Woods, John

Scholarship at UWindsor

University of WindsorScholarship at UWindsorOSSA Conference Archive OSSA 2May 15th, 9:00 AM - May 17th, 5:00 PMCommentary on PowersJohn WoodsFollow this and additional works at: http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchivePart of the Philosophy CommonsThis Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences at Scholarship at UWindsor. It hasbeen accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized administrator of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, pleasecontact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.John Woods, "Commentary on Powers" (May 15, 1997). OSSA Conference Archive. Paper 87.http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA2/papersandcommentaries/87COMMENTS ON LAWRENCE POWERS' "AD HOMINEM ARGUMENTS"John WoodsDepartment of PhilosophyUniversity of Lethbridge©1998, John Woods The first thing to notice about this engaging paper is the liberty the author takes with the concepts of ad hominemargument and fallacy. A charge of fallacy is not that of an invalid argument; it is not even that of an invalidargument with a disposition to deceive. It is the charge of a hyperinvalid argument, an argument whose premisesare absolutely true and warranted and whose conclusion is absolutely false and unwarranted. An invalid argumentis a weaker thing. It is an argument of which it might be the case that the premisses are true and the conclusionfalse. As far as I can tell, no one before Powers has forwarded quite this view of fallaciousness. It seems anoriginal contribution.Ad hominem arguments also receive an original specification. They are not what you find in Aristotle, or Locke,Watts, Whately or Johnstone. They are not tu quoque arguments. They do not fit the abusive-circumstantial grid,so loved by writers of textbooks, in any obvious way. Rather, they are arguments in the form,(1) Arguer S is evil, deceitful and diabolically clever (EDD) (2) Therefore one should not listen to him; one should ignore his arguments.The question which Powers puts is whether arguments of this form are fallacious in his own original sense of theterm. He concludes that they are not. I shall return to this central claim, but for now I want to address whatstrikes me as an unprofitable detour. Powers appears to think that his ad hominem arguments are argumentsaddressed to an arguer by the person to whom the argument mentioned in (2) is directed. Taken this way, the adhominem is a dialectical argument, an argument in the form(1)You are EDD(2) Therefore I should ignore the argument you are now addressing to me.It would be well to emphasize that what we have here is an argument; it is not a withdrawal from theconversation at hand, and not a declaration that I'm not going to listen to you. It is not an explanation of why I amquitting the discussion. Rather, it is an argument designed to get you to concede that the person to whom you aredirecting your argument, namely me, should pay it no mind. If my ad hominem argument were sound, and if yourEDD property is something you invariably instantiate, and if I know this, then I can only know that my argumentwill be unavailing. It is already guaranteed that I cannot succeed in making it, even if it is a perfectly validargument. What this shows, as Powers suggests, is that there is something "wrong" with ad hominem argumentsin this kind of dialectical context. My own view is that it is unhelpful to encumber ad hominems with thisdialectical cachet. I agree that when used in this way, they will misfire. But this does not show that there issomething wrong with the ad hominem, but rather that they are not admissible in such contexts. They are such asnot to be useable in these ways. A hammer is wholly useless for screwing in screws. There is something wrongwith a hammer in that use, even though it may be a perfect hammer.Let me now leave this dialectical setting and get on with the main task. Powers says, "You can't call an argumenta fallacy merely because you don't like the conclusion." The communist, atheist and homosexual argue for whatothers (here stylized as "we") take as atrocious conclusions. We shouldn't, he says call them fallacies on thataccount. I am not so sure. For consider:(i) How likely is it that people who call these arguments "fallacies" do so in the sense of ahyperinvalid argument? Isn’t it more likely that, on the model of the reductio ad falsum theircomplaint is one in the form, "Because your conclusion is obviously false, then your argument iseither valid but unsound, or invalid"?(ii) How often do we charge arguments with monstrous conclusions with fallaciousness? Whetheron the more or less traditional view or on Powers' own, a fallacy is an argument which seems to becorrect. It is quite true that there has always been the theoretically tricky problem of distinguishingarguments made bad by the obvious falsity of their conclusion from perfectly good arguments forutterly surprising and counterintuitive conclusions. But I am speaking of actual practice. Sometimeswe do dismiss arguments simply for the lunacy of their conclusions. And sometimes we are right todo so.In calling ad hominem arguments fallacies, Powers accuses logicians of violating their own—as he sees it—goodadvice in this regard ("Don't attribute fallaciousness just because you don't like the conclusion"). Well, no logicianI've ever heard of has called what Powers calls "ad hominem arguments" what Powers calls "fallacies". WhenPowers' reconstructions are honoured, the complaint that ad hominem arguments are fallacious would be acomplaint in the form:Arguments in the form(1)S is EDD(2)Therefore one should ignore S's argumentsare such that even when (1) is absolutely true and warranted, (2) is absolutely false and unwarranted.And, I say again, that no logician until Powers himself has made this complaint.Well and good, but is the complaint true? If Powers' claim is that ad hominem arguments aren't fallacious as such,he is right by the peculiarities of his reconstructed concepts of ad hominem argument and fallacy. The claim is ofa type that is neither original nor very striking. The same claim is routinely made by other authors, rejigged to fittheir rather different conceptions of these things. But if Powers is saying that ad hominems are, as such, notfallacious, the claim is both original and striking. (Even Locke's pressing a man with consequences of hisprinciples and concessions can be mishandled). Is Powers right? It depends, I think, on what is built into theEDD—property and in the nature of the difference it provides between the arguer and the addressee. It alsodepends on features of the arguer's conclusion p. If the addressee's epistemic relation to p is that it is beyond theaddressee's competence to judge except with the aid of argument for it, and if the arguer's EDD—state is suchthat the addressee is unable to make a competent assessment of the arguer's arguments, then if the arguer doesmake an argument for p, the rational thing for the addressee to do is ignore it. Suppose p is an arcaneproposition from category theory, with respect to which the addressee has little competence. In some situations,say, where the addressee is a callow student and the addresser a professor of mathematics, the fact that thestudent can't follow the proof doesn't rationally preclude his subscription to p—not, to be sure, on the basis ofhis seeing the proof to be sound, but rather on the basis of his belief that a proof of p exists, a belief that relies onthe fact that a proof has been purported by someone he trusts and is right to trust. But this is not our situation.The arguer is not only one of Powers' "intellectuals", and so has competence which the addressee is unable tojudge, he is also EDD, that is, untrustworthy! Thus the addressee is adversely positioned. Proposition p is aproposition that he cannot properly judge without proof, and a proof which he also cannot judge is advanced bysomeone whom he cannot trust. If that is the purport of the EDD clause, then ad hominem arguments are neverfallacies.It may be wondered whether this is indeed the purport of the clause. Powers' examples seem to suggest adifferent set up. Suppose our arguer is now a charming and commandingly attractive chap who is also apedophile. His arguments for man-boy sexual relations are seductive and masterly. Of course, they are wrong,since their conclusions are morally monstrous. Yon youngster is about to be offered such an argument. I say,"Pay it no mind. He'll bewitch you if given a chance. You would be better off to walk away." So far so good; nofallacy here. But now suppose that the pedophile is also a master of category theory. This means that he getscategory theory right, not wrong, and that his proofs are correct, not incorrect. Then the argument, "He is aclever and deceitful pedophile, so you should ignore his proof of mathematical proposition p" is silly. It is morethan silly, it is a hyperinvalid argumentum ad hominem. The premise is absolutely true and warranted, and theconclusion is absolutely false and unwarranted. What is more, it is a ad hominem which many a logic textbookwould welcome as an example of a fallacy. But it is not a fallacy in Powers' sense, even apart from its slightdisposition to deceive. It is not a fallacious ad hominem because it is not an ad hominem. The arguer fails theEDD-condition in relation to category theory.Powers secures his strong thesis that ad hominems are as such fallacy-free by, in effect, making the EDD-condition of the arguer always a relevant condition. Textbook ad hominems are often fallacies of irrelevance, asis the case we just considered. EDD-ness is always a matter of the arguer's evil, deceptive and diabolically cleverways with respect to whatever may be the issue at hand. In Powers' reconstruction, this is what ad hominemscan never be, namely, fallacies of irrelevance. But, then, it must be said that Powers' strong result is got at thecost of its realism. In the real world, nobody fulfils the EDD-condition. View Paper by L. PowersView Index of Papers and CommentariesReturn to Main Menu

Commentary on Powers

http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1934&context=ossaarchive

Commentary on Powers

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

Scholarship at UWindsor