In this paper I argue that the consistency condition from the Deutsch's influential model for closed timelike curves (CTCs) differs significantly from the classical consistency condition found in Lewis (1976) and Novikov (2002), as well as from the consistency condition found in the P-CTC model, the major rival to Deutsch's approach. Both the CCC and the P-CTC consistency condition are formulable in the context of a single history of the world. Deutsch's consistency condition relies on the existence of a structure of parallel worlds. I argue that Deutsch's commitment to realism about parallel worlds puts his solutions to the information paradox in jeopardy. I argue that, because of Deutsch's commitment to this metaphysical picture, he is committed to the existence of physical situations that are in every way indistinguishable from the paradoxes he attempts to rule out by adopting the model in the first place. Deutsch's proposed solution to the Knowledge Paradox, in particular his commitment to the actuality of the many worlds of the Everett interpretation (on which he relies to solve the paradoxes), guarantees the existence of worlds that are indistinguishable from worlds in which the genuine Knowledge Paradox arises
