Patterson, Edwin W.

English

Indiana University Bloomington Maurer School of Law

Indiana Law JournalVolume 25 | Issue 2 Article 15Winter 1950The Rational Basis of Contracts and RelatedProblems in Legal Analysis, by Merton FersonEdwin W. PattersonColumbia UniversityFollow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/iljPart of the Contracts CommonsThis Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the LawSchool Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been acceptedfor inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator ofDigital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contactwattn@indiana.edu.Recommended CitationPatterson, Edwin W. (1950) "The Rational Basis of Contracts and Related Problems in Legal Analysis, by Merton Ferson," Indiana LawJournal: Vol. 25: Iss. 2, Article 15.Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol25/iss2/15BOOK REVIEWSnot be answered if men seek salvation in the exclusive worship of a popularpresent-day secular trinity: Purely informative education, tolerance anddemocracy.Today many men and women have turned for anchorage in a time ofstress from religion or devotion to the gods of science to public education.It is assumed that free education for all will give men common goals and asaving wisdom even though the goals of education are not agreed upon. It isassumed that if men accumulate enough facts somehow a sound philosophywill emerge from the pile like some genie from a bottle. Combine educationwith unlimited tolerance for any and all ideas however incompatible or falseand with devotion to a vague something called democracy and everything willcome out all right. Do not ask the deeper question, what are the wise andproper purposes of your democracy; do not suggest limitations on its powerlest you be branded as an enemy of the people. The worship of this trio, edu-cation, tolerance and democracy, gives men the pleasing sense of having allthe answers, or if not that somehow the answers will come through withouttoo much trouble. This secular religion encourages drift under an illusion ofprogress. Let us hope that it will not be a drift towards totalitarianism, orbetter yet that men will realize the need of sound and long-term principles.Having found them, the climate of opinion in which the Supreme Court workswill be philosophically helpful rather than evasive of fundamental issues ordeleterious.And whether or not the judiciary, as Jefferson charged, are miners andsappers of the Constitution, the fact that they work unobtrusively and with-out the dramatic gesticulations of spotlighted executive and legislature, shouldnot blind us to the importance of their work. Nor does it free bench and bar,political scientists and all thoughtful Americans from the duty of constantscrutiny and constructive criticism of the Supreme Court of the United Stateswhose members do so much to make the supreme law of the land.BEN W. PALMERtTHE RATIONAL BASIS OF CONTRACTS AND RELATED PROBLEMS IN LEGALANALYSIS. By Merton Ferson.* Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, Inc.,1949. Pp. ix, 330. $4.00.In this volume Dean Ferson has brought together a number of his essayson the legal analysis of consensual acts. The title of the book might well havebeen, "Legal Transactions and Juristic Acts," for those two conceptions pro-vide the common denominator of the diverse legal problems which the authort Member of the Minneapolis Bar. D*Dean Emeritus, College of Law, University of Cincinnati; Visiting Professor,Vanderbilt University Law School.INDIANA LAW JOURNALreduces to their simplest terms. "Legal transaction" includes not only con-tracts in the narrow sense of legally obligatory promises but also gifts, ex-changes, barters, declarations of trust and wills. In a final chapter, DeanFerson discusses certain problems of agency, and presumably he would in-clude the creation of the principal-agent relation as a legal transaction. The"juristic act" is the signal that flashes the actor's will to be bound by a legaltransaction. While his definitions of these terms at the end of the first chap-ter are avowedly tentative, his use of them clarifies their meanings. Wiselyenough, he does not set out to build up formal definitions of them, but ratherto use them in solving a number of familiar controversial problems of the lawof contracts and the law of agency.The term "contract" was once used to include most of the things thatDean Ferson regards as legal transactions. Its narrower meaning (enforce-able promises) came about through the interest of text-writers and the divisionof subject matter in law school curricula. This narrowing and other factors,more or less accidental, led to the dispersal of other legal transactions into thecourses in personal property (gifts, pledges), sales, agency, wills, trusts andothers. Dean Ferson's book provides an argument that this dispersal was un-wise, and that the beginning law student should be introduced to the elementalaspects of the whole panoply of legal transactions because the legal require-ments of one type of transaction throw light on those of another type. To thismay be added the argument that the pressure to reduce or omit the traditionalcourses on private law and to increase the amount of student time and en-ergy devoted to taxation, corporations and "public law" courses, would makean introductory course in legal transactions a curricular economy. DeanFerson's book would be useful collateral reading for the student in such acourse. For the student in the present courses in contracts it offers an ele-mentary and readily understandable comparison of the various types oftransactions.Some examples of Dean Ferson's use of his basic conception, juristic act,will serve to illustrate the theme and content of the book. He first shows thatnot all juristic acts need to be communicated to the other party to the trans-action in order to be legally effective. A's gift of a chattel to C can be madeeffective by delivery of the chattel to B for C, even though C does not knowabout the juristic act. C's "acceptance" of the gift is presumed.- At thispoint he fails to note that the presumption is not conclusive, in the sense thatC may, on learning of the gift, disclaim any interest in the chattel. Thuscommunication of the juristic act to the donee has legal significance. Thesame may be said of a gratuitous declaration of trust, and of a will that be-comes effective on the death of the testator. The legal effect of such a juristic1. P. 11.BOOK REVIEWSact is a tentative transfer of ownership, based upon the presumption, justifiedby experience, that donors rarely make gifts that will be onerous or unwelcometo their donees. Aside from this tentative legal effect, a gratuitous juristicact is like an offer in that the offeree may by his assent accept or reject it.This point is rather crucial in Dean Ferson's conception of the juristic act,which he frequently treats as if it were effective without regard to the assentof the other party.He uses this conception to provide solutions of a number of familiar legalproblems. One is the creation of a right in a third party beneficiary. WhenR makes a (legally binding) promise to E that R will render a performance toB, a third person who does not know of the transaction at that time, R's juris-.tic act of making the promise manifests his will to be bound and the absence ofcommunication to B should not prevent the act from being immediately effec-tive to create a legal right in B. Quite properly, he says that the difficultywhich some American courts have made out of the absence of "privity" be-tween R and B is needless. 2 Since almost all American jurisdictions now al-low the third party beneficiary to maintain an action against the promisor, thisargument will be needed only for the die-hards who still defend the citadel ofprivity. Presumably, the English House of Lords, which never overrules itsprecedents, will remain unmoved. However, Dean Ferson's argument would,I should think, lead logically to the conclusion that, the promisor's manifesta-tion of his will to be bound to the beneficiary being a sufficient criterion, therelation of the beneficiary (B) to the promisee (E) should be irrelevant, andhence the distinction between creditor beneficiaries and donee beneficiaries is,unless justified on other grounds, merely an historical survival. However, heaccepts the division into creditor beneficiaries and donee beneficiaries ap-proved by the Restatement of Contracts," without noting that these are Pro-crustean beds for some varieties of beneficiary transactions.Dean Ferson also uses the conception of a juristic act to attack the pre-existing duty rule. If D owes C a debt of $100, past due, and C orally accepts$50 from D in full discharge of his obligation, most courts still hold that C isnot thereby precluded from recovering a judgment against D for the unpaidbalance of the debt, on the ground that D gave no sufficient consideration forC's promise to discharge him. Dean Ferson argues that C's juristic act is nota promise to discharge D but a manifestation of a present discharge, and that,like a present exchange or a gift, it should be effective without regard to con-sideration.4 This analysis seems to me an over-simplification, both from thestandpoint of formal analysis and of policy arguments. As to the former,either C's juristic act is an exchange, in which case a consideration is required2. P. 146.3. P. 151.4. P. 157 et seq.INDIANA LAW JOURNAL(contrary to Dean Ferson's conclusion) or it is a gift of C's chose in action,in which case, as an oral gratuitous transfer of a chose in action, it would berevocable. Dean Ferson at times seems to assume that any manifestation bya donor of his intent to make a gift is legally effective,5 although at one pointhe recognizes that the creditor's juristic act must, to be effective, comply withthe requirements of gifts., On the policy side, he mentions Ames' excellentanalysis of the pre-existing duty rule but neglects to mention Ames' argumentthat the rule is based on public policy rather than the absence of a bargained-for consideration. The pre-existing duty rule is a kind of indirect sanctionto coerce men into performing their contractual duties. The wisdom of im-posing this indirect sanction universally may well be questioned. Yet evenwhere, as in New York and some other states, it has been partly abandonedby statute, the problem of unjust coercion by an obligor who takes advantageof his obligee and threatens not to perform unless promised additional com-pensation, will still have to be dealt with. Dean Ferson does not discuss theselatter problems.The principle that a promise should be enforced because it arouses ex-pectation in the promisee is persuasively used by Dean Ferson to attack therule that the intervening death or insanity of the offeror, unknown to theofferee, revokes an offer.' Yet elsewhere, as in defending the acceptance-by-mailing rule and attacking the view that cross-offers do not make a con-tract, the author seems to assume that a declaration of the will alone is orshould be legally effective to create a duty or a transfer. It seems safe to saythat no system of law has ever adopted and applied this principle universally.On the contrary, some additional requirement, such as a writing, a delivery ofproperty, a bargain, or injurious reliance or a causa, is almost universall3nimposed. Such requirements are open to criticism in detail, and are sometimescircumvented where they appear to thwart the will of the declarant. Still itis arguable, at least, that the privilege of changing one's mind is entitled tolegal recognition unless someone else can show a sufficient reason to the con-trary. In this book Dean Ferson does not squarely face this antithesis.Despite his self-imposed limitations, the author has presented a unifiedanalysis of some familiar and recurrent problems of the law of contracts.The absence of full citations of cases and legal literature makes it all themore readable for the law teacher and the law student.EDWIN W. PATTERSON*5. P. 11, pp. 158, 165, 173.6. P. 167.7. Ch. V.* Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia University.

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