Ahmad, Hassan

English

bepress Legal Repository

Book Notes: Islamic Natural Law Theories, by Anver M. Emon

York University, Osgoode Hall Law School

Osgoode Hall Law JournalVolume 49, Number 1 (Summer 2011) Article 9Book Notes: Islamic Natural Law Theories, byAnver M. EmonHassan AhmadFollow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohljBook NoteThis Book Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in OsgoodeHall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.Citation InformationAhmad, Hassan. "Book Notes: Islamic Natural Law Theories, by Anver M. Emon." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 49.1 (2011) : 183-184.http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol49/iss1/9183Book NoteISLAMIC NATURAL LAW THEORIES, by Anver M. Emon'HASSAN AHMADANVER M. EMON SURVEYS classical juridical opinions concerning the role ofreason in Islamic law and theology. He delineates how pre-modern Muslimjurists utilized nature as the link between divine will and human reason in fusingfact and value.'The first chapter introduces natural law and its historical place in theIslamic ethos. Emon elucidates three reasons for the usefulness of natural law,namely its malleability into law and theology; its distinctness from rigid legalclassifications that place scholars into one school of thought or another; andits multi-dimensional capability of relating to scholars of varying intellectualinclinations. He explains Islamic natural laws contribution to the understandingof reason within Shari'a and presents contemporary debates concerning the issue.The chapter concludes with an overview of the Islamic natural law theories thatcomprise the remainder of the book, termed Hard and Soft Natural Law, theprimary difference being that in the former, the natural world is an immutableforce created by God for the benefit of humanity, whereas in the latter, nature ismutable by the grace of God (fadl). The soft naturalists' critique of Hard NaturalLaw, termed the Voluntarist critique, centres upon God's omnipotence andaversion to placing value judgments of good or evil upon human beings based ontheir reasoned judgments.Chapter two provides a synopsis of Hard Natural Law and the jurists whoespoused its tenets. Emon focuses on three individuals and their'contributions.First, he discusses Abu Bakr al-Jassas's espousal of the presumption of permissibilityconcerning all matters unmentioned in sacred texts. Al-Jassas posited that Godcreated the cosmos for the benefit of humanity, and thus reasoned determinationson matters unstated by divine revelation are permissible and to be encouraged.1. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) 222 pages.184 (2011149 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNALNext, Emon discusses Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbar's Hard Natural Law theory, whichutilized concepts such as sustenance (rizq), obligation (taklifi, divine assistance(lu], and justice (al-ta'dil wa'l-tajwir). Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbar theorized that "Godprovides human beings with sustenance, which is an empirically verifiable goodthat sustains human life.... [S]ince [sustenance] is bestowed by God, it offers abasis for fusing fact and value in nature."2 Lastly, the author discusses the naturallaw epistemology of Abu al-Husayn al-Basri, who echoed al-Jassas's theory of thepresumption of permissibility but claimed. that acts are functions of the "onto-logical presumption about nature and reason... Where there is no evidence of evilor corruption in an act, the act is deemed to be good on naturalistic grounds."3Chapter three presents the Voluntarist critique of Hard Natural Law,which focuses on the fallibility of human reason and the primacy of divine will.Voluntarists criticized the hard naturalist notion that reason can reflect divineintent, subsequently limiting God's omnipotence. Emon surveys the variousviews espoused by eminent jurists including al-Baqallani, ibn Hazm, al-Ghazali,and ibn 'Aqil on the role and ability of human knowledge to conceive truth. Theauthor then discusses determinations made by reason and the inherent qualitiesof good (husn) and bad (qubh) in such human determinations. The chapter endsby explaining the Voluntarist critique of hard naturalists in fusing fact and value.While the latter presumed permissibility in matters not mentioned by divinetexts, the former argued for a state of suspended judgment in such instances(tawaqqufi, thus limiting the role of reason.Chapter four outlines the precepts of Soft Natural Law, whose adherentsrelied more heavily on divine texts that emphasize analogical deduction intheir hermeneutics to extend the law. They viewed nature as contingent upona divine change in mind and thus not an independent source of human reason,despite the fact that they accounted for societal benefit (maslaha) in their juristicconsideration. The author proceeds through this chapter by outlining theoriesfrom the most prominent soft naturalists, namely al-Ghazali, al-Raii, al-Tufi,and al-Shatibi.The conclusion highlights two ironies from the preceding chapters-first,that despite varying theological positions, jurists came to similar conclusions infusing fact and value in nature and second, that the soft naturalist commitmentto reasoned deliberation, used historically as an agent of limitation inlegal interpretation, has been utilized by modern reformers as a method ofexpanding Shari'a.2. Ibid at 52.3. Ibid at 82.

https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1079&amp;context=ohlj

Book Notes: Islamic Natural Law Theories, by Anver M. Emon

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

bepress Legal Repository

York University, Osgoode Hall Law School