Lawrence, Mark Atwood

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LBJ and Vietnam: A Conversation - Not Even Pasthttps://notevenpast.org/lbj-and-vietnam-conversation/[5/18/2020 10:24:14 AM]"The past is never dead. It's not even past." William FaulknerNOT EVEN PAST     THE PUBLIC HISTORIANMore from The Public HistorianBOOKSMore BooksDIGITAL HISTORYLBJ and Vietnam: A Conversationby Mark Atwood LawrenceWhy did the United States choose to fight a major war in Vietnam? The question has bedeviled scholarsalmost since President Lyndon Johnson made the decision in 1965.The most common answer that historians have offered over the years suggests that LBJ believed he hadno real option but to commit U.S. forces.  In this view, the president understood that the government ofSouth Vietnam, a strong ally of the United States, would inevitably collapse under the weight of amounting communist insurgency if Washington did not send troops to help stave off the threat. Thepresident believed, moreover, that such a collapse would amount to a major defeat for the United Statesin a key part of the world and would imperil U.S. security everywhere by calling into questionWashington’s determination to help its allies around the globe. So momentous were the stakes, in short,that LBJ never seriously considered any alternative to escalation. But LBJ was, in this view, certain ofanother thing too: U.S. troops, once committed, would inevitably succeed in defeating the communistinsurgency and bolstering South Vietnam as a pro-U.S. bastion. Johnson was convinced of the necessityof intervening in Vietnam and the certainty of success. Like 4TweetMaking History: Houston’s “Spirit of theConfederacy”May 06, 2020America for Americans: A History ofXenophobia in the United States byErika Lee (2019)April 20, 2020Más de 72: Digital Archive ReviewBOOKS FILMS & MEDIA THE PUBLIC HISTORIAN BLOG TEXAS ABOUTSTUDENTSOUR/STORIES15 MINUTE HISTORY Not Even Past 652 New Edit Post Howdy, Gilbert BorregoLBJ and Vietnam: A Conversation - Not Even Pasthttps://notevenpast.org/lbj-and-vietnam-conversation/[5/18/2020 10:24:14 AM]More from Digital HistoryFILMS & MEDIAMore from Films & MediaTEXASMore from TexasAs historians have gained access to secret documentation, however, they have questioned thisinterpretation. Again and again, newly opened records from the National Archives in Maryland, theLyndon Johnson Presidential Library at UT-Austin, and elsewhere have demonstrated that the presidentand his advisers recognized reasonable alternatives to intervention and foresaw the many problems thatwould beset U.S. forces when they were sent into Vietnam. The result of such discoveries has been topaint a new picture of LBJ’s decision-making in 1964 and 1965. Where scholars once saw certainty andconfidence, they now see indecision and anxiety.One of the best pieces of evidence for this newer view of U.S. decision-making is the recording of aconversation between LBJ and his national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy, on May 27, 1964. Thistape, released by the LBJ Library in 1997, is among the most spectacular of the telephone conversationsrecorded in the Oval Office during the Johnson presidency. Like other chief executives from FranklinRoosevelt to Richard Nixon, LBJ frequently recorded conversations and meetings, most likely in order tohave a record to refresh his memory but possibly also to help shape the historical record. Whatever themotive, the recordings unquestionably offer historians a remarkable new resource for appreciating thepresident’s personal opinions much more fully than ever before.In his conversation with Bundy, LBJ expresses deep anxiety about what would happen if the UnitedStates failed to defend South Vietnam from communist takeover – evidence that bolsters the older,conventional view of U.S. motives for escalation. Fearing what historians would later dub the “dominoeffect,” Johnson suggests that the communist powers – the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic ofChina – would be emboldened by a communist victory in South Vietnam and might make troubleelsewhere. The communists, in fact, “may just chase you right into your own kitchen,” the president saysin his typical down-home manner. LBJ also provides evidence for the older interpretation by breezilydismissing other powerful Americans who urged him to negotiate a settlement and withdraw U.S. powerfrom South Vietnam. He shows special contempt for Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, chargingthat the Montana Democrat, a strong advocate of winding down the U.S. role in South Vietnam, had “nospine at all” and took a position that was “just milquetoast as it can be.”In other parts of the conversation, however, LBJ heaps doubt on the idea that defending South Vietnamwas crucial to U.S. security. “What in the hell is Vietnam worth to me?” he asks Bundy. “What is Laosworth to me? What is it worth to this country?” Most chillingly, Johnson shows keen awareness thatvictory in Vietnam was anything but a sure thing. He worries that full-fledged U.S. intervention in Vietnamwould trigger corresponding escalation by communist China, raising the horrifying specter of a directsuperpower confrontation, as in Korea a few years earlier, between Chinese and U.S. forces. “I don’t thinkwe can fight them 10,000 miles away from home and ever get anywhere in that area,” LBJ asserts.Moreover, the United States, once committed to a war, might find it impossible to get out. “It’s damn easyto get into a war, but … it’s going to be awful hard to ever extricate yourself if you get in,” LBJ asserts withremarkable prescience.Johnson also defies the older interpretation of his outlook by showing openness to a range of opinionsabout how to proceed in Vietnam. To be sure, he hardly expresses enthusiasm about the idea of cuttingAmerican losses and withdrawing from South Vietnam, as Mansfield and prominent journalist WalterLippmann among others were urging at the time. Neither, however, does he dismiss the possibility out ofhand when the subject comes up. On the contrary, he urges consideration of a wide range of opinionsand expresses hope that Lippmann might sit down with the hawkish Secretary of Defense RobertMarch 16, 2020Ayka (Dir: Sergei Dvortsevoy, 2018)October 02, 2019A (Queer) Rebel Wife In TexasMarch 11, 2020LBJ and Vietnam: A Conversation - Not Even Pasthttps://notevenpast.org/lbj-and-vietnam-conversation/[5/18/2020 10:24:14 AM]19th century 20th Century African American History american history Asia Asia & Middle East book review Brazil British Empire China Civil War Cold War Colonialism communism cultural history digital history Early Modern Europe Europe film gender history History of Science immigration India Islam Latin America Latin American History Mexico Not Even Past Public History race religion Russia slavery Texas Texas History Texas History Day Transnational Twentieth Century History United States US History USSR Womens History world history World War IINOT EVEN PAST is produced byThe Department of HistoryTHE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN We are supported by the College of Liberal ArtsAnd our READERSDONATECONTACTAll content © 2010-present NOT EVEN PAST and the authors,unless otherwise notedSign up to receive bi-weekly email updatesMcNamara to discuss their differences.Which is the “real” LBJ – the president who dismissed Mansfield as spineless or the president whoquestioned the real value of an independent, pro-American South Vietnam to the United States? At theend of the day, of course, it’s impossible to say. Both sets of ideas seem to have swirled simultaneously inLBJ’s head as he made fateful decisions. But one thing is certain: simple, rigid interpretations ofJohnson’s attitudes to not hold up to the remarkable complexity of the emerging documentary record. Toappreciate U.S. decision-making fully will require the release of further sources but also, almost certainly,a willingness to tolerate contradictions, nuance, and ambiguity.Listen to the conversation (Johnson, Lyndon B. Johnson’s Vietnam Anguish, May 27, 1964: Conversationwith national security advisor McGeorge Bundy. 27 May 1964. History and Politics Out Loud. Ed. JerryGoldman. 30 Sept. 1999. Northwestern University.)Transcript of the conversation (Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the President’sSpecial Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, May 27, 1964, 11:24 a.m.. Source:U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-68, Volume XXVII, MainlandSoutheast Asia: Regional Affairs, Washington, DC, Document Number 53. Original Source: JohnsonLibrary, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a telephone conversation between the President andMcGeorge Bundy, Tape 64.28 PNO 111. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by theOffice of the Historian specifically for this volume.)Posted October 25, 2010More 1900s, Asia, Blog, Cold War, Discover, Politics, United StatesBOOKS FILMS & MEDIA THE PUBLIC HISTORIAN BLOG TEXAS

LBJ and Vietnam: A Conversation

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LBJ and Vietnam: A Conversation

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