Costi della guerra e forze in campo nel secolo XV, tra verit\ue0 storiografiche e manipolazione dell\u2019informazione

Abstract

How can we nowadays quantify the costs of a medieval war? There is no clear answer, because there are too many factors to count on and not all of them can be expressed in figures: the acquisition of men and animals, weapons and supplies; and, together with them, the costs of maintaining a whole host of commissioners, ambassadors, informers, spies... The credibility of the available numbers also plays against us: data on money handled, men, weapons or the fleet were often consciously manipulated by those who used them, according to their own interests. Thus, when it was intended to dissuade the enemy, the potential of the forces themselves tended to increase; while, in order to get aid from the Allies, the tendency was to reduce the value of the own army. In the wars of the first Renaissance, the powers in conflict used to fight with propaganda and information, so it was in the diplomatic arena that conflicts were often resolved. Until Charles VIII of France declared on Italy a real war: cruel, quick and without intermediaries