An Improved Tax Scheme for Selfish Routing

Abstract

We study the problem of routing traffic for independent selfish users in a congested network to minimize the total latency. The inefficiency of selfish routing motivates regulating the flow of the system to lower the total latency of the Nash Equilibrium by economic incentives or penalties. When applying tax to the routes, we follow the definition of [Christodoulou et al, Algorithmica, 2014] to define ePoA as the Nash total cost including tax in the taxed network over the optimal cost in the original network. We propose a simple tax scheme consisting of step functions imposed on the links. The tax scheme can be applied to routing games with parallel links, affine cost functions and single-commodity networks to lower the ePoA to at most 4/3 - epsilon, where epsilon only depends on the discrepancy between the links. We show that there exists a tax scheme in the two link case with an ePoA upperbound less than 1.192 which is almost tight. Moreover, we design another tax scheme that lowers ePoA down to 1.281 for routing games with groups of links such that links in the same group are similar to each other and groups are sufficiently different