Financial contagion from liquidity shocks has being recently ascribed as a
prominent driver of systemic risk in interbank lending markets. Building on
standard compartment models used in epidemics, in this work we develop an EDB
(Exposed-Distressed-Bankrupted) model for the dynamics of liquidity shocks
reverberation between banks, and validate it on electronic market for interbank
deposits data. We show that the interbank network was highly susceptible to
liquidity contagion at the beginning of the 2007/2008 global financial crisis,
and that the subsequent micro-prudential and liquidity hoarding policies
adopted by banks increased the network resilience to systemic risk---yet with
the undesired side effect of drying out liquidity from the market. We finally
show that the individual riskiness of a bank is better captured by its network
centrality than by its participation to the market, along with the currently
debated concept of "too interconnected to fail"