Lee, Elizabeth A.

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Recent Developments: Murphy v. Edmonds: Maryland\u27s Statutory Cap on Noneconomic Damages in Personal Injury Cases Is Constitutional and Neither Violates Due Process nor Denies Right to a Jury Trial

University of Baltimore School of Law

University of Baltimore Law ForumVolume 22Number 3 Spring, 1992 Article 151992Recent Developments: Murphy v. Edmonds:Maryland's Statutory Cap on NoneconomicDamages in Personal Injury Cases Is Constitutionaland Neither Violates Due Process nor Denies Rightto a Jury TrialElizabeth A. LeeFollow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lfPart of the Law CommonsThis Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion inUniversity of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, pleasecontact snolan@ubalt.edu.Recommended CitationLee, Elizabeth A. (1992) "Recent Developments: Murphy v. Edmonds: Maryland's Statutory Cap on Noneconomic Damages inPersonal Injury Cases Is Constitutional and Neither Violates Due Process nor Denies Right to a Jury Trial," University of Baltimore LawForum: Vol. 22 : No. 3 , Article 15.Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol22/iss3/15that changes have occurred which, when considered with all other rel-evant circumstances, required that a change in custody be made to accom-modate the future best interest of the children" Id. at 1139. The court ac-knowledged that "[a] determination of custody requires an element ofpredic-tion" and that it is "neither necessary nor desirable" to wait until a child is harmed to make a custody change. Id. The court also examined the rela-tionship between a master's recom-mendations and a chancellor's judge-ment. In particular, the court was troubled by the chancellor's failure to exercise independent judgment after subjecting the master's fact-finding to a clearly erroneous test. The court called the burden on chancellors "sub-stantial," and the court emphasized that while consideration may and should be given to a master's recom-mendations, the final decision must be that of the chancellor's. Id. at 1135, 1138. ''That the conclusions ... ofthe master are well supported by the evi-dence is not dispositive ifthe indepen-dent exercise of judgment by the chan-cellor on those issues would produce a different result," explained the court. Id. at 1135. The McCready and Domingues opinions should provide fresh guid-ance for change-in-custody cases. The decisions affirmed that the standard for modification of custody orders is the ''best interests ofthe child." Addition-ally, the Court of Appeals of Maryland clearly stated that a child need not have been adversely affected before a chance in custody can occur. Finally, the court's emphasis on the chancellor's duty to exercise independent judgment forces trial judges to take procedural steps to avoid the appearance of rub-ber-stamping the recommendations of masters. - Catherine E. Head 32 - The Law Foruml22.3 Murphyv. Edmonds: MARYLAND'S STATUTORY CAPON NONECO-NOMIC DAMAGES IN PER-SONAL INJURY CASES IS CON-STITUTIONAL AND NEITHER VIOLATES DUE PROCESS NOR DENIES RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL. In Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102 (Md. 1992), the Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld the State's statu-tory cap on noneconomic damages in personal injury cases as constitutional. Using the least burdensome test in analyzing the Courts & Judicial Pro-ceedings article, section 11-108 ofthe Maryland Code, the court found that the law was rationally related to the State's purpose and did not violate the equal protection clause of the constitu-tion. The court's ruling also means that limiting a jury's award with a noneconomic damages cap does not violate an individual's constitutional right to a jury trial. In justifying it's position, the court proclaimed its def-erence to the legislature in removing the issue from the judiciary and enact-ing the cap with legislation. Sarah Murphy was involved in an automobile accident while driving on 1-83 in Baltimore. The defendants' tire blew out and his truck ran across the median striking Ms. Murphy, causing her serious injuries. Ms. Murphy and her husband filed a complaint in Balti-more County Circuit Court for com-pensatory and punitive damages. The jury awarded the Murphys $510,000 in noneconomic damages. The defen-dants filed post trial motions request-ing that the noneconomic damages be reduced to the statutory amount of $350,000 as provided in section 11-108. The plaintiffs, however, argued that section 11-108 violated the equal pro-tection guarantee embodied in the Due Process Clause found in article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The trial court ruled that the statute limited an important right, and there-fore, the statute would have to pass the heightened scrutiny test. Id. at 106. The judge found the statute failed heightened scrutiny and therefore up-held the jury award. The court of special appeals re-versed the trial court's holding in Edmonds v. Murphy, 573 A.2d 853 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990). There, the court found that there was no impor-tant right which the statute was limit-ing and, determined that as such, sec-tion 11-108 was rationally related to the State's goal of economic regula-tion and thus constitutional. . The plaintiffs appealed to the court of appeals on two issues: 1) that the classification created by section Il-108 violated the equal protection guar-antee of article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and 2) that sec-tion 11-108 infringes upon the right to ajurytrial under articles 5and23 ofthe Maryland Declaration of Rights. The court began its analysis on the premise that equal protection as ad-dressed in Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and ar-ticle 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights was the same concept for ana-lytical purposes. Opinions of the United States Supreme Court dealing with the Equal Protection Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment were there-fore viewed by the court of appeals as ''practically direct authorities." Id. at 1 08 (citing Attorney General v. Waldron, 426 A.2d 929 (1981». The plaintiffs argued that section 11-108 created two classes of people when damages were awarded under this statute. One group, composed of those who were less seriously injured, got to keep the entire jury award, while the other group, those who were more seriously injured, did not. Such classi-fication, the plaintiffs argued, was in violation ofthe equal protection guar-antee of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. In addressing the plaintiffs' claim, the court discussed the three different standards of review for classifications chaJlenged under the equal protection guarantees. The least restrictive stan-dard of review was the rational basis test, where it would strike down legis-lation "only if it [was] so unrelated to legitimate purpose that government actions were irrational." Id. (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, III S. Ct. 2395, 2406 (1991». Secondly, the court identified "in-termediate scrutiny," or "heightened scrutiny." For this classification to be sustained it "must serve important gov-ernmental objectives and must be sub-stantially related to achievement of those objectives." Id. at 110 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976». The court then recognized the third category involving cases where a "sus.., pect class" or a "fundamental right" was burdened. The court explained that the classification was subject to strict scrutiny and it would uphold such a law "under equal protection guarantee only if it [was] shown that 'they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest. ,,, Id. at 109 (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985». The plaintiffs argued that the inter-mediate scrutiny test should apply be-cause section 11-1 08 limits an "impor-tant personal right." Id. at 111. The plaintiffs asserted that this personal right arose out of the common law right to be compensated for noneconomic damages. The court of appeals refused to apply the intermedi-ate test on the basis that, in its view, the right to compensation under common law does not give rise to an "important personal right." The court stated, "a legislative cap of $350,000 upon the amount of noneconomic damages which can be awarded to a tort plaintiff does not implicate such an important 'right' as to trigger any enhanced scru-tiny." Id. The court based its position on ar-ticle 5 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which said the common law was subject "to the revision of and amendment or repeal by the legislature of this state." Id. at 112. The court reasoned that just because a law was found in the common law does not mean that the legislature could not change it. Further, the court empha-sized that iftheplaintiffs' position was adopted, every common law would become a personal right and applying the intermediate standard of review would prevent the legislature from making many laws. Id. The court pointed out that its deci-sion followed the United States Su-preme Court's ruling in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978), where the Court ap-plied the rational basis test to a legisla-tive cap on tort damages in nuclear power accidents. In that case, the Court stated that the law was "'a clas-sic example of an economic regula-tion' needed to accommodate 'the bur-dens and benefits of economic life, '" and further emphasized that '''[a] per-son has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law.'" Id. (quoting Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 88). The court of appeals further stated that its holding does not limit a person's access to the courts, as the Murphys argued. The court reasoned that modi-fying the substantive law does not re-strict access to the courts. Even if section 11-108 was restrictive, the court explained, it would be reasonable based upon the legislative intent of increas-ing the availability of insurance in Maryland. Id. at 113-14. Having decided that the rational basis test applied in this case, the court viewed the statute as constitutional. The court looked to the General Assembly's reasoning for passing the legislation. The court noted the legislature's concern about the avail-ability and cost ofliability insurance in Maryland, the excessive insurance pre-miums for doctors, and the declining services available for patients. The court noted that the stated purpose of the law was to "assure the availability of sufficient liability insurance, at a reasonable cost, in orderto coverclairns for personal injuries to members of the public." Id. at 115. As such, it served a legitimate state purpose and applied to all personal injury claimants equally, ratherthan singling out one category of claimants. Therefore, the court held that the noneconomic damages cap was neither irrational or arbitrary. The plaintiffs' second argument was that the cap violated their right to a jury trial as guaranteed by articles 5 and 23 ofthe Maryland Declaration of Rights. Their rights, the plaintiffs argued, were violated because the cap interfered with the jury's ability to properly determine damages and also interfered ''with the jury's exclusive province in determin-ing factual issues." Id. at 116. The court rejected this argument, stating that, because it was decided that the legislature was allowed to cap noneconomic damages, there was noth-ing for the judge or the jury to decide. Id. The right to a jury trial arises in cases where the result or issue must be decided by either the judge or the jury. The court held, however, that the leg-islature had taken the issue of noneconomic damages out ofthe hands of both the judge and jury. ld. The holding in Murphy settles a long argument in the legal, legislative and insurance communities. The Mary-land Legislature enacted the noneconomic damages cap because it places as a high priority on the avail-ability of insurance to Maryland citi-zens. The court of appeals has clearly decided this one issue of whether sec-tion 11-108 is constitutional. Yet, it is foreseeable that more litigation will follow as future litigants debate issues regarding whether certain damages are economic or noneconomic, as well as to which cases the noneconomic cap will apply. - Elizabeth A. Lee Woodson v. State: HEIGHTENED EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATION REQUIRED TO ADMIT CONFES-SIONS WHICH TRIGGER DEATH SENTENCE ELIGIBIL-ITY. In Woodson v. State, 325 Md. 251, 600 A.2d 420 (1992), the Court of Appeals of Maryland nullified petitioner's death sentence by revers-_____________________________ 22.3/fhe Law Forum - 33 

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Recent Developments: Murphy v. Edmonds: Maryland\u27s Statutory Cap on Noneconomic Damages in Personal Injury Cases Is Constitutional and Neither Violates Due Process nor Denies Right to a Jury Trial

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