In the present work Berkeley\u27s theory of vision is considered in its historical origins, in its relation to Berkeley\u27s general philosophical conceptions, and in its early reception. Berkeley\u27s theory replaces an account of vision according to which distance and other spatial properties are deduced from elementary data through an unconscious geometric inference. This account of vision in terms of natural geometry was first introduced by Descartes and Malebranche. Among Berkeley\u27s immediate sources of knowledge of the geometric theory of perception, a key role was played by the treatise of dioptrics of William Molyneux, Dioptrica Nova. Berkeley\u27s understanding of natural geometry relies closely on Molyneux\u27s description of the mechanism of vision which avoids the complexities of the accounts of Descartes and Malebranche. In the first chapter Berkeley\u27s theory is presented by way of contrast with Molyneux\u27s theory. In the second chapter I consider the relation between the theory of vision and immaterialism. In the final chapter I examine one of the first criticisms of Berkeley\u27s theory, that which is found in William Porterfield\u27s Treatise on the Eye. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)Dept. of Philosophy. Paper copy at Leddy Library: Theses & Major Papers - Basement, West Bldg. / Call Number: Thesis1997 .G72. Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 37-01, page: 0076. Adviser: John P. Wright. Thesis (M.A.)--University of Windsor (Canada), 1997
