontinental ballistic missiles. More progress was made in 36 hours than theprevious 15 years combined. Paul Nitze, the president’s special adviser on arms control and a fixture inU.S. foreign policymaking throughout the Cold War, remarked Soviet concessions were “the best we havereceived in 25 years.” When Reagan and Gorbachev began their fourth and final meeting, they knew thestakes: an historic agreement for deep arms cuts and eventual disarmament. They also knew the finaland toughest challenge; how to finesse Reagan’s steely support for SDI and Gorbachev’s stand that theU.S. confine R&D to the labs.Initial expectations for Reykjavik had been modest. Recurrent crises had beset U.S.-Soviet relations sinceReagan took office. The White House’s more confrontational tone, the shooting down of a waywardKorean airliner over Soviet territory, the deployment of quick-strike missiles in Europe, and an alarmingNATO nuclear exercise codenamed Able Archer, compounded an already fraught relationship. However,conditions eventually improved. Reagan assumed a more conciliatory line so as to facilitate arms controlinitiatives and lessen the chances of an accidental nuclear exchange. It was Gorbachev’s rise to power in1985, however, that transformed the tenor of the Cold War by infusing new life into a listless Sovietsystem. Following a series of three elderly statesmen whose best days were behind them, he wasconfronted by an economic system with chronic shortages and, in April 1986, a catastrophic meltdown ofthe nuclear reactor at Chernobyl, Ukraine. Gorbachev insisted that “new thinking” be applied to theUSSR’s manifold problems, and espoused the policies of perestroika, restructuring the Soviet economy,and glasnost, making the government more open and responsive. A major element of perestroika wasredirecting the river of resources flowing into the state’s military-industrial complex, especially the secretagencies managing the USSR’s nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programs, to more productiveends. Unable and unwilling to keep pace with U.S. military spending, Gorbachev instead offered a three-step plan to liquidate the superpowers’ nuclear weapons.May 27, 2020Ayka (Dir: Sergei Dvortsevoy, 2018)October 02, 2019Spanish Flu in the Texas Oil FieldsMay 26, 2020The Strangest Dream - Reykjavik 1986 - Not Even Pasthttps://notevenpast.org/strangest-dream-reykjavik-1986/[5/28/2020 8:58:54 AM]It was a bold initiative, but Gorbachev’s labors were close to bearing fruit when he and Reagan sat downfor their last tête-à-tête. Reagan promised to share advances in missile defense with the Soviets.Gorbachev fired back that the U.S. had thus far been unwilling to share even industrial and agriculturaltechnology with his country. Just when the statesmen seemed to have exhausted their cases,Gorbachev’s foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, urged them to cross the finish line, declaring theyhad “come very close to accomplishing this historic task … [a]nd when future generations read the record… they will not forgive us if we let this opportunity slip by.” Despite Shevardnadze’s appeal, however,Reagan and Gorbachev failed to agree on the wording of the final text. The two negotiating parties leftReykjavik without an agreement.Sadly, subsequent generations have more often forgotten than condemned the talks. The calamity ofclimate change is more familiar to our undergraduates than the firestorm of nuclear war and the long nightof the ensuing nuclear winter. In the 1980s, scientists theorized that only 200 thermonuclear explosionswould kick up a planetary shroud of radioactive dust, lowering temperatures enough to recreate theclimactic conditions in which the dinosaurs died off. Five countries—the U.S., Russia, Great Britain,France, and China—have more than 200 warheads. The U.S. and Russia are currently reducing theirarsenals to 1,550 deliverable warheads. A conflict between India and Pakistan, who fought four warssince 1947, where nuclear weapons were used would jeopardize the continuation of life, as we know it.Current global affairs hardly resemble the global situation in 1986 when two nuclear-armed superpowerstestily eyed one another. Yet some themes have reoccurred. Just as the Soviet Union fiscal emergencyforced Gorbachev to offer a plan to nuclear disarmament, today’s financial crisis could pave the way fordeep multilateral arms cuts. The nuclear disaster at Fukushima, Japan augurs lessons similar to those ofChernobyl regarding the uncontrollable nature of nuclear power. It remains for the leaders of today to takeadvantage of their window of opportunity.For two days on a remote archipelago in the North Atlantic, Reagan and Gorbachev discussed theentwined destinies of the Cold War and nuclear arms. As educators, we must remind our students of suchmoments, when history conspires to grant individuals the occasion to re-route its course. Reykjavik’sgreat tragedy is not its failure; after all, the negotiations paved the way for two momentous treaties—the1987 Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile Treaty and the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Itstragedy resides in its potential disappearance from our collective memory. For our students’ generationwill have to address this dangerous legacy of the Cold War—even if they don’t remember it.The Strangest Dream - Reykjavik 1986 - Not Even Pasthttps://notevenpast.org/strangest-dream-reykjavik-1986/[5/28/2020 8:58:54 AM]19th century 20th Century African American History american history Asia Asia & Middle East book review Brazil British Empire China Civil War Cold War Colonialism communism cultural history digital history Early Modern Europe Europe film gender history History of Science immigration India Islam Latin America Latin American History Mexico Not Even Past Public History race religion Russia slavery Texas Texas History Texas History Day Transnational Twentieth Century History United States US History USSR Womens History world history World War IINOT EVEN PAST is produced byThe Department of HistoryTHE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN We are supported by the College of Liberal ArtsAnd our READERSDONATECONTACTAll content © 2010-present NOT EVEN PAST and the authors,unless otherwise notedSign up to receive bi-weekly email updatesYou may also like:Reuters, Mikhail Gorbachev, “A Farewell to Nuclear Arms,” October 11, 2011“The Reykjavik File: Previously Secret Documents from U.S. and Soviet Archives on the 1986 Reagan-Gorbachev Summit, from the collections of The National Security Archive, George Washington University,Washington DC.Jonathan Hunt and Paul Walker, “The Legacy of Reykjavik and the Future of Nuclear Disarmament,”Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Nov/Dec 2011.Photo Credits:Federal Government via Wikimedia CommonsPosted November 7, 2011More 1900s, Blog, Cold War, Discover, Europe, Politics, Science/Medicine/TechnologyBOOKS FILMS & MEDIA THE PUBLIC HISTORIAN BLOG TEXAS

The Strangest Dream – Reykjavik 1986

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The Strangest Dream – Reykjavik 1986

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