Conrad, Amy

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Recent Developments: Godinez v. Moran: the Standard of Competency Required by the Due Process Clause for Pleading Guilty or Waiving Right to Counsel Is the Same as the Standard for Competency to Stand Trial

University of Baltimore School of Law

University of Baltimore Law ForumVolume 24Number 2 Fall, 1993 Article 71993Recent Developments: Godinez v. Moran: theStandard of Competency Required by the DueProcess Clause for Pleading Guilty or WaivingRight to Counsel Is the Same as the Standard forCompetency to Stand TrialAmy ConradFollow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lfPart of the Law CommonsThis Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion inUniversity of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, pleasecontact snolan@ubalt.edu.Recommended CitationConrad, Amy (1993) "Recent Developments: Godinez v. Moran: the Standard of Competency Required by the Due Process Clausefor Pleading Guilty or Waiving Right to Counsel Is the Same as the Standard for Competency to Stand Trial," University of BaltimoreLaw Forum: Vol. 24 : No. 2 , Article 7.Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol24/iss2/7Godinez v. MoranTHE STANDARD OFCOMPETENCYREQUIRED BY THEDUE PROCESS CLAUSEFOR PLEADING GUILTYOR WAIVING RIGHTTO COUNSELIS THE SAME ASTHE STANDARD FORCOMPETENCYTO STAND TRIALThe United States Supreme Courtin Godinez v. Moran, 113 S.Ct. 2680(1993), held that the standard ofmen-tal functioning required before a crimi-nal defendant may plead guilty orvoluntarily waive his right to the as-sistance of counsel is the same stan-dard of competency required for stand-ing trial. In so holding, Justice Tho-mas, writing for the majority, foundthat the Due Process Clause did notrequire a heightened competency stan-dard for pleading guilty or waivingthe right to counsel.On August 13, 1984, in his hospi-tal bed, Richard Allen Moran con-fessed to killing the bartender of theRed Pearl Saloon in Carson City,Nevada, and a patron of that estab-lishment on August 2, 1984. Hefurther admitted that he murdered hisex-wife nine days later. Following theshooting of his ex-wife, Moran at-tempted suicide by shooting himselfin the abdomen and slitting his wrists.At arraignment, Moran entered aplea of not guilty to three counts offirst-degree murder. Subsequently, thetrial court ordered apsychiatric evalu-ation in order to ascertain his compe-tence to stand trial. In September1984, two psychiatrists found thatMoran was competent to stand trial.The prosecution then issued notice ofits intent to seek the death penalty. OnNovember 28, 1984, Moran informedthe trial court ofhis des ire to waive hi sconstitutional right to the assistanceof counsel and to enter guilty pleas tothe three murder counts in order toprevent the admission of mitigatingevidence at sentencing. Thereupon,the trial court inquired into Moran'smental competence to waive his rightsand found that Moran '"knowinglyand intelligently' waive[d] his right tothe assistance of counsel.. and thathis guilty pleas were 'freely and vol-untarily' given...." Godinez, 113 S.Ct.at 2683 (citations omitted).A three judge panel sentencedMoran to death for each of the threecounts of first-degree murder on Janu-ary 21, 1985. On appeal, the Su-preme Court of Nevada upheld bothdeath sentences for the Red PearlSaloon murders, but reversed the sen-tence for the murder of Moran's ex-wife in favor ofa life sentence withoutparole.Thereafter, Moran sought post-conviction reliefinNevada state courton the theory that he was incompetentto serve as his own counsel. At anevidentiary hearing, the trial courtrejected Moran's claim on the basisthat two psychiatrists had evaluatedhim as competent and Nevada's high-est court dismissedhis appeal. Moranthen filed a writ of habeas corpus inthe United States District Court forthe District of Nevada, which deniedhis petition.Subsequently, the Court of Ap-peals for the Ninth Circuit reversedand concluded that the Nevada statetrial court erred at the post-convictionevidentiary hearing when it appliedthe competency standard for standingtrial, rather thanthe "reasoned choice"standard. The court of appeals ruledthat constitutional waiver required aheightened standard of competencybecause waiving counsel or pleadingguilty requires a "capacity for 'rea-soned choice' among the alternativesavailable to him." Id. at 2684 (cita-tions omitted). The United StatesSupreme Court granted certiorari inorder to resolve the conflict among thefederal courts of appeals and the statesupreme courts as to what standard ofcompetency due process requires whenevaluating a criminal defendant's en-try of a guilty plea or waiver of hisright to counsel.The Court began its analysis byenumerating a two-prong test formental competence to stand trial--thethreshold issue which must be re-solved before a criminal defendantmay be tried. The first element re-quired a criminal defendant to have"'sufficient present ability to consultwith his lawyer with a reasonabledegree of rational understanding."'Id. at 2685 (quoting Dusky v. UnitedStates, 362 U.S. 402 (1960)). Thesecond element required the defen-dant to have "a rational as well asfactual understanding of the proceed-ings against him." Id. (quoting Dusky,362 U.S. 402 (1960)).The Court next rejected the posi-tion of the court of appeals that due26 - U. Bait. L.F. / 24.2RECENT DEVELOPMENTSprocess requires a heightened level ofmental functioning before a criminaldefendant may plead guilty or waivehis right to counsel. The Court did notdistinguish between the "reasonedchoice" standard of competence ap-plied by the court of appeals and the"rational understanding of the pro-ceedings" test applied when evaluat-ing competency to stand trial. TheCourt observed that a criminal defen-dant will have to consider the samerights when deciding either to standtrial or plead guilty. The Court recog-nized that "while the decision to pleadguilty is undeniably a profound one, itis no more complicated than the sumtotal of decisions that a defendantmay be called upon to make during thecourse of a trial." Id. at 2686. Suchdecisions may include whether to takethe witness stand, waive his right to ajury trial, or waive his right to con-front his accusers by foregoing anycross-examination of the state's wit-ness. Id.Moreover, the Court opined that acriminal defendant's waiver of hisconstitutional right to the assistanceof counsel does not require the exer-cise of"an appreciably higher level ofmental functioning than the decisionto waive other constitutional rights."Id. The Court emphasized that adefendant need only make a compe-tent waiver, regardless of whether ornot he is competent to represent him-self. Although the accused may beincapable of representing himself ef-fectively due to his lack of legal knowl-edge and experience, the Courtstressed the necessity of honoring adefendant's right to choose self-rep-resentation. Id. at 2687.The Court continued its analysisby clarifying the two-prong waivertest contemplated in Westbrook v.Arizona, 384 U.S. 150(1966). First,the court must determine that a defen-dant is competent to stand trial. Sec-ond, once a defendant decides to pleadguilty or waive his right to counsel,the trial court must make a findingthat the defendant made a knowingand voluntary relinquishment of hisconstitutional rights. Id. (citationsomitted). The Court noted, however,that a trial court need not make aseparate competency determination inevery case, but only in those where thedefendant's competency to stand trialis in doubt. Id. at 2688, n.13.The Court concluded by statingthat the purpose of the competencyrequirement is to safeguard that acriminal defendant understands thenature of the proceedings initiatedagainst him and that he is capable ofassisting counsel in his defense. TheCourt also stressed that the level ofmental functioning needed to assistcounsel during trial, such as whethera defendant should take the witnessstand and thereby waive his rightagainst self-incrimination, is the samelevel of mental functioning requiredto reasonably waive other constitu-tional rights.In his concurring opinion, JusticeKennedy, with whom Justice Scaliajoined, agreed in the result, but notedhis reservations about the majority'sreasoning. Justice Kennedy foundthat the majority's emphasis upon thetypes of decisions a defendant mustmake throughout the course of a trialwas misplaced. The concurring opin-ion stated that such reasoning tends to"confuse the content of the standardwith the occasions for its applica-tion." Id. at 2688 (Kennedy, J., con-curring). Through an historical analy-sis of the common law, JusticeKennedy determined that a single com-petency standard applied for the dura-tion of a trial to all of the variousdecisions a defendant may makethroughout the pendency of his case.Justice Kennedy then concluded thata single standard of competency didnot offend the requirements of theDue Process Clause. Id. at 2691.In his dissenting opinion, JusticeBlackmun, with whom Justice Stevensjoined, rejected the majority's analy-sis as "contrary to both common senseand longstanding case law." 1d. at2692 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Jus-tice Blackmun further admonished themajority for diminishing the signifi-cance of key facts and circumstancesof the Moran case. The Court mini-mized the importance of his suicideattempt and use of four different pre-scription drugs at the time he pleadguilty to capital murder and waivedhis right to counsel, by relegatingthem to footnotes. Justice Blackmunfurther argued that based on the factsof the Moran case, the trial courtshould have conducted another com-petency determination to establish ifMoran was capable of waiving hisconstitutional rights. The dissent con-sidered the competency standards forstanding trial and waiving counsel asinherently different, thereby conclud-ing that the standard of competencyrequired to waive the right to counselwas similar to the Ninth Circuit's"reasoned choice" standard. Id. at2695.The Godinez decision is signifi-cant in that the Supreme Court hasresolved the confusion surroundingthe competency standard requiredwhen a defendant waives his right tocounsel or enters a plea of guilty.According to the Court, the Due Pro-cess Clause requires only a finding ofcompetency to stand trial. This stan-dard is the level of mental functioningneeded to reasonably make any deci-sion throughout the course of a trial,as long as a defendant has been ren-dered competent to assist counsel inhis defense. This simplifies the in-quiry in criminal cases where compe-tency to stand trial is not in doubt; inthose cases the trial court need onlydetermine whether the defendantknowingly and intelligently waivedhis constitutional rights.- Amy Conrad24.2 / U. Bait. L.F. - 27

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Recent Developments: Godinez v. Moran: the Standard of Competency Required by the Due Process Clause for Pleading Guilty or Waiving Right to Counsel Is the Same as the Standard for Competency to Stand Trial

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