Holz, Andrea S.

English

University of Baltimore School of Law

University of Baltimore Law ForumVolume 25Number 2 Fall, 1994 Article 101994Recent Developments: Ayers v. State: Maryland's"Hate Crimes" Statute Held Not to BeUnconstitutional Because Petitioner LackedStanding to Make a Facial Challenge of the StatuteAndrea S. HolzFollow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lfPart of the Law CommonsThis Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion inUniversity of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, pleasecontact snolan@ubalt.edu.Recommended CitationHolz, Andrea S. (1994) "Recent Developments: Ayers v. State: Maryland's "Hate Crimes" Statute Held Not to Be UnconstitutionalBecause Petitioner Lacked Standing to Make a Facial Challenge of the Statute," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 25 : No. 2 ,Article 10.Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol25/iss2/10Ayers v. State: MARYLAND'S "HATE CRIMES" STATUTE HELD NOT TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE PETITIONER LACKED STANDING TO MAKE A FACIAL CHALLENGE OF THE STATUTE. In Ayers v. State, 335 Md. 602, 645 A.2d 22 (1994), the Court of Appeals of Mary-land, in a 4-3 decision, held that Maryland's "hate crimes" stat-ute, Maryland Annotated Code article 27, Section 470A(b )(3)(i), was not unconstitutional as ap-plied to the facts of this case. The court did not reach the ques-tion of whether the statute is indefinite and has a chilling ef-fect on the exercise of First Amendment liberties because the court held that Ayers lacked standing to make such a chal-lenge of the statute. Nonethe-less, by so holding, the Court of Appeals of Maryland sent a strong message to Maryland cit-izens that crimes motivated by racial prejudice will not be tol-erated. On the evening of March 2, 1992, Petitioner John Randolph Ayers and his friend, Sean Riley, discussed a racial incident that occurred at an area 7-Eleven store several nights earlier in which Ayers confront-ed a black male teenager, shout-ed racial epithets at him and knocked him to the ground. In addition, Ayers shouted racial epithets at a black female teen-ager and chased her. After dis-cussing this earlier incident, Ayers and Riley saw two black women walking and began to chase them. Riley chased one woman, Myrtle Guillory, and Ayers chased the other, Johnnie Mae McCrae. Guillory man-aged to safely reach a friend's house and called the police; Ayers abducted McCrae, dragged her into the woods, threatened to kill her, and at-tempted to set her on fire by spraying charcoal lighter fluid on her. Ayers was indicted in the Circuit Court for Montgom-ery County for assault, assault with intent to maim, kidnap-ping, conspiracy to commit a racially motivated crime, and committing a racially motivated crime in violation of the "Hate Crimes" statute, Section 470A(b)(3)(i). At trial, Guillory and McCrae testified as to the inci-dent. Riley, testifYingasa State's witness, said that he and Ayers went out that evening to find black people to beat up because they were angry about the 7-Eleven incident that had oc-curred several nights before. In addition, Riley corroborated Guillory and McCrae's testimo-ny as to the facts of the case. Ayers disputed all of this testi-mony, stating that the incident occurred because he and Riley were provoked by the black women. During cross-exami-nation, Ayers admitted that the 7-Eleven confrontation was ra-cial in nature and that he had chased some black people be-cause he was upset. The defense made sev-eral motions for mistrial based on the theories that the prosecu-tion was trying to get Ayers to incriminate himself on the other charge and that the prosecu-tion's use of Lisa Walker, one of the black teenagers from the 7 -Eleven incident, was inadmis-sible testimony. The trial court ultimately overruled each mo-tion for mistrial, holding that Walker's testimony was proper because it tended to show mo-tive which is an element of the offense of committing a racially motivated crime under Section 470A(b)(3)(i). However, the court did givethejury a caution-ary instruction stating that cer-tain acts that occurred during the 7-Eleven incident were not to be considered by the jury in determining their ultimate deci-sion; they were merely to estab-lish proof Defense counsel stat-ed that they were satisfied with this instruction. Lastly, in its instruction to the jury, the court made the following statement: "[t]hede-fendant is also charged with the racially motivated crime. It is a crime to harass or commit a crime upon a person because of that person's race, color, reli-gious beliefs, or national ori-gin." In addition, the State used the term "harass" during its closing argument. Defense counsel did not object to the instruction or the closing argu-ment. Ayers was subsequently found guilty on all counts and was sentenced to incarceration for a total of sixty years. Ayers appealed his con-viction based on four arguments. First, Ayers argued that his con-victionunder Section 470Amust be overturned because Section 470A on its face violates the First and Fourteenth Amend-ments in that the part of the statute prohibiting "harass-ment" of someone based on race is unconstitutionally vague, fails to provide fair notice as to what behavior constitutes "ha-RECENT DEVELOPMENTS rassment," and creates a danger of arbitrary enforcement. Ayers, 335 Md. at 619,645 A.2d at 30. Ayers also contended that the statute is overbroad because "harass" was not defined, and that the statute is a content-based regulation of speech which cannot be justified. Id. Second, Ayers argued that the statute was unconstitutional as applied in this case because by allowing the 7-Eleven testimo-ny into evidence, the court al-lowed prejudicial and irrelevant testimony which prevented him from receiving a fair trial. Fur-thermore, the trial judge erred by not weighing the probative value of the testimony against its prejudicial impact. Id. at 620, 645 A.2d at 30-31. Third, Ayers attacked the sufficiency of evidence presented to con-vict him under Section 470A, arguing that the only evidence that his acts were racially moti-vated came from his accom-plice, Riley, and therefore his conviction violated the rule that a person may not be convicted on the uncorroborated testimo-ny of an accomplice. Id. at 621, 645 A.2d at 3l. Ayers' final argument was that the court abused its discretion in sentenc-ing him to a sixty year prison term which constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari prior to re-view by the court of special appeals. In its analysis of Ayers' first argument, the court of ap-peals noted that Ayers was not charged under the harassment portion of Section 470A. Ayers acknowledged this but argued that the jury may have convict-ed him of harassment based on the court's instruction and the State's closing argument which both mentioned the word "ha-rass." Id. at 626, 645 A.2d at 33. The court pointed out that Ayers never raised any objec-tion to the use of the term "ha-rass" by the court and the State, and therefore Ayers was pre-cluded from raising this issue on appeal. Id. at 627-28,645 A.2d at 34. In addition, the court refused to believe that using the word "harass" in the jury in-struction and the closing argu-ment was sufficient to lead the jury to conclude that Ayers was charged with, and could be con-victed for, mere harassment. Id. at 628, 645 A.2dat34-35. Last-ly, the court held that the record was devoid of evidence that, during the attack ofthe victims, Ayers was engaged in any sem-blance of constitutionally pro-tected speech that was consid-ered by the jury in determining his guilt. Id. at 627,645 A.2d at 34. Therefore, the court con-cluded that "Ayers lack[ed] standing to challenge the stat-ute facially on the basis that the harassment prong of Section 470A [was] vague and over-broad." Id. at 629, 645 A.2d at 35. As to Ayers' second ar-gument, the court of appeals carefully reiterated the general rule that "evidence of a defen-dant's prior criminal acts may not be introduced to prove guilt of the offense for which the ----------~-defendant is on trial" because ofthe danger that the defendant will not be able to receive a fair trial. Id. at 630-31,645 A.2d at 35. The court, though, noted that several exceptions exist to this general rule, one being that evidence of other crimes is ad-missible if it tends to establish motive. Id. at 631,645 A.2d at 36. In prior cases, the court held that evidence of another crime is admissible if the other crime tends to directly prove the guilt of the defendant in the case at hand, or if the other crime is so linked with the crime at hand that one cannot be proven with-outtheother. Id. at631-32, 645 A.2d at 36 (citing Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565, 115 A.2d 502 (1955) and Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 350 A.2d 680 (1976)). The court outlined a three-step procedure to be fol-lowed by a trial court when determining whether to admit evidence of other crimes: 1) determine ifthe evidence is one of the longstanding exceptions to the general rule; 2) if the evidence is an exception, decide whether the defendant's involve-ment in the other crimes is es-tablished by clear and convinc-ing evidence; and 3) if the sec-ond requirement is met, weigh the probative value of the evi-dence against any prejudice to-ward the defendant that would result from allowing it into evi-dence. Ayers 335 Md. at 632, 645 A.2d at 36-37. In analyzing these steps, the court determined that the trial court did not err in its deter-mination that the evidence was admissible because: 1) the evi-dence was admitted to show motive; 2) the prosecution es-tablished Ayers' involvement in the 7-Eleven incident through the testimony ofRiley and Walk-er; and 3) the trial judge con-cluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial impact. Id. at 633-35, 645 A.2d at 37-38. The court ultimately found that the trial court did not err when it denied defense counsel's sever-al motions for mistrial and ad-mitted into evidence testimony regarding the 7 -Eleven incident. With regard to Ayers' third argument, the court held that Riley's testimony was in-deed corroborated by the testi-mony of Walker and the various police officers. Id. at 638, 645 A.2d at 39-40. Though Walker and the other witnesses did not corroborate Riley's testimony with regard to Ayers' motive in the crimes, they did corroborate Riley's testimony as to Ayers' participation in the crime. The court noted that if the corrobo-rative testimony shows the par-ticipation of the accused in the crime itself, "the trier of fact may credit the accomplice's tes-timony even with respect to matters as to which no corrob-orative testimony was ad-duced." Id. at 638,645 A.2d at 39. With regard to Ayers' cruel and unusual punishment claim, the court reviewed prior cases where it held that "a sen-tence is unconstitutional only if it is 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime committed by the - .-- -- - ----.-_---- ------ ---===-====-:J defendant." Id. at 639, 645 A.2d at 40 (quoting Thomas v. State, 333 Md. 84, 634 A.2d 1 (1993)). Because the sentences were within the permissible stat-utory and common law limits, the court held that the sentences were not unconstitutionally dis-proportionate. Id. at 640, 645 A.2d at 41. The court noted that a trial judge is vested with discretion in imposing sentenc-es, and there was no evidence in the record to support the con-clusion that an abuse of discre-tion occurred in this case. Ayers at 640-41, 645 A.2d at 41. Therefore, the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the deci-sion ofthe trial court, upholding Maryland's "Hate Crimes" stat-ute as applied to the facts of Ayers' case. Id. at 642, 645 A.2d at 41. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Bell, joined by Justices Chasanow and Raker, argued that the 7-Eleven incident should not have been admitted into evidence because this testimo-ny did not prove Ayers' motive in the case; it merely established Ayers as a bigot. Id. at 646-47, 645 A.2d at 42-43. Bell wentto great lengths to clarify this dis-tinction: evidence that Ayers was a bigot only proved that he was a bigot-it did not prove that the 7-Eleven incident was the precipice to the crime at hand, and therefore, this evi-dence did not prove Ayers' motive. Id. at 651-52,645 A.2d at 46-48. Therefore, Bell con-cluded that the testimony re-garding the 7-Eleven incident should not have been admitted .- ---~-~---- -----------into evidence, and Ayers' con-viction based on Section 470A(b )(3)(i) should have been overturned. Id. at 660, 645 A.2d at 50-51. By holding that Mary-land's "Hate Crimes" statute is not unconstitutional as applied to the facts in Ayers v. State, the Blaine v. Blaine: INDEFINITE ALIMONY MAY BE AWARDED PURSUANT TO AN EXTENSION OF REHABILITATIVE ALIMONY. RECENT DEVELOPIVCIENTS Court of Appeals of Maryland sent a warning to all Maryland citizens that crimes motivated by racial prejudice will not be tolerated. In so holding, the core of this opinion was that racial prejudice, by itself, will not be condoned, and when it is coupled with the commission of Indefinite alimony may be granted upon the termination of a fixed period of rehabilita-tive alimony, ifit is determined that circumstances have arisen since the divorce which would render termination inequitable. In so holding, the Court of Ap-peals of Maryland in Blaine v. Blaine, 336 Md. 49, 646 A.2d 413 (1994), broadened a trial court's discretion in extending indefinitely an original award of rehabilitative alimony under sec-tions 11-106 and 11-107 of the Family Law Article of the An-notated Code ofMaryland. Ad-ditionally, the court concluded that an award of indefinite ali-mony would be supported if the divorced parties' respective standards of living were found to be unconscionably disparate, and the formerly dependent spouse had made as much progress toward becoming self-a crime, it will be separately punished. The court spoke with amoral conscience, and charged all Maryland citizens to uphold this moral code by respecting the differences of all human-kind. - Andrea S. Holz supporting as could reasonably be expected. InNovember 1985, Ms. Blaine was granted an absolute divorce in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, and was awarded rehabilitative alimony in the amount of $800.00 per month for a period of sixty months. The alimony award was based on evidence that Dr. Blaine, Ms. Blaine's husband, earned a salary in excess of $62,000.00 a year compared to Ms. Blaine's income which to-taled $10,000.00 a year. In granting a fixed period of alimo-ny, the circuit court took into consideration the fact that Ms. Blaine was working towards a master's degree in health pro-motion counseling, which she anticipated would lead to a po-sitionearning$40,OOO.00ayear. Approximately five years later, Ms. Blaine made a __ . _____ ~_ .. 2S.2/U. Ba:i:. [~.?-4S 

Recent Developments: Ayers v. State: Maryland\u27s  Hate Crimes  Statute Held Not to Be Unconstitutional Because Petitioner Lacked Standing to Make a Facial Challenge of the Statute

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Recent Developments: Ayers v. State: Maryland\u27s Hate Crimes Statute Held Not to Be Unconstitutional Because Petitioner Lacked Standing to Make a Facial Challenge of the Statute

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