Hugel, David H., Esq.

English

University of Baltimore School of Law

University of Baltimore Law ForumVolume 13Number 1 Fall 1982 Article 81982Recent Developments: AdministrativeAdjudication, an Idea Whose Time Has ComeDavid H. Hugel Esq.Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lfPart of the Law CommonsThis Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion inUniversity of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.Recommended CitationHugel, David H. Esq. (1982) "Recent Developments: Administrative Adjudication, an Idea Whose Time Has Come," University ofBaltimore Law Forum: Vol. 13: No. 1, Article 8.Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol13/iss1/8FORUMRecent DevelopmentsAdministrative Adjudication, an Idea WhoseTime Has Comeby David H. Hugel, Esq.Primarily in response to an over-whelming criminal and traffic courtcaseload, the State of New York in1970 became the first jurisdiction inthis country to remove minor trafficoffenses from the criminal courtsystem. This was implemented byan innovative pilot project in NewYork City for processing such mat-ters administratively by an adjudi-cation division within the State Mo-tor Vehicle Division. The success ofthis project has resulted in its beingexpanded to include additional ju-risdictions within New York Stateand the implementation of similaradministrative adjudication pro-grams in Rhode Island and the Dis-trict of Columbia, as well as in theinitiation of pilot projects in the cityof Seattle, Washington and threeCalifornia counties.Simply stated, administrative ad-judication applies modern technol-ogy and procedures to the trial ofmotor vehicle offenses. Administra-tive adjudication removes the trialof such cases from overcrowdedcourt dockets by transferring re-sponsibility for the factual deter-mination of whether or not a mo-torist committed a given offense toan administrative agency, such asthe motor vehicle department, orquasi-judicial forum where trainedhearing officers first make thatjudgment, and then invoke appro-priate administrative licensing sanc-tions.It should be emphasized that thissimplified procedure applies only tominor traffic offenses which havebeen decriminalized and do not carrythe possibility of incarceration. It isalso important to note that motor-ists retain their right to an ultimatejudicial review of any administra-tive determination, although theNew York State experience whichprovides for an intermediate admin-istrative review indicates that nearlyall cases are resolved in the admin-istrative forum making further ap-peal to the courts unnecessary.Among the acknowledged bene-fits of administrative adjudication isthe reduction of court caseloads anddelays associated with the trial ofsuch cases within the court system.According to one comprehensivestudy evaluating New York's ad-ministrative adjudication system,"elimination of the almost 800,000traffic cases from the criminal courtshad freed a large number of judgesto devote their attention to more se-rious criminal matters. Estimates ofthe actual number have varied, butgo as high as eighteen. It was feltthat this has had a salutary effecton criminal court backlogs and de-lays." See A Report on the Status andPotential Implications of Decriminali-zation of Moving Traffic Violations, U.S.Department of Transportation,NHTSA Contract No. DOT-HS-123-1-179, Arthur Young and Company(1972).Viewed from a highway safetyperspective, the greatest benefit ofadministrative adjudication is that itreduces the time between when anoffense occurs, when it is adjudi-cated and when appropriate sanc-tions are applied. Instead of beingrequired to await a formal court pro-ceeding, followed by the inherentdelay between the time of that trialand when its results are acted uponby the driver licensing authority, aconsolidated administrative adjudi-cation system allows the immediateimposition of administrative sanc-tions following a determination ofguilt by the reviewing authority.In addition, combining the adju-dication of guilt hearing with ad-ministrative sanction procedures ismore convenient for motorists. Theyneed only appear at one proceedingwhich is conducted in a more re-laxed atmosphere than the formalcourtroom setting where traffic casesare normally tried. Studies have alsoshown that, once implemented, anadministrative adjudication systemshould be more cost effective thanthe traditional court/administrativehearing system since it reduces per-sonnel and other costs associatedwith operating a dual system.Administrative adjudication, beingnon-criminal in nature, also allowsfor relaxed rules of evidence and alesser burden of proof, such as clearand convincing evidence. Undersome systems, motorists who do notcontest the basic facts, but who wishto present mitigating evidence maytender a plea of guilty with expla-nation, thereby saving untold hoursof time for police officers who neednot appear at trial since the basicfacts of the incident are uncontro-verted. To fully appreciate the ram-ifications of handling traffic offen-ses administratively, one mustremember that in the majority ofstates traffic offenses are currentlyclassified as misdemeanors and triedin the criminal courts. As such, theyare subject to the same rules andprocedures, and offenders are pro-tected by the same constitutionalsafeguards as for any other crime.The extent of those Constitutionalrights need not be examined here.However, the U.S. Supreme Courthas made it clear that these rightsinclude, depending upon whetheror not incarceration may be im-posed, the right to counsel, Scott v.Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); and theright to jury trial, Duncan v. Louisi-ana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). In such casesthe state also has a high burden ofproof, since it must prove the de-fendant guilty beyond a reasonabledoubt and to a moral certainty.While such safeguards are essen-tial to protect the rights of defen-dants charged with criminal offen-ses from government abuses, theyhave no place in a modern drivercontrol system whose goal is not topunish the guilty, but to identifythe errant driver and to take cor-rective action designed to preventthe driver from causing injury ordamage to himself or others. Yet, inthe great majority of states, trafficoffenses are still tried in the criminalcourt system as they have been sincethe first ordinances and laws wereenacted to control the horseless car-riage when it appeared on Ameri-can highways around the turn ofthe century.There is little justification for con-tinuing to try minor traffic offensesin a court system burdened by case-loads, when viable alternatives areavailable which could relieve thissituation. Changing traditionalmethods of doing business, partic-ularly those involving long estab-lished court procedures, however,often requires overcoming en-trenched opposition from special in-terests which may feel threatenedby such changes. It is ironic thatsuch resistance often comes fromthose who would benefit the great-est from proposed changes. Lawenforcement officials, the defensebar, the courts and the motoriststhemselves, must fully appreciatethe potential benefits to be derivedfrom changing current adjudicationprocedures before they can be ex-pected to support any modificationof the present system. The adoptionof this innovative alternative to thetraditional method for handlingtraffic offenses, would be a small,but significant step toward modern-izing our archaic court system.Streamlining the driver control sys-tem by consolidating adjudicationand sanctioning procedures shouldalso result in a more efficient andeffective highway safety effort.(David H. Hugel first became interested inadministrative adjudication as a former staffaide and public information officer for theCommissioner of the Maryland Departmentof Motor Vehicles. Mr. Hugel, a 1973 grad-uate of University of Baltimore School of Law,has served as an Assistant State's Attorneyfor Baltimore County, and as AssistantCounsel with Northwestern University'sTraffic Institute. In his present position asMaryland State's Attorney's Coordinator,Mr. Hugel develops and conducts legal ed-ucation programs for state prosecutors. Healso publishes a bi-monthly newsletter de-voted to reviewing and interpreting currentappellate court decisions, and serves on nu-merous boards and committees, including theGovernor's Task Force on the Drinking Driver.Mr. Hugel has lectured extensively on legaland highway safety issues.)In Harper v. Harper, Md. ,448 A.2d 916 (1982), The Court ofAppeals took the opportunity to re-fine the approach to the classifica-tion and division of marital prop-erty. This decision will affect howMaryland courts will determine anequitable distribution of property inan action for divorce under Mary-land's Marital Property Dispositionin Divorce and Annulment Act[hereinafter referred to as MPDA],Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann.§§ 3-6A-01 to -07 (1974, 1980 Repl.Vol. & 1981 Cum. Supp.).The decision included a disputeover the division of the interests ofthe divorcing spouses in a parcel ofland which the husband had ac-quired, and paid for in part prior tothe marriage, pursuant to a land in-stallment contract and the spouses'respective interests in the house thatwas constructed on the property bythe expenditure of marital funds. Mr.Harper argued that the lower courts'decisions, which divided the par-ties' interests in the land and houseequally, were inequitable as the par-cel of land had been acquired priorto the marriage. The Court of Ap-peals upheld in part and reversedin part the lower appellate court'sholding and ordered the case re-manded to the trial court for furtherproceedings in accordance with itsopinion.Top interest on StatementSavings and Passbook AccountsGreat rates on allCertificates of DepositFull range of Mortgage LoansTax-Shelter Retirement PlansTelephone Transfer ServiceAutomatic Loan PaymentsConvenient officesthroughout the Statei Full-Service Savings Officesin all Hutzler's storesAnd much, much more...IN and Lean A rlsocatPonMAIN OFFICE: 1300 North Charles at Preston. Baltimore. Maryland 21201 (301) 332-7100FORUMIn so doing, the court indulged ina lengthy review of the statutoryhistory of MPDA and of the pre-vailing doctrines which other stateswith similar statutes have employedin enforcing those statutes. Whilestressing the importance of protect-ing the interests of spouses who hadmade monetary and nonmonetarycontribution to the marital unit andresidence, the court considered andrejected two competing theoriesadopted by a majority of its sisterjurisdictions: (1) the "inception oftitle theory," which grants title tothe spouse who had acquired an eq-uitable right to the property prior tothe marriage, even though not per-fected, and (2) the "transmutationof property theory," which classi-fies property as marital for the pur-pose of equitable distribution whenthere has been a contribution ofmarital funds to nonmarital prop-erty. Instead, the court held thatunder the MPDA, the appropriateanalysis to be applied is the "sourceof funds theory."Under that theory, when prop-erty is acquired by an expend-iture of both nonmarital andmarital property, the propertyis characterized as part non-marital and part marital. Thus,a spouse contributing nonmar-ital property is entitled to aninterest in the property in theratio of the nonmarital invest-ment to the total nonmarital andmarital investment in the prop-erty. The remaining property ischaracterized as marital prop-erty subject to an equitable dis-tribution.Harper, -- Md. at -, 448 A.2d at929.The court stated that the "sourceof funds theory" is consistent withthe language of § 3-6A-01(e), whichsets forth an exclusive list of non-marital property and indicates a leg-islative intent that certain propertynot be subject to equitable distri-bution, specifically, property whichis acquired prior to the marriage.Additionally, to best effectuate theimposition of its holding, the courtadopted an interpretation of the term"acquired" appearing in § 3-6A-01(e) as:The on-going process of mak-ing payment for property. Tib-bets, 406 A.2d at 77. Under thisdefinition, characterization ofnonmarital or marital propertydepends upon the source ofeach contribution as paymentsare made, rather than at the timelegal or equitable title or pos-session of the property is ob-tained.Id. at -, 448 A.2d at 929.Thus, in light of the court's newlyadopted source of funds theory andinterpretation of the term "ac-quired," it remanded the case to thetrial court so that there might be adetermination as to: (1) the sourceof the funds expended for the parcelof land and the improvements madethereon by the spouses individuallyand as a unit; (2) the degree to whichthe parcel of land and the maritalresidence are to be characterized asmarital and/or nonmarital; and (3)the value of the marital property.The aforementioned factors are allrelevant in the court's determina-tion of an equitable distribution ofthe property in issue.The decision adds some clarifi-cation to the MPDA which to thisdate remains a statute relatively un-defined by case law. It seems to reaffirm that Maryland courts have lit-tle or no intention of becoming acommunity property jurisdiction, asevidenced by the Court of Ap-peals's rejection of the "inception oftitle theory" and the "transmuta-tion of property theory."RecentDevelopments inMaryland's IntestateSuccession LawThe 1982 amendment to Md. Est.& Trusts Code Ann. § 3-102 (1974),is a welcome change to Maryland'sintestate succession law. The legis-lature's purpose for enacting theamendment was to reflect the in-testate's desire to have the greaterportion of the estate go to the sur-viving spouse.Under the statute as it existed priorto 1981, a surviving spouse receivedonly one third of the deceased's es-tate if there was a surviving issue.If there was no surviving issue, buta surviving parent of the deceased,then the spouse's share of the estateincreased to one half. And, if therewere no surviving issue or parents,but a surviving sibling of the de-ceased, then the spouse's share be-came one half of the residue of theestate plus $4,000.00. Thus, the onlyway a surviving spouse was entitledto receive the entire estate was ifthere were no surviving issue, par-ents or siblings of the deceased. Md.Est. & Trust Code Ann. § 3-102(1974).The 1981 amendments to the lawincreased the spouse's distributionof the estate to one half regardlessof whether there was a survivingissue or parent. Absent a survivingissue or parent, the spouse receivedthe entire estate regardless ofwhether or not there was a surviv-ing sibling. Md. Est. & Trust CodeAnn. § 3-102 (1981).The 1982 amendment gives thesurviving spouse an even greaterportion of the estate if the survivingissue is an adult as opposed to asurviving minor issue. If the surviv-ing issue is an adult, then the spousewill be entitled to the first $15,000of the estate plus one half of theresidue. The same entitlement ap-

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