Eldridge, Richard Thomas

Philosophy and Literature

English

Richard Eldridge

Crossref

&lt;i&gt;Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis&lt;/i&gt; (review)

Works

Review Of  Beyond Objectivism And Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, And Praxis  By R. J. Bernstein

Swarthmore College Works Philosophy Faculty Works Philosophy 10-1-1984 Review Of "Beyond Objectivism And Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, And Praxis" By R. J. Bernstein Richard Thomas Eldridge Swarthmore College, reldrid1@swarthmore.edu This work is brought to you for free and open access by . It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of Works. For more information, please contact myworks@swarthmore.edu. Follow this and additional works at: https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-philosophy  Part of the Philosophy Commons Let us know how access to these works benefits you  Recommended Citation Richard Thomas Eldridge. (1984). "Review Of "Beyond Objectivism And Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, And Praxis" By R. J. Bernstein". Philosophy And Literature. Volume 8, Issue 2. 292-293. DOI: 10.1353/phl.1984.0029 https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-philosophy/301 %H\RQG2EMHFWLYLVPDQG5HODWLYLVP6FLHQFH+HUPHQHXWLFVDQG3UD[LVUHYLHZ5LFKDUG(OGULGJHPhilosophy and Literature, Volume 8, Number 2, October 1984, pp.292-293 (Review)3XEOLVKHGE\-RKQV+RSNLQV8QLYHUVLW\3UHVVDOI: 10.1353/phl.1984.0029For additional information about this article                                                      Access provided by Swarthmore College (19 Aug 2015 20:55 GMT)http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/phl/summary/v008/8.2.eldridge.html292Philosophy and Literaturemetaphysical dialectics of Marcuse, Adorno, and Sartre, and by using it to undermineLacan's "phallocentrism" and "semiocentrism," and Habermas's ideal speech/communica-tion dieory. In this Marxist/deconstructionist light, Ryan interprets Capital: he insists ondie interpénétration ("differentiality") of politics and economics, and rejects necessary("decidable") historical laws. Ryan also examines Lenin's systematic misreading ofMarx,where decentralized communism becomes the basis for statism, oppression, and transcen-dent trudis.Ryan applies this Marxist/deconstructionist theory to many contemporary issues. Heconsiders ideological elements in everyday views of terrorism, feminism, liberalism,human rights, social planning, credit, and foreign policy. He criticizes traditional views ofacademic freedom, disciplinary study, and die relation of American education tobusiness, and offers suggestions for "radical teachers." Finally, he explores common direc-tions in Marxism/deconstruction, (Rowbotham's) socialist feminism, and (Negri's)autonomy dieory in terms of human needs, agency, and social categories and organiza-tion.Ryan writes with exceptional clarity, and raises indisputably important issues.However, his project suffers from four fundamental weaknesses. (1) Deconstruction, ascritique of metaphysics, may be alloyed with Marxism (minus metaphysics — or any "ism"minus metaphysics) but it is not clear that this strengtiiens Marxism. Many haveunderstood Marx's Capital, dialectics, and relation to Leninism much as Ryan doeswithout reference to deconstruction. Ryan says people die for being Marxists but not forbeing deconstructionists; we may lament this injustice, but calling Marx a "proto-deconstructionist" while claiming deconstruction lacks a social dieory seemsunilluminating. (2) Ryan's arguments are weak, self-referentially naive, and cry for"deconstruction." His dichotomies — metaphysical/non-metaphysical, ideological/non-ideological, theoretical/practical — constitute a "metaphysical system of priorities andoppositions." Ryan never subjects his views to his own criticisms. (3) Ryan gives no argu-ment for his leftist/radical political goals. Whatever one's sympathies, argument is needed(especially for sweeping proclamations that, e.g. , connect Searle's philosophy to torture inChile). While he claims that "revolution is not a party" matter (vive la différante!), Ryanappears a party man. He attempts to base his politics on deconstruction, but deconstruc-tion is incompatible with diis notion of basis, and all political issues are "undecidable"within deconstruction. (4) Ryan claims practical rather than scholarly goals. Grantingthis dualism, does the book succeed? I see no evidence to answer affirmatively, butperhaps Ryan does "keep open the question of revolution." This in itself is important.WhitmanCollegeJohnJ. StuhrBeyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, andPraxis, by Richard J. Bernstein; xvi & 284 pp. Philadelphia:University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983, $25.00 clothbound, $8.95paper.Beyond Objectivism and Relativism is a survey of recent dunking about knowledge andjustification. Focusing on Kuhn, Winch, and Gadamer, Bernstein traces the emergenceof historicist theories of justification in both the natural and human sciences. WhatReviews293justifies a theory in physics, anthropology, or literary criticism is not, as Kuhn, Winch,and Gadamer have shown, its having been formulated in accordance with aphilosophically established decision procedure or scientific method. Descartes and hislogical positivist successors were wrong to think there is an ahistorical scientific method(p. 128). Any mediods of justification which have ever been employed or which we canimagine necessarily depend upon at least some tacit unargued traditional presuppositions.To many of their immediate readers, Kuhn, Winch, and Gadamer seemed to be urg-ing a variety of relativism, arguing that all scientific mediods and standards of rationaljustification are local and arbitrary. In fact, however, it has become clear (partly throughthe work of such later figures as Feyerabend, Lakatos, Rorty, Geertz, and Habermas)that the epistemológica! views of Kuhn, Winch, and Gadamer were not intended to sup-port relativism and, moreover, do not. Instead, a dieory can be justified historically if itcan be shown to satisfy criteria of theory choice which have been (in a phrase Bernsteinborrows from Rorty) "hammered out" in the course of past inquiry (p. 67). What thisseems to mean is that criteria of theory choice evolve historically along with actualdieories. The task of an inquirer, in seeking to justify a theory at a historical moment, is todiscern which parts of his tradition — perhaps its art, its physics, its epistemology, or itssociology — are most plausible and worth preserving and to modify either his theories orcriteria of theory choice in light of a judgment about what in his tradition is sound. Theability to judge or discern what in a tradition is sound is not governed by formalizablerules. Rationality has a "judgmental" or "practical" character (p. 74). It is more like prac-tical wisdom, the ability to respond appropriately in various situations in which one iscalled upon to act, dian it is like the ability to prove theorems. Knowledge of what in atradition is sound is more like knowledge of a person, in resting on long acquaintance andsympatiiy, than it is like knowledge of a fact. Finally, practical wisdom can be developedand exercised only under certain specific social conditions, as Habermas and Arendt inparticular have emphasized (p. 169). Historical consciousness must be valued andencouraged, not systematically inhibited as it is in modern technological society, if prac-tical wisdom is to flourish and justifiable theory choices are to be made.Bernstein's summaries of both post-Kuhnian philosophy of science and Gadamerianhermeneutics are masterful: lucid, non-technical, and sound. Philosophers of bothanalytic and Continental temperament, social theorists, anthropologists, and literaryscholars will all find work in fields diey may have thought foreign to them made bothaccessible and interesting.Yet Bernstein's positive account of the criteria of rational theory choice is thin andunconvincing. He discusses no concrete cases of theory choice which are rationallyjustifiable by his lights, and in the absence of any such discussion it is hard to see what hiscriteria come to. Vague talk about the historical "hammering out" of criteria of dieorychoice is empty unless concretely illustrated.Bernstein's construal of objectivism as die thesis diat "there is or must be some perma-nent, ahistorical matrix or framework to which we can ultimately appeal in determiningthe nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness or Tightness" (p. 8) is bothidiosyncratic and fuzzy. It is not clear that Bernstein actually wishes to reject and movebeyond objectivism, given his view that we must appeal to historical facts in seekingjustifications because of the very nature of rationality, not merely because of historicalcontingencies.SwarthmoreCollegeRichard Eldridge

Swarthmore College 
Works 
Philosophy Faculty Works Philosophy 
10-1-1984 
Review Of "Beyond Objectivism And Relativism: Science, 
Hermeneutics, And Praxis" By R. J. Bernstein 
Richard Thomas Eldridge 
Swarthmore College, reldrid1@swarthmore.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-philosophy 
 Part of the Philosophy Commons 
Let us know how access to these works benefits you 
 
Recommended Citation 
Richard Thomas Eldridge. (1984). "Review Of "Beyond Objectivism And Relativism: Science, 
Hermeneutics, And Praxis" By R. J. Bernstein". Philosophy And Literature. Volume 8, Issue 2. 292-293. DOI: 
10.1353/phl.1984.0029 
https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-philosophy/301 
This work is brought to you for free by Swarthmore College Libraries' Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Philosophy Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of Works. For more information, please contact 
myworks@swarthmore.edu. 
Philosophy and Literature, Volume 8, Number 2, October 1984, pp.
292-293 (Review)
DOI: 10.1353/phl.1984.0029
For additional information about this article
                                                      Access provided by Swarthmore College (19 Aug 2015 20:55 GMT)
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/phl/summary/v008/8.2.eldridge.html
292Philosophy and Literature
metaphysical dialectics of Marcuse, Adorno, and Sartre, and by using it to undermine
Lacan's "phallocentrism" and "semiocentrism," and Habermas's ideal speech/communica-
tion dieory. In this Marxist/deconstructionist light, Ryan interprets Capital: he insists on
die interpénétration ("differentiality") of politics and economics, and rejects necessary
("decidable") historical laws. Ryan also examines Lenin's systematic misreading ofMarx,
where decentralized communism becomes the basis for statism, oppression, and transcen-
dent trudis.
Ryan applies this Marxist/deconstructionist theory to many contemporary issues. He
considers ideological elements in everyday views of terrorism, feminism, liberalism,
human rights, social planning, credit, and foreign policy. He criticizes traditional views of
academic freedom, disciplinary study, and die relation of American education to
business, and offers suggestions for "radical teachers." Finally, he explores common direc-
tions in Marxism/deconstruction, (Rowbotham's) socialist feminism, and (Negri's)
autonomy dieory in terms of human needs, agency, and social categories and organiza-
tion.
Ryan writes with exceptional clarity, and raises indisputably important issues.
However, his project suffers from four fundamental weaknesses. (1) Deconstruction, as
critique of metaphysics, may be alloyed with Marxism (minus metaphysics — or any "ism"
minus metaphysics) but it is not clear that this strengtiiens Marxism. Many have
understood Marx's Capital, dialectics, and relation to Leninism much as Ryan does
without reference to deconstruction. Ryan says people die for being Marxists but not for
being deconstructionists; we may lament this injustice, but calling Marx a "proto-
deconstructionist" while claiming deconstruction lacks a social dieory seems
unilluminating. (2) Ryan's arguments are weak, self-referentially naive, and cry for
"deconstruction." His dichotomies — metaphysical/non-metaphysical, ideological/non-
ideological, theoretical/practical — constitute a "metaphysical system of priorities and
oppositions." Ryan never subjects his views to his own criticisms. (3) Ryan gives no argu-
ment for his leftist/radical political goals. Whatever one's sympathies, argument is needed
(especially for sweeping proclamations that, e.g. , connect Searle's philosophy to torture in
Chile). While he claims that "revolution is not a party" matter (vive la différante!), Ryan
appears a party man. He attempts to base his politics on deconstruction, but deconstruc-
tion is incompatible with diis notion of basis, and all political issues are "undecidable"
within deconstruction. (4) Ryan claims practical rather than scholarly goals. Granting
this dualism, does the book succeed? I see no evidence to answer affirmatively, but
perhaps Ryan does "keep open the question of revolution." This in itself is important.
WhitmanCollegeJohnJ. Stuhr
Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and
Praxis, by Richard J. Bernstein; xvi & 284 pp. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983, $25.00 clothbound, $8.95
paper.
Beyond Objectivism and Relativism is a survey of recent dunking about knowledge and
justification. Focusing on Kuhn, Winch, and Gadamer, Bernstein traces the emergence
of historicist theories of justification in both the natural and human sciences. What
Reviews293
justifies a theory in physics, anthropology, or literary criticism is not, as Kuhn, Winch,
and Gadamer have shown, its having been formulated in accordance with a
philosophically established decision procedure or scientific method. Descartes and his
logical positivist successors were wrong to think there is an ahistorical scientific method
(p. 128). Any mediods of justification which have ever been employed or which we can
imagine necessarily depend upon at least some tacit unargued traditional presuppositions.
To many of their immediate readers, Kuhn, Winch, and Gadamer seemed to be urg-
ing a variety of relativism, arguing that all scientific mediods and standards of rational
justification are local and arbitrary. In fact, however, it has become clear (partly through
the work of such later figures as Feyerabend, Lakatos, Rorty, Geertz, and Habermas)
that the epistemológica! views of Kuhn, Winch, and Gadamer were not intended to sup-
port relativism and, moreover, do not. Instead, a dieory can be justified historically if it
can be shown to satisfy criteria of theory choice which have been (in a phrase Bernstein
borrows from Rorty) "hammered out" in the course of past inquiry (p. 67). What this
seems to mean is that criteria of theory choice evolve historically along with actual
dieories. The task of an inquirer, in seeking to justify a theory at a historical moment, is to
discern which parts of his tradition — perhaps its art, its physics, its epistemology, or its
sociology — are most plausible and worth preserving and to modify either his theories or
criteria of theory choice in light of a judgment about what in his tradition is sound. The
ability to judge or discern what in a tradition is sound is not governed by formalizable
rules. Rationality has a "judgmental" or "practical" character (p. 74). It is more like prac-
tical wisdom, the ability to respond appropriately in various situations in which one is
called upon to act, dian it is like the ability to prove theorems. Knowledge of what in a
tradition is sound is more like knowledge of a person, in resting on long acquaintance and
sympatiiy, than it is like knowledge of a fact. Finally, practical wisdom can be developed
and exercised only under certain specific social conditions, as Habermas and Arendt in
particular have emphasized (p. 169). Historical consciousness must be valued and
encouraged, not systematically inhibited as it is in modern technological society, if prac-
tical wisdom is to flourish and justifiable theory choices are to be made.
Bernstein's summaries of both post-Kuhnian philosophy of science and Gadamerian
hermeneutics are masterful: lucid, non-technical, and sound. Philosophers of both
analytic and Continental temperament, social theorists, anthropologists, and literary
scholars will all find work in fields diey may have thought foreign to them made both
accessible and interesting.
Yet Bernstein's positive account of the criteria of rational theory choice is thin and
unconvincing. He discusses no concrete cases of theory choice which are rationally
justifiable by his lights, and in the absence of any such discussion it is hard to see what his
criteria come to. Vague talk about the historical "hammering out" of criteria of dieory
choice is empty unless concretely illustrated.
Bernstein's construal of objectivism as die thesis diat "there is or must be some perma-
nent, ahistorical matrix or framework to which we can ultimately appeal in determining
the nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness or Tightness" (p. 8) is both
idiosyncratic and fuzzy. It is not clear that Bernstein actually wishes to reject and move
beyond objectivism, given his view that we must appeal to historical facts in seeking
justifications because of the very nature of rationality, not merely because of historical
contingencies.
SwarthmoreCollegeRichard Eldridge


https://works.swarthmore.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1300&amp;context=fac-philosophy

Review Of Beyond Objectivism And Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, And Praxis By R. J. Bernstein

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

Crossref

Works

Works

Works