Author Institution: University of Toledo, Toledo, Ohi

Ludmer, Henry

The Ohio Journal of Science

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OIL IN GERMANYHENRY LUDMER,University of Toledo,Toledo, OhioThe subject "Oil in Germany" was and is of great importance to us becauseit was and still is a very essential part of Germany's war potential as well as ofher peacetime economy.World War I revealed the importance of oil to military operations. LordCurzon made the long-remembered statement that the Allies floated to victoryon a sea of oil. Marshal Foch added that in war a drop of gasoline is worth adrop of blood.World War II clearly demonstrated the absolute necessity of oil in war. Notonly did the want of it, the need of it, breed the force which attempted to obtainit, but it also played a leading part in the strategy of the victorious side. It issmarter to ground planes and put out of commission tanks by destroying their oildepots than to risk more men and machines by fighting them. Therefore allinformation concerning the natural and synthetic oil of Germany was classifiedinformation and hard to get. Some of the data presented in this study could notbe checked or rechecked because of lack of information from the Russian sector ofGermany.First, the geographic location of Germany's natural and synthetic oil, petroleumrefineries, oil centers, firms, etc., will be described. Then an oil estimate willbe made and finally the elimination of Germany's production of synthetic gasolineand oil will be discussed. It is beyond the scope and time of this study to describethe various processes (Hydronation, Hydrogenation, Carbonization, Bergius,Fischer-Tropsch, Winkler, and other I. G. Farben-processes) used in the productionof synthetic oil.It should be remembered that Germany lacked sufficient natural oil withinher own boundaries to maintain her military machine and that even after gainingall the oil in Central Europe, she still lacked enough oil to wage a successful war.This lack was a direct stimulus to the experimentation in snythetics and theproduction of synthetic oil. Germany built a large number of synthetic plants,all of which were subject to raids during the war. The most important one ofthese synthetic plants was the Leuna Works at Merseburg. This plant waswrecked by allied bombing, but recently has been restored to 40% of its capacity.It is supplying gasoline to the Russian occupational forces now. Forty percentof the Leuna plant was completely destroyed and about 70% of it was unroofed.Leuna Works is a limited liability corporation whose stock was owned by theI. G. Farbenindustrie A.G. combine. Since Allied confiscation of the Germanassets of the I. G. Farben-combine, the title to the Leuna Works as well as tomany other synthetic oil plants rests with the Allied control council for Germany.At present the plant is employing about 18,000 workers, about half of its wartimepeak.The situation in the other plants listed is similar.I. NATURAL OIL.—Production of natural oil is centered in North West Ger-many at:Nienhagen—Production about 300,000 tons per year.Rietberg—Production about 300,000 tons per year.Heide—Production about 50,000 tons per year.259260 HENRY LUDMER Vol. X L V I ITotal production of natural crude oil in Germany for 1942 is estimated at800,000 tons.II. PETROLEUM REFINERIES.—Total refining capacity in 1938 was 3,000,000tons a year. It was centered in the Hamburg area and in the Hanoverarea.A secondary concentration was on the Rhine and Ruhr, chiefly atEmmerich.Dortmund.Dusseldorf.Imports were also refined at Regensburg.III. SYNTHETIC OIL.—Germany's main source of oil supply. Principal syntheticoil plants:Estimated Annualcapacity (1,000Location Name of Plant Tons p. a.)Bergius—Hydrogenation Plants—Leuna—Merseburg Ammoniawerke Merseburg GmbH 400Politz—Stettin Hydrierwerke AG 400Scholven—Buer (Rhur) Hydrierwerke Scholven Hibernia AG 350Gelsenkirchen (Rhur) Gelsenkirchen—Benzin AG 325Troglitz—Zeitz Braunkohle—Benzin AG 320Magdeburg Braunkohle—Benzin AG 300Wesseling Union Rheinische BraunkohlenKraftstoff AG 250Bohlen—Rotha Braunkohle—Benzin AG 200Lutzendorf Mucheln Wintershall AG 125Welheim Bottrop (Rhur)....Rhurol GmbH 100Blechhammer (Silesia)(a) North IG Farbenindustrie 750(b) South IG Farbenindustrie 7504,275Estimated AnnualCapacity (1,000Location Name of Plant Tons p. a.)Fischer-Tropsch Plants:Ruhland—Schwarzheide . Braunkohle—Benzin AG 400Liitzendorf—Mucheln Wintershall AG 200Rauxel (Rhur) Klockner—Wintershall AG 200Homberg (Ruhr) Treibstoflfabrik Rheinpreussen 200Holten (Ruhr) Rhurbenzin AG 130Wanne—Eickel (Rhur) Krupp Treibstoffwerke 130Dortmund (Ruhr) Hoesch—Benzin GmbH 130Deschowitz Schaffgotsch'sche Benzin GmbH 110Kamen-Dortmund (Ruhr)... Chemische Werke, Essener Steinkohle AG. 501,550IV, OIL CENTERS,—The following list indicates the storage capacity availableat the principal oil storage centers. In each of the town areas it is dis-tributed over a number of individual plants, but in no case is it possibleNo. 6 OIL IN GERMANY 261to give even an estimate of the actual quantities which are likely to be instorage.Place Capacity in TonsBerlin 68,900Bremen 748,800Bremerhaven 459,700Danzig 5,800Duisburg 66,500Dusseldorf 31,800Emden 43,500Frankfurt-Main 141,200Hamburg 1,361,200Hanover 287,300Kiel 737,300Koln 14,000Munchen 69,000Rostock 11,000Stettin 187,000Stuttgart 17,500Wilhelmshaven 221,0004,471,500The following underground army oil storage depots are definitely known:Place Capacity in TonsHitzacker (Luneburger Heide) 2,400,000This depot consists of 114 "holes" or "departments," each ofwhich contains five storage tanks.Farge (14 miles NW of Bremen) 340,000Nienburg (Luneburger Heide) 193,200Loccum (Luneburger Heide) 15,6002,948,800These figures are by no means complete, but they represent the locationsof the principal depots. We may assume that the others were destroyed1 during the war.V. MAJOR OIL FIRMS.Firm LocationBremer Chemische Fabrik A. G Klaffenbach (Erzgebirge)I. 0. G. Mineraldl-Raffinerie Herzog Munchen-OttobrunnKarl Pohlmann Mineralol-Raffinerie Kerbach (Kassel)Teutonia Mineralol-Raffinerie Berlin-RudowAlfred Teves Frankfurt (Main)Hans R. Schroeter MagdeburgDeutsche Hydraulik und Prazisions-werke G.m.b.H Berlin-WittenauDeutsche Gasolin A. G Emmerich .Deutsche Vacuum 01 A. G OslebshausenMitag Deutsche Treibstoffe A. G RegensburgNerag A. G MisburgRhenania-Ossag Mineralwerke A. G Konigsberg (Pr.)Shell-Floridsdorfer Mineralolfabrik A. G Wein-FloridsdorfThe present capacity of these firms is unknown.262 HENRY LUDMER Vol. XLVIIVI. OIL ESTIMATE.I t has been estimated tha t the Germans produce about 267,000 barrels dailynow, while our daily production in 1946 was 5,070,000 barrels, plus imports of370,000 barrels, totally 5,440,000 barrels. There is a tremendous demand for oilin Germany now and Germany has to rely heavily upon petroleum imports fromthe Middle East and other areas. Germany is forced to convert cars, trucks,etc., to charcoal and similar substitutes. The German nation is very poor inregard to its oil supply. In addition to it the most important oil fields and refineriesare dominated by affiliates of the large oil groups, in particular Standard-Vacuumand Shell-group.VII. GERMANY'S OIL AND THE FUTURE.Briefly we have surveyed the oil situation as it stands in Germany today.We have seen that production is low principally due to the effects created byWorld War II. Our bombers destroyed or damaged oil installations from therefineries of Bordeaux to the oil fields of Ploesti. It will be many years before allof these installations are operating on a former capacity basis. On the otherhand World War II developed and proved the value of synthetic oil.In accordance with the Berlin Protocol of March 28, 1946, the Allied ControlCouncil is to determine the amount and character of the industrial capital equip-ment unnecessary for the German peace economy and therefore available forreparations. All industrial capital equipment for the production of syntheticoil and gasoline is to be eliminated. But 14 lines later the same document states"Facilities for the production of synthetic gasoline and oil, synthetic ammonia andsynthetic rubber, and of all ball and taper roller bearings, will be temporarilyretained to meet domestic requirements until the necessary imports are availableand can be paid for." There is a contradiction between both policies. On onehand we would like to eliminate Germany's war potential and on the other handwe are retaining there the most important war facilities.We all know that oil is the raw material for a thousand purposes, the sourceof power in industry, the source of fuel and lubricants and that it must not be keptfrom or taken away from those who need it. The Atlantic Charter stated that allnations should have the right to trade and access to raw materials of the worldwhenever necessary to their prosperity. This applies to Germany too.We also know that Germany will not be able to pay for oil imports for quitesome time. Are Standard and Shell willing to accept Christmas toys for oilagain as they had to accept them before World War II ?Should we let the Russians have the German facilities for the productionof synthetic gasoline and oil? Soon after Anschluss German interests "legallyacquired" title to all foreign and domestic oil properties in Austria. Thisacquisition is at present a cause of considerable concern to the four powers. Underthe Potsdam Agreement the Russians were given the right to take German holdingsin Austria as reparations. It is the opinion of the writer that such holdings cannot properly be considered German, if acquired during the war. A restorationof all property rights to the prewar owners should be attempted. There mustnot be any transfer of facilities as long as domestic oil requirements are not met.But at all times there should be a rigid control of all facilities for the productionof synthetic gasoline and oil even though converted to civilian production, in orderto ensure that these plants are not again used for war purposes. Elimination ortransfer of the facilities mentioned do not seem advisable as such acts wouldcause considerable unemployment in Germany. Reconversion and control seemto be better solutions.No. 6 OIL IN GERMANY 263Amiable policy between nations on the subject of German oil cannot bringeverlasting peace within itself, but it can be of great assistance, while lack of suchan amiable policy can be a great hindrance to peace. All nations seek wealth.Oil is wealth. A proportionate sharing of it is essential to a lasting peace..BIBLIOGRAPHYAMERICAN SOURCESBusiness Week: 2 February, 1946; 9 February, 1946.Oil & Gas Journal: 18 November, 1944; 22 September, 1945; 29 September, 1945; 10 November,1945; 8 September, 1945; 19 January, 1946; 26 January, 1946; 2 February, 1946, 23 February,1946; 2 March, 1946; 9 March, 1946.Christian Ethics—Osborne.Oil in the Earth—-Pratt.GERMAN SOURCESTaschenbuch fur Verwaltungbeamte, Berlin, 1942.Der Olkreig, Leipzig, 1943—A. Zischka, author; W. Goldman, publisher, 2nd ed.Der Neue Brockhaus, Dresden, 1939, etc.

Oil in Germany

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Oil in Germany

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