Incorporating in Delaware can be expensive. Corporations pay up to 180,000annuallyforthissimpleprivilege—afigurethatissubstantiallyhigherthanincorporationinanyotherstate.Intheircontroversialarticle,PriceDiscriminationintheMarketforCorporateLaw,ProfessorsMarcelKahanandEhudKamarshowthatDelaware’sabilitytochargeapremiumforincorporations,intheformofitsannualfranchisetax,isevidenceofDelaware’smarketpowerinthejurisdictionalcompetitionforcorporatecharters.Beyondsimplychargingapremium,however,ProfessorsKahanandKamarshowthatDelawarefurtherincreasesitsprofitsbyengaginginpricediscrimination—tailoringitspremiumaccordingtothevalueeachfirmattributestotheprivilegeofincorporatinginDelaware.ThisArticleprojectsProfessorsKahanandKamar’sanalysisontotheworldoflimitedliabilitycompanies(“LLCs”).ToassessDelaware’smarketpowerinthejurisdictionalcompetitionforLLCcharters,thisArticleexaminestheLLCanalogofthecorporatefranchisetax.Insteadofafranchisetax,everyDelawareLLCischargedaflatannualtaxof250. As this Article shows, Delaware’s LLC tax, unlike its corporate franchise tax, does not represent a premium and does not price discriminate. But why? The Article explores the possibility that, in the jurisdictional competition for LLC charters, Delaware lacks the kind of market power it has long enjoyed for corporate charters. To explain why this may be, the Article argues that the high level of contractibility and the resulting reduction in legal indeterminacy available under LLC law substantially diminish two of Delaware’s traditional competitive advantages, namely the network effects associated with its law and its expert judiciary. With these two competitive advantages diminished, Delaware LLC law, unlike its corporate law, is not an obviously superior product. And with several available substitutes in the market for LLC law, Delaware may be unable to command a premium