Lupinacci, Brooke

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Touro Law Review Volume 19 Number 2 New York State Constitutional Decisions: 2002 Compilation Article 13 April 2015 Court of Appeals of New York, People v. William II Brooke Lupinacci Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview  Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Fourth Amendment Commons Recommended Citation Lupinacci, Brooke (2015) "Court of Appeals of New York, People v. William II," Touro Law Review: Vol. 19 : No. 2 , Article 13. Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol19/iss2/13 This Search and Seizure is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu. Court of Appeals of New York, People v. William II Cover Page Footnote 19-2 This search and seizure is available in Touro Law Review: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol19/iss2/13 SEARCH AND SEIZUREUnited States Constitution Amendment IV:[N]o warrants shall be issue, but upon probable cause,supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularlydescribing the place to be searched, and the persons orthings to be seized.New York Constitution Article I Section 12:The right of the people to be secure in their persons,houses, papers and effects, against unreasonablesearches and seizures, shall not be violated, and nowarrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,supported by oath or affirmation, and particularlydescribing the place to be searched, and the persons orthings to be seized....COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORKPeople v. William "II"; People v. Rodriguez'(decided June 6, 2002)This is a consolidated action involving two cases in whichWilliam "II" and Rodriguez were named as defendants. William IIpleaded guilty to possession of marijuana in the third degree andRodriguez was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in thethird degree.2 The trial court denied William II's motion tosuppress, and the appellate division affirmed. The trial courtdenied Rodriguez's motion to suppress, and the appellate divisionthen reversed, from which the state appealed.4 In both cases, thestate agreed that the stop and attempted frisk of William II, and the'98 N.Y.2d 93, 772 N.E.2d 1150, 745 N.Y.S.2d 792 (2002).2 Id. at 96, 772 N.E.2d at 1151, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 793.3id.4 Id. at 97, 772 N.E.2d at 1152, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 794.1Lupinacci: Search and SeizurePublished by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2003TOURO LAWREVIEWtraffic stop of Rodriguez both required reasonable suspicion. 5Both cases share a common issue: "whether the facts andinformation the police possessed, when coupled with ananonymous tip that a described individual was carrying a gun,established reasonable suspicion for the intrusions."6  In bothcases, New York Constitutional issues were not raised. Rather, theCourt of Appeals reached its decision by following the rationale ofthe United States Supreme Court decision of Florida v. J.L.7 TheNew York Court of Appeals ultimately granted William II'smotion to suppress, dismissed his indictment, and affirmed as tothe order given to Rodriguez.8In William I, the City of Ithaca Police Department receivedan anonymous call signifying that a man named "Will" was a partof a recent drive-by shooting.9 The anonymous caller gave aphysical description of Will, said he was carrying a weapon, andwas accompanied by two Caucasian males. 10 The caller alsodescribed Will's location." Upon dispatch, one officer spotted anindividual he knew as "Will Cruz," who matched the physicaldescription given by the anonymous caller, with two Caucasianmales.' 2 The officer spotted the group and frisked Cruz, eventhough Cruz's attire would not permit a weapon to be concealed.'3Another officer approached the other two males and ordered themto face his police car.1 4 The trial court initially found that WilliamII ran from the police to avoid questioning and a possible frisk.' 5Additionally, the court determined that the officer who orderedWilliam II to face the car "had no reason to believe that [WilliamII] had been handed the weapon by [Cruz] but felt that there hadbeen enough time for that to happen.' 16 The police eventually' Id. at 96, 772 N.E.2d at 1151, 745 N.Y.S. at 793.6 William II, 98 N.Y.2d at 97, 772 N.E.2d at 1151, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 793.7 529 U.S. 266 (2000).8 William II, 98 N.Y.2d at 100, 772 N.E.2d at 1153, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 795.9 Id. at 97, 772 N.E.2d at 1151, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 793.10 Id."1Id.12 id.13 William II, 98 N.Y.2d at 100, 772 N.E.2d at 1153, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 795.14 id.15id.16 Id. at 98, 772 N.E.2d at 1150, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 792.[Vol 193042Touro Law Review, Vol. 19 [2003], No. 2, Art. 13https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol19/iss2/13SEARCH AND SEIZUREapprehended William II, searched his backpack and discoveredmarijuana and drug paraphernalia.17In Rodriguez, police officers on patrol received a report thata "light-skinned male Hispanic, in his twenties, with black hair,wearin a black-and-white checkered shirt and jeans, was carryinga gun. 8 The officers observed a man that matched the descriptionstanding in front of a grocery store approximately two hours afterreceiving the initial report.' 9 The officers watched Rodriguez getinto the back seat of a car, and the officers then followed as thevehicle drove away. 20 The officers eventually pulled the car over,and as they approached the vehicle, they observed Rodriguez"dropping a gun from the car window." 21  The officerssubsequently searched Rodriguez, and placed him under arrest.22The Court of Appeals noted that for a search and seizure tobe reasonable, it must inquire as to: "whether the officer's actionwas justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably relatedin scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in thefirst place." 23  Furthermore, the court discussed that a stop bypolice, which is not justified from the beginning, could not be17 id.'" William I, 98 N.Y.2d at 98, 772 N.E.2d at 1152, 745 N.Y.S. at 794.'9 1d.20 id.21 id.22 id.23 William I, 98 N.Y.2d at 98, 772 N.E.2d at 1152, 745 N.Y.S. at 794 (citingTerry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Terry, holds that:where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leadshim reasonably to conclude in light of his experience thatcriminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whomhe is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where inthe course of investigating this behavior he identifies himselfto dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he isentitled for the protection of himself and others in the area toconduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of suchpersons in an attempt to discover weapons which might beused to assault him.392 U.S. at 20. This decision created a "stop and frisk" exception tothe probable cause requirement. Courts today will find that such asearch is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and any weaponsseized may be properly introduced in evidence against the person fromwhom they were taken. Id. at 31.20033Lupinacci: Search and SeizurePublished by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2003TOURO LAWREVIEW"validated by a subsequently acquired suspicion."24 As mentionedearlier, the state in both cases agreed that "the police intrusionswere justifiable at their inception only if the police officers'knowledge at the time carried a reasonable suspicion that criminalactivity was afoot.,25The Court of Appeals began its analysis by discussing theUnited States Supreme Court case of Florida v. J.L.,26 which thecourt found to be "particularly instructive" because of itsresemblance to the facts of William II and Rodriguez.27Ultimately, the Court of Appeals adopted the identical rationale ofUnited States Supreme Court in JL., and reached the sameconclusion: an anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is not,without more, sufficient to justify a Terry stop and frisk 2 8 of thatperson.29In Florida v. JL., police received notification from ananonymous caller that a young black male, wearing a plaid shirtstanding by a bus stop with three other black males, was carrying agun.30 The police went to the bus stop and saw a young blackmale, wearing a plaid shirt, standing amongst three other blackmales.31  Aside from the anonymous tip, the officers did notwitness any unusual activity that would indicate the possibility ofcriminal activity.3 2  One of the officers approached J.L., friskedhim and discovered a gun.3 3  J.L., who was under the age ofeighteen, was subsequently charged with carrying a weapon24 Id. at 98, 772 N.E.2d at 1152, 745 N.Y.S. at 794 (citing People v. McIntosh,96 N.Y.2d 521, 527, 755 N.E.2d 329, 333, 730 N.Y.S.2d 265, 269 (2001)).25 William I, 98 N.Y. 2d at 98, 772 N.E.2d at 1152, 745 N.Y.S. at 794. In thecontext of search and seizure, reasonable suspicion is, "that 'quantum ofknowledge sufficient to induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious [person]under the circumstances to believe criminal activity is at hand' Id. (citingPeople v. Martinez, 80 N.Y.2d 444, 606 N.E.2d 951, 591 N.Y.S. 823 (1992)(quoting People v. Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d 106, 324 N.E.2d 872, 365 N.Y.S.2d 509(1972)).26 529 U.S. 266 (2000).2 7 William IL 98 N.Y.2d at 98, 772 N.E.2d at 1152, 745 N.Y.S. at 794.28 See supra note 23.29 William II, 98 N.Y.2d at 99, 772 N.E.2d at 1153, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 795.3 0 JL., 529 U.S. at 268.31 id.32 Id.33 id.[Vol 194Touro Law Review, Vol. 19 [2003], No. 2, Art. 13https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol19/iss2/13SEARCH AND SEIZUREwithout a license.34 J.L argued that the gun should be suppressedbecause it was the "fruit of an unlawful search," and as a result, thetrial court granted J.L.'s motion.35 However, the appellate courtreversed, and the Supreme Court of Florida agreed with J.L. thatthe search was "invalid under the Fourth Amendment."36The United States Supreme Court determined that ananonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is not, without more,sufficient to justify a police officers' stop and frisk of that person.37The Court stated that the officers in J.L. based their suspicionspurely on an anonymous tip rather than their personalobservations.38 The Court then compared the facts of J.L with adecision it made ten years earlier in Alabama v. White.39In White, the Court held that an anonymous tip, ascorroborated by independent police work, did provide sufficientindicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make aTerry stop.4 ° An anonymous caller told police that a womandriving a station wagon with a broken taillight, was carrying anounce of cocaine, and was going to leave an apartment building ata specific time destined for a specific motel, which the calleridentified.4' Upon police investigation, the anonymous informantaccurately predicted every one of the woman's movements and thepolice did in fact discover cocaine on her person.42 Even thoughevery detail mentioned by the anonymous tipster was not verified,the Court found that "it was not unreasonable to conclude [that] theindependent corroboration by the police of significant aspects ofthe informer's predictions imparted some degree of reliability tothe other allegations made by the caller." 43 The Court classified itsdecision as a "close case," noting "the anonymous [tip] contained arange of details relating not just to easily obtained facts and14 Id. at 269.3 J.L., 529 U.S. at 269.36 id.17 Id. at 274.38 Id. at 270.'9 496 U.S. 325 (1990).40 Id. at 332.41 Id. at 327.42id.41 Id. at 331-32.20035Lupinacci: Search and SeizurePublished by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2003TOURO LAW REVIEWconditions at the time of the tip, but to future actions of thirdparties not easily predicted." 4After reviewing the facts of White, the United StatesSupreme Court concluded that the facts in J.L. were clearlydistinguishable. The majority noted that unlike the anonymous callin White, the call in J.L. did not provide police with any"predictive information" that would allow the police to test theinformant's "knowledge or credibility. 4 5  The Court furtherexplained that but for the anonymous call, the police would nothave had any reason to conduct a search of J.L. The Court alsonoted that merely because the allegation about the gun turned outto be true, this alone does not justify the requisite reasonablesuspicion as required by Terry, for the "reasonableness of theofficer's suspicion must be measured by what the officers knewbefore they conducted their search."4 7  As a result, the Courtconcluded that, "if White was a close case on the reliability ofanonymous tips, this one surely falls on the other side of theline. 48 Therefore, the weapon seized from J.L. was deemed thefruit of an unlawful search and could not be used as admissibleevidence at trial.49As mentioned earlier, the New York Court of Appealsadopted the requirements of Florida v. JL. and applied them toWilliam II and Rodriguez.50 In so doing, the court found that the"police did not have reasonable suspicion to subject William II to aTerry stop and frisk.' Much like the police officers in JL., thepolice approached William II's companion, Cruz, based solely onan anonymous tip.52 This anonymous tip not only lacked44 White, 496 U.S. at 332 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 245 (1983)).In Gates, a "totality of the circumstances" approach is used to determinewhether an informant's tip established probable cause, whereby "the informant'sveracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are highly relevant." Gates, 462U.S. at 245.4 5J.L., 529 U.S. at 271.46 id.47 id.48 id.49 Id.50 William II, 98 N.Y.2d at 99, 772 N.E.2d at 1153, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 795.51 Id.52 id.[Vol 196Touro Law Review, Vol. 19 [2003], No. 2, Art. 13https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol19/iss2/13SEARCH AND SEIZURE"predictive information" that would test the caller's knowledge butalso "rendered suspect when directly contradicted by the policeofficer's observation that Cruz was not dressed in a manner thatwould permit him to conceal a weapon on his person.,53Moreover, the anonymous tip in William II failed to point out thedefendant and did not present any pertinent information to propose,"he possessed a weapon or that he engaged in any criminalactivity., 54 As a result, the New York Court of Appeals found thatthe police officers did not have reasonable suspicion to believe thatCruz, "the subject of the tip, had handed William II the weapon."55Therefore, the police officers' attempted frisk of the defendant wasimproper. 56Likewise, in Rodriguez, the Court of Appeals found that thepolice officers' suspicion for stopping the vehicle in whichRodriguez was a passenger was unreasonable.5 7 The Court opinedthat the officers stopped the car based solely on the fact that thedefendant matched the physical description that the anonymoustipster provided.58 As a result, the anonymous tip, on its own,lacked the sufficient indicia of reliability to conduct a Terry stop.59Furthermore, the Court of Appeals supported the appellatedivision's determination that the gun, which was dropped out ofthe car window by the defendant was not abandoned 60 because the53 id.54 Id." William II, 98 N.Y.2d at 99, 772 N.E.2d at 1153, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 795.56 Id.57 id.58 Id.59 Id. Additionally, the People's assertion that the officers stopped the vehicleout of concern for the livery cab driver's safety was contradicted by thetestimony of the People's only witness at the suppression hearing. Duringquestioning, the witness, who was one of the arresting officers, stated:Q: When you first started following the car, did you have anyreason to believe this was a gypsy cab?A: At that time, no.Q: And when you first stopped the vehicle, you did not knowat that time it was a gypsy cab, did you?A: No.Id. at 100.60 It is important to note: "Property is deemed abandoned when the expectationof privacy in the object or place searched has been given up by voluntarily andknowingly discarding the property. The result is a waiver of constitutional2003 3097Lupinacci: Search and SeizurePublished by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2003TOURO LAWREVIEWstop was not based on a reasonable suspicion that criminal activitywas afoot.6 1In conclusion, after the decisions of People v. William IIand People v. Rodriguez, federal and New York courts useidentical requirements in determining whether an anonymous tipprovides sufficient indicia of reliability to conduct a Terry stop. Itis clear that when information is passed through a purelyanonymous source, and wholly vague in its description of criminalconduct as alleged by the caller, police officers may use the tip as ameans of identifying a possible suspect but must be careful toconduct a thorough observation of the individual's conduct toassess whether or not criminal activity is present. Due to the factthat the Court of Appeals adopted the requirements demanded inthe Supreme Court case of Florida v. J.L., police officers in NewYork cannot claim reasonable suspicion as a basis for a Terry stopif they act solely on tips from an anonymous source.Brooke Lupinacciprotection." People v. Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 N.Y.2d 99, 110, 666 N.E.2d 207,213, 643 N.Y.S.2d 502, 508 (1996).61 William II, 98 N.Y.2d at 100, 772 N.E.2d at 1153, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 795.[Vol 198Touro Law Review, Vol. 19 [2003], No. 2, Art. 13https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol19/iss2/13

Court of Appeals of New York, People v. William II

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Court of Appeals of New York, People v. William II

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