In his Democratic justice and the social contract, Weale presents a distinctive contingent practice-dependent model of \u2018democratic justice\u2019 that relies heavily on a condition of just social and political relations among equals. Several issues arise from this account. Under which conditions might such just social and political relations be realised? What ideal of equality is required for \u2018democratic justice\u2019? What are its implications for the political ideal of citizenship? This paper focuses on these questions as a way to critically reconsider Weale\u2019s model. After presenting Weale\u2019s procedural constructivism, I distinguish his model from an institutional practice-dependent model, one salient example of which is Rawls\u2019s political constructivism. This distinction allows for a formulation of the social and political equality required for justice in each case. The contingent model assumes that an equality of \u2018status\u2019 will generate just social practices, yet it fails to recognise that an equality of \u2018role\u2019 is also important to ensure citizens\u2019 compliance. The paper ultimately seeks to show that the contingent model is insufficient to ensure that just social practices will become stable
