It has been intimated that renvoi might be allowed as an exceptional doctrine with respect to the lex domicilii. The theory suggested is that since the adoption of the le.~ domicilii in the Conflict of Laws arose from a desire that the rights governed thereby be subject to one law -an aim impossible of realization after many countries have gone over to the lex patrie-_courts still adhering to the old rule would be justified in interpreting the same in a renvoi sense. This conclusion, however, is inadmissible. Could the question be examined de novo, English and American courts, for example, might hold, in view of their tendency to subject transfers of personal property inter vivos to the lex rei site, that the same rule should govern its distribution upon death. But as long as the lex domicilii is retained as the general principle a substitution of the lex fori for the foreign law upon the sole ground that the foreign country had become a convert to the lex patrie could be supported neither upon principle nor upon grounds of policy. The objections raised against renvoi in general apply with full force to this class of cases
