This report details Mahmoud Abbas's policy platform and potential challenges he may face from within and without the Palestinian political landscape

Pina, Aaron D.

UNT Digital Library

1 The “old-guard” are founding members of the PLO and Fatah.  The “young-guard” are generallycomprised of key actors in the first intifada and seek an increased role in the national movement.Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of CongressCRS Report for CongressReceived through the CRS WebOrder Code RS22047Updated June 9, 2005Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas:Overview of Internal and External Challenges Aaron D. PinaAnalyst in Middle East AffairsForeign Affairs, Defense, and Trade DivisionSummaryOn January 15, 2005, Mahmoud Abbas (a.k.a. Abu Mazen) was sworn in asPresident of the Palestinian Authority (PA).  Many believe that the Abbas victory marksthe end of an autocratic era dominated by the late Yasir Arafat and the increasedpossibility of improved prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace.  This report detailsAbbas’s policy platform and potential challenges he may face from within and withoutthe Palestinian political landscape.  Domestic challenges include Israel’s plannedwithdrawal from Gaza, continuing municipal and parliamentary elections, violent anti-occupation elements, calls for financial, judicial, and security reform, as well as aparalyzed economy.  Abbas also faces multiple challenges in creating a viablePalestinian state based on a secure peace with Israel:  the requirements of the “RoadMap,” Palestinian violence toward Israel, and final status issues, such as the future ofJerusalem, refugees, and final political borders.  This report will be updated asnecessary.Palestinian Centers of PowerFatah.  Under Arafat, Fatah became the most prominent political party in thePalestinian territories.  The leading political body within  Fatah is the Central Committee(CC), elected by the general membership.  Fatah’s Revolutionary Council (RC) parallelsthe CC as a decision-making body and does not exclude armed resistance as an option.On November 21, 2004, Fatah nominated Mahmoud Abbas as its presidential candidate.Some analysts claim any credibility that a moderate Abbas may have within Fatah hingeson a compromise between “old-guard” CC Members and the RC “young-guard”.1Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).  The PLO describes itself as “theembodiment of the Palestinian national movement,” and for four decades it wasCRS-22 PLO-related documents available online at [http://www.palestine-un.org/plo/frindex.html].3 Arnon Regular, “PA Security Council to Oversee Armed Forces,” Ha’aretz, Jan. 11, 2005.4 “Rice: U.S. Prepared to Train Palestinian Security Forces,” Ha’aretz, Feb. 4, 2005. 5 “Abbas Announces Security Shake-Up,” BBC News Service, Apr. 23, 2005.dominated by Arafat.2  The PLO is organized into three political bodies: the PalestineNational Council, a parliamentary body; the Central Council, a 124 memberdecision-making body; and the 18-member Executive Committee, which elects theChairman of the PLO.  After the death of Arafat, the Executive Committee electedMahmoud Abbas Chairman of the PLO.Palestinian Authority (PA) & Elections.  On January 9, 2005, the PA heldpresidential elections (which Hamas boycotted), and Fatah candidate Mahmoud Abbaswas certified winner and President-elect.  The first two rounds of municipal elections(held in January and May) resulted in Abbas’ Fatah party winning 60 municipalities andHamas winning 48.  Two more municipal rounds are expected in September andDecember 2005.  Palestinian legislative elections were expected to be held in July 2005,but have been postponed.  Party elections are to take place later in 2005.Table 1.  January 9, 2005, Palestinian Presidential Election ResultsCandidates Votes (%) Votes (total)Mahmoud Abbas 65.52 501,448Mustufa Barghouti 19.48 156,227 Tayseer Khaled 3.35 26,848Abd Alhalim Ashqar 2.76 22,171Basam Al Salhi 2.67 21,429Assayed Barakeh 1.30 10,406Abd Al-Karim Shbair 0.71 5,717Source: Palestinian Central Elections Commission.Positions on Internal Security and Reform ChallengesSecurity Services.  Most analysts agree that PA security reform is necessary inorder to halt violence directed against Israel and provide stability for a future Palestinianstate.  In 2005, the PA National Security Council (NSC) was formed as a first step inconsolidating security elements.3  According to the legislation, as President, Abbas issupreme commander of three institutions which consolidate dozens of security services:General Intelligence (unifies PA intelligence organs), General Security (civil andpreventive services), and the National Security Council (the basis of a possible armedforce).  Recently, Secretary of State Rice stated that the “United States is prepared to helptrain Palestinian security forces.”4   Egypt has also offered to train Palestinian securityforces.  On April 23, 2005, Abbas appointed Brigadier General Sulayman Abu-Mutlaqcommander of general security in the Gaza Strip.  Brigadier General  Ziyad Hab-al-Rihis in charge of general security affairs in the West Bank.5  Many experts view thesedevelopments as positive, noting that Abbas is attempting to rein in disparate intelligenceCRS-36 Hani al-Masri, “What Is the Purpose of Unifying Security Agencies?,” Al-Ayyam (West Bank),Apr. 16, 2005.7 Palestinian PM Mahmoud Abbas’s speech before Palestinian Legislative Council, Apr. 29,2003.  Negotiations Affairs Department, PLO available at [http://www.nad-plo.org].8 The World Bank, Stagnation or Revival?  Israeli Disengagement and Palestinian EconomicProspects, Dec. 2, 2004.9 “Palestinians Expect Abbas to Bring Economic Prosperity,” Palestine Chronicle, Jan. 9, 2005.10 “Hamas Ready to Join PLO ,” Al-Jazeera, Mar. 29, 2005.apparatuses.  Still others contend that organizational reform masks underlying problemsof a lack of power-sharing and vaguely assigned duties.6Corruption and Reform.  The PA has been criticized repeatedly for non-transparency, corruption, and cronyism, and Palestinian opinion surveys consistentlyreveal  public displeasure over corruption. However, some international assessments haveacknowledged progress in Palestinian judicial, economic, and political reforms.  Abbashas stated the need for the PA to “continue to implement and develop its reform plan.”7On March 1, 2005, Britain hosted a conference on Palestinian reform.  At the conference,the European Union pledged to assist with the establishment of new Palestinianinstitutions; the United States committed to setting up a security coordinating group; andthe World Bank stated its intention to assist in economic development.  Many feel that theretention of Salem Fayyad as Finance Minister is also a positive step for reforms.Economic Conditions.  One of the most pressing domestic issues Abbas  facesis economic stagnation.  A recent World Bank report warns of “the potentialdisintegration of the Palestinian economy under the sustained pressure of conflict andIsraeli closure policies.”8  Many analysts agree that openly contested, free elections, andongoing reforms may increase the likelihood of international aid to Palestinians,particularly from the United States.  According to one report, “people voted for Abbasbecause they believed that he would be able to bring them jobs, and improve their livingconditions.”9  On March 31, the Palestinian Legislative Council approved a $2.2 billionbudget for 2005.  The budget assumes that pledges of $1.2 billion in international aid,made at the March 1, 2005, London Conference, will be included.  James Wolfensohn,outgoing head of the World Bank, was recently appointed special representative to Gazato coordinate reconstruction efforts after Israel’s planned withdrawal from Gaza. The Palestinian Opposition.  Nationalist groups like the al-Aksa MartyrsBrigade and Islamists like Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad oppose many PAbilateral agreements with Israel and continue to advocate violent resistance to theoccupation.  However, some, most notably Hamas, have indicated a degree of pragmatismand flexibility in recent statements vis-a-vis the PA and Israel.  For example, MahmoudZahar, a leading Hamas figure, recently expressed  interest in joining the PLO.10  Seculargroups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Frontfor the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the People’s Party are often critical of PApolicies but  work alongside the PLO in a loose political coalition, voicing dissent withinthe body politic. Some report that Fatah may form a united nationalist-democratic frontCRS-411 Khalid Amayreh, “Palestinian Politicians Eye Alliances,” Al-Jazeera, Apr. 25, 2005.12 Since 2000 over 3,000 Palestinians and nearly 1,000 Israelis have been killed.  The totalnumber of Palestinians injured ranges between 20-35,000 and between 5-6,000 Israelis. Availableonline at [http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8166.doc.htm].13 “Abbas Says Armed Intifada Has to Stop,” Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), Dec. 14, 2004.14 H.Res. 56 (passed on Feb. 2, 2005) acknowledged that President Abbas disavows terrorism.S.Res. 27 (passed on Feb. 1, 2005) recognized Abbas’s commitments to peaceful coexistencewith Israel.15 Steven R. Weisman and Terence Neilan, “Israeli and Palestinian Leaders Meet for 1st Timein 4 Years,” New York Times, Feb. 8, 2005.16 Available online at [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4372561.stm].to challenge Hamas, which is expected to join the Palestinian political system after the2005 elections.11  Peace and the “Road Map”Violence.  The sustained violence since September 2000 has greatly affected bothPalestinians and Israelis.12  At the June 2003 Aqaba Summit, Abbas stated, “there will beno military solution for this conflict, so we repeat our renunciation of terrorism againstthe Israelis wherever they might be.”13  Since then, Abbas has continually denouncedviolence as a means to achieve independence, instead calling for popular and social meansto end the Israeli occupation.  Congress has noted President Abbas’s denunciation ofterror as a means of securing a Palestinian state.14 Israel briefly ended talks with Abbas (January 14-19, 2005) after a bombingoccurred at a crossing point between Israel and Gaza. This was seen, by some, asindicative of Prime Minister Sharon’s mistrust of Abbas’s commitment to ending violenceand as an effort to push Abbas to act rapidly.  Others see Abbas as a fully committedpartner for peace, as evidenced by his deployment of security forces in Gaza to haltattacks on Israeli settlements and military personnel.  On February 8, 2005, PresidentAbbas and Prime Minister Sharon discussed Israeli-Palestinian security measures todecrease armed violence.  As a result of the meeting, and despite sporadic violence,Sharon and Abbas agreed, in principle, to a unilateral cease-fire.15  Random attacksagainst Israel (mostly in Gaza) have continued.  Notably, Hamas claimed responsibilityfor launching 26 mortars and a number of anti-tank rockets at settlements and armyoutposts in Gaza on May 18, injuring one Israeli.  However, an Israeli intelligence officercredited Palestinian security services with preventing many attacks.16Israeli Closures.  In the spring of 2002, Israel implemented a series of village,town, and city closures and curfews in an effort to reduce violence. Many claim thatrestricting the flow of Palestinian goods and people within and between the West Bank,Gaza, and Israel, hampers Palestinian economic activity and may increase militancy.Others cite Israel’s need to ensure its citizens protection by drastically limiting themovement and supplies of Palestinian militants. In his presidential inaugural address,Abbas stated “our hand is outstretched to the Israeli partner to make peace, not with wordsCRS-517 Arnon Regular, “Abbas Says Wants Road Map Implemented in Full ,” Ha’aretz, Jan. 16, 2005.18 “Mofaz freezes handover of West Bank cities to Palestinians,” Ha’aretz Service, May 3, 2005.19 The barrier or wall/fence is slightly more than half finished.20 Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas’s speech before Palestinian Legislative Council,Apr. 29, 2003.  Negotiations Affairs Department, PLO, available online from the NAD-PLOwebsite at [http://www.nad-plo.org].21 Available online at [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm].22 “Abbas, Qurei Urge Release of All Palestinian Detainees,”  Palestine Media Watch, Dec. 28,2004.but with deeds, and put an end to closures, arrests and the building of the fence.”17  Todate, Israeli officials have transferred the security responsibility of two towns (Jericho andTulkarem) to the PA, with three more (Bethlehem, Ramallah, and Qalqilyah) to come.Recently, Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz announced a freeze to these transfers dueto the PA’s lack of action against Palestinian violence.18Israeli Separation Barrier.  In April 2002, in reaction to Palestinian suicide-bombings, Israel approved the construction of a barrier between Israeli and Palestinian-held territory, largely built inside the Palestinian side of the “Green Line” (the 1967 cease-fire line separating the West Bank from Israel).19  Some Israelis contend their securitydepends on the construction of the barrier, noting decreased suicide bombings in Israelsince the barrier’s construction.  Critics of the barrier see it as de facto Israeli annexationof portions of the occupied West Bank.  President Abbas claims “the removal of the wallwill be among the first issues that our government will address because, without itsremoval, Israel will effectively destroy the Roadmap.”20Israeli-Palestinian Mutual Commitments.  Released on April 30, 2003, theframework (or “Road Map”) envisions a three-stage process comprising reciprocal stepsleading to a viable Palestinian state alongside a secure Israel by 2009.21  President Abbashas expressed support for the Road Map and its implementation.  In a visit to the UnitedStates in May 2005, President Abbas noted that several questions remained unansweredrelating to the planned Israeli withdrawal and other commitments.Prisoner Release.  A core domestic issue for Abbas is the release of Palestinianpolitical prisoners.  Abbas has publicly stated “in principle we work for every prisoner tobe released, but what we are looking for is the release of those who have spent many longyears in jail.”22  On December 27, 2004, an  agreement between Egypt, Israel, and the PAculminated with the release of 159 Palestinian political prisoners; on January 3, 2005,Israeli Cabinet ministers approved the release of an additional 900 Palestinian prisonersand on February 21, 2005 the first 500 prisoners of these were released.  On June 2, 2005,Israel released 400 more Palestinians.  Some experts see this development merely as anIsraeli gesture of goodwill towards Abbas; others view the release as a first step towardthe wider release of an estimated 7,000 political prisoners.Jerusalem.  Israel claims Jerusalem as its undivided capital, while Palestiniansseek to establish a capital for their state in East Jerusalem.  Abbas repeatedly has calledfor the capital of any Palestinian state be located in the eastern portion of Jerusalem.CRS-623 “Israeli Police Chief in Jordan,” Al-Jazeera News, May 3, 2005.24 “Abbas: Refugees Will Return to Israel,” Associated Press, Jan. 4, 2005. 25 For a more detailed analysis of U.S.-Palestinian aid, see CRS Report RL32260, U.S. ForeignAssistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and FY2005 Funding, byJeremy M. Sharp.26 Congress prohibits direct funding for the PA, but provides for a Presidential waiver if thePresident finds such aid is in US national interest.  See H.R. 4818 (P.L. 108-447), ConsolidatedAppropriations Act, FY2005, Limitation on Assistance to the Palestinian Authority, Sec. 550.27 “Bush Vows to Work for Palestinian State,” CNN, Nov. 12, 2004.There are also reports that Israeli internal security forces are preparing for possibleconfrontations between Jewish extremists and Palestinian Muslims near the al-Aqsamosque, Islam’s third most venerated site.23  In April 2005, Israeli police arrested Jewishmilitants on suspicion they were planning to attack the al-Aqsa mosque.Refugees.  President Abbas, himself a refugee, has made several unequivocalstatements in support of the right of return for Palestinian refugees, claiming Palestinianrefugees and their descendants from the war that followed Israel’s creation in 1948 havethe right to return to their original homes.24  Some have suggested that Abbas may relaxhis stance on the refugee issue depending on the outcome of other outstanding issues.Issues for CongressU.S. Aid to the Palestinians.25  Since 1993, Congress has authorized over $1.5billion in assistance to the Palestinians, generally distributed via third parties such as theU.S. Agency for International Development and private voluntary organizations.  Fundsare also distributed to Palestinians through the U.N. Relief and Works Agency(UNRWA).  The executive branch has granted assistance directly to the PA on threeoccasions: in 1994, $10 million was distributed to the PA through the Holst Fund at theWorld Bank; on July 8, 2003, $20 million was granted to the PA for infrastructureprojects; and on December 8, 2004, President Bush approved $20 million for Palestinianutility payments to Israel.26  The FY2005 emergency supplemental appropriations act (P.L.109-113, May 11, 2005) calls for $200 million to be made available for programs tosupport the Palestinians.  On May 25, 2005, President Bush announced his intention tosteer $50 million directly to the PA to be used in Gaza. Israeli-Palestinian Peace.  President Bush has stated that the establishment ofa Palestinian state, living next to a secure Israel, is a top priority for his second term.27During his visit to Washington in May 2005, President Abbas reiterated his strongcommitment to the peace process, ending terror and incitement, and to achievingPalestinian goals through political negotiations.  President Abbas and Israeli PrimeMinister Sharon are set to meet on June 21, 2005, to further coordinate Israel’s plannedwithdrawal from Gaza. 

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas: Overview of Internal and External Challenges

1 The “old-guard” are founding members of the PLO and Fatah.  The “young-guard” are generallycomprised of key actors in the first intifada and seek an increased role in the national movement.Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of CongressCRS Report for CongressReceived through the CRS WebOrder Code RS22047Updated May 20, 2005Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas:Overview of Internal and External Challenges Aaron D. PinaAnalyst in Middle East AffairsForeign Affairs, Defense, and Trade DivisionSummaryOn January 15, 2005, Mahmoud Abbas (a.k.a. Abu Mazen) was sworn in asPresident of the Palestinian Authority (PA).  Many believe that the Abbas victory marksthe end of an autocratic era dominated by the late Yasir Arafat and the increasedpossibility of improved prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace.  This report detailsAbbas’s policy platform and potential challenges he may face from within and withoutthe Palestinian political landscape.  Domestic challenges include the Israeli plannedwithdrawal from Gaza, upcoming parliamentary elections slated for July 17, 2005,violent anti-occupation elements, calls for financial, judicial, and security reform, aswell as a paralyzed economy.  Abbas also faces multiple challenges in creating a viablePalestinian state based on a secure peace with Israel: the requirements of the “RoadMap,” Palestinian violence toward Israel, and final status issues, such as the future ofJerusalem, refugees, and final political borders.  This report will be updated asnecessary.Palestinian Centers of PowerFatah.  Under Arafat, Fatah became the most prominent political party in thePalestinian territories.  The leading political body within  Fatah is the Central Committee(CC), elected by the general membership.  Fatah’s Revolutionary Council (RC) parallelsthe CC as a decision-making body and does not exclude armed resistance as an option.On November 21, 2004, Fatah nominated Mahmoud Abbas as its presidential candidate.Some analysts claim any credibility that a moderate Abbas may have within Fatah hingeson a compromise between “old-guard” CC Members and the RC “young-guard”.1Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).  The PLO describes itself as “theembodiment of the Palestinian national movement,” and for four decades it wasCRS-22 PLO-related documents available online at [http://www.palestine-un.org/plo/frindex.html].3 Arnon Regular, “PA Security Council to Oversee Armed Forces,” Ha’aretz, Jan. 11, 2005.4 “Rice: U.S. Prepared to Train Palestinian Security Forces,” Ha’aretz, Feb. 4, 2005. 5 “Abbas Announces Security Shake-Up,” BBC News Service, Apr. 23, 2005.dominated by Arafat.2  The PLO is organized into three political bodies: the PalestineNational Council, a parliamentary body; the Central Council, a 124 memberdecision-making body; and the 18-member Executive Committee, which elects theChairman of the PLO.  After the death of Arafat, the Executive Committee electedMahmoud Abbas Chairman of the PLO.Palestinian Authority (PA) & Elections.  The PA, created by the 1993Declaration of Principles, is charged with administrating the West Bank and Gaza. OnJanuary 9, 2005, the PA held presidential elections (which Hamas boycotted), and Fatahcandidate Mahmoud Abbas was certified winner and President-elect.  The first two roundsof municipal elections (held in January and May) resulted in Abbas’ Fatah party winning60 municipalities and Hamas winning 48.  Two more municipal rounds are expected inSeptember and December 2005.  On July 17, 2005, Palestinian legislative elections areexpected with party elections to take place sometime in 2005.January 9, 2005, Palestinian PresidentialElection ResultsCandidates Votes (%) Votes (total)Mahmoud Abbas 65.52 501,448Mustufa Barghouti 19.48 156,227 Tayseer Khaled 3.35 26,848Abd Alhalim Ashqar 2.76 22,171Basam Al Salhi 2.67 21,429Assayed Barakeh 1.30 10,406Abd Al-Karim Shbair 0.71 5,717Source: Palestinian Central Elections Commission.Positions on Internal Security and Reform ChallengesSecurity Services.  Most analysts agree that PA security reform is necessary inorder to halt violence directed against Israel and provide stability for a future Palestinianstate.  In 2005, the PA National Security Council (NSC) was formed as a first step inconsolidating security elements.3  According to the legislation, as President, Abbas issupreme commander of three institutions which consolidate dozens of security services:General Intelligence (unifies PA intelligence organs), General Security (civil andpreventive services), and the National Security Council (the basis of a possible armedforce).  Recently, Secretary of State Rice stated that the “United States is prepared to helptrain Palestinian security forces.”4   Egypt has also offered to train Palestinian securityforces.  On April 23, 2005, Abbas appointed Brigadier General Sulayman Abu-Mutlaqcommander of general security in the Gaza Strip.  Brigadier General  Ziyad Hab-al-Rihis in charge of general security affairs in the West Bank.5  Many experts view thesedevelopments as positive, noting that Abbas is attempting to rein in disparate intelligenceCRS-36 Hani al-Masri, “What Is the Purpose of Unifying Security Agencies?,” Al-Ayyam (West Bank),Apr. 16, 2005.7 Palestinian PM Mahmoud Abbas’s speech before Palestinian Legislative Council, Apr. 29,2003.  Negotiations Affairs Department, PLO available at [http://www.nad-plo.org].8 The World Bank, Stagnation or Revival?  Israeli Disengagement and Palestinian EconomicProspects, Dec. 2, 2004.9 “Palestinians Expect Abbas to Bring Economic Prosperity,” Palestine Chronicle, Jan. 9, 2005.10 “Hamas Ready to Join PLO ,” Al-Jazeera, Mar. 29, 2005.apparatuses.  Still others contend that organizational reform masks underlying problemsof a lack of power-sharing and vaguely assigned duties.6Corruption.  The PA has been criticized repeatedly for non-transparency,corruption, and cronyism, and Palestinian opinion surveys consistently reveal  publicdispleasure over corruption. However, some international assessments haveacknowledged progress in Palestinian judicial, economic, and political reforms.  Abbashas stated the need to “continue to implement and develop its reform plan.”7  On March1, 2005, Britain hosted a conference on Palestinian reform.  At the conference, theEuropean Union pledged to assist with the establishment of new Palestinian institutions;the United States committed to setting up a security coordinating group; and the WorldBank stated its intention to assist in economic development.  Many feel that the retentionof Salem Fayyad as Finance Minister is also a positive step.Economic Conditions.  One of the most pressing domestic issues Abbas  facesis economic stagnation.  A recent World Bank report warns of “the potentialdisintegration of the Palestinian economy under the sustained pressure of conflict andIsraeli closure policies.”8  Many analysts agree that openly contested, free elections, andongoing reforms may increase the likelihood of international aid to Palestinians,particularly from the United States.  According to one report, “people voted for Abbasbecause they believed that he would be able to bring them jobs, and improve their livingconditions.”9  On March 31, the Palestinian Legislative Council approved a $2.2 billionbudget for 2005.  The budget assumes that pledges of $1.2 billion in international aid,made at the March 1, 2005, London Conference, will be included.  James Wolfensohn,outgoing head of the World Bank, was recently appointed special representative to Gazato coordinate reconstruction efforts after Israel’s planned withdrawal from Gaza. The Palestinian Opposition.  Nationalist groups like the al-Aksa MartyrsBrigade and Islamists like Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad oppose many PAbilateral agreements with Israel and continue to advocate violent resistance to theoccupation.  However, some, most notably Hamas, have indicated a degree of pragmatismand flexibility in recent statements vis-a-vis the PA and Israel.  For example, MahmoudZahar, a leading Hamas figure, recently expressed  interest in joining the PLO.10  Seculargroups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Frontfor the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the People’s Party (formerly PalestineCommunist Party) are often critical of PA policies but  work alongside the PLO in a loosepolitical coalition, voicing dissent within the body politic. Some report that Fatah mayCRS-411 Khalid Amayreh, “Palestinian Politicians Eye Alliances,” Al-Jazeera, Apr. 25, 2005.12 Since 2000 over 3,000 Palestinians and nearly 1,000 Israelis have been killed.  The totalnumber of Palestinians injured ranges between 20-35,000 and between 5-6,000 Israelis. Availableonline at [http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8166.doc.htm].13 “Abbas Says Armed Intifada Has to Stop,” Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), Dec. 14, 2004.14 H.Res. 56 (passed on Feb. 2, 2005) acknowledged that President Abbas disavows terrorism.S.Res. 27 (passed on Feb. 1, 2005) recognized Abbas’s commitments to peaceful coexistencewith Israel.15 Steven R. Weisman and Terence Neilan, “Israeli and Palestinian Leaders Meet for 1st Timein 4 Years,” New York Times, Feb. 8, 2005.16 Available online at [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4372561.stm].form a united nationalist-democratic front to challenge Hamas, which is expected to jointhe Palestinian political system after the 2005 elections.11  Peace and the “Road Map”Violence.  The sustained violence since September 2000 has greatly affected bothPalestinians and Israelis.12  At the June 2003 Aqaba Summit, Abbas stated, “there will beno military solution for this conflict, so we repeat our renunciation of terrorism againstthe Israelis wherever they might be.”13  Since then, Abbas has continually denouncedviolence as a means to achieve independence, instead calling for popular and social meansto end the Israeli occupation.  Congress has noted President Abbas’s denunciation ofterror as a means of securing a Palestinian state.14 Israel briefly ended talks with Abbas (January 14-19, 2005) after a bombingoccurred at a crossing point between Israel and Gaza. This was seen, by some, asindicative of Prime Minister Sharon’s mistrust of Abbas’s commitment to ending violenceand as an effort to push Abbas to act rapidly.  Others see Abbas as a fully committedpartner for peace, as evidenced by his deployment of security forces in Gaza to haltattacks on Israeli settlements and military personnel.  On February 8, 2005, PresidentAbbas and Prime Minister Sharon discussed Israeli-Palestinian security measures todecrease armed violence.  As a result of the meeting, and despite sporadic violence,Sharon and Abbas agreed, in principle, to a unilateral cease-fire.15  Random attacksagainst Israel (mostly in Gaza) have continued.  Notably, Hamas claimed responsibilityfor launching 26 mortars and a number of anti-tank rockets at settlements and armyoutposts in Gaza on May 18, injuring one Israeli.  However, an Israeli intelligence officercredited Palestinian security services with preventing many attacks.16Israeli Closures.  In the spring of 2002, Israel implemented a series of village,town, and city closures and curfews in an effort to reduce violence. Many claim thatrestricting the flow of Palestinian goods and people within and between the West Bank,Gaza, and Israel, hampers Palestinian economic activity and may increase militancy.Others cite Israel’s need to ensure its citizens protection by drastically limiting themovement and supplies of Palestinian militants. In his presidential inaugural address,Abbas stated “our hand is outstretched to the Israeli partner to make peace, not with wordsCRS-517 Arnon Regular, “Abbas Says Wants Road Map Implemented in Full ,” Ha’aretz, Jan. 16, 2005.18 “Mofaz freezes handover of West Bank cities to Palestinians,” Ha’aretz Service, May 3, 2005.19 The barrier or wall/fence is slightly more than half finished.20 Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas’s speech before Palestinian Legislative Council,Apr. 29, 2003.  Negotiations Affairs Department, PLO, available at [http://www.nad-plo.org].21 Available online at [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm]22 “Abbas, Qurei Urge Release of All Palestinian Detainees,”  Palestine Media Watch, Dec. 28,2004.but with deeds, and put an end to closures, arrests and the building of the fence.”17  Todate, Israeli officials have transferred the security responsibility of two towns (Jericho andTulkarem) to the PA, with three more (Bethlehem, Ramallah, and Qalqilyah) to come.Recently, Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz announced a freeze to these transfers dueto the PA’s lack of action against Palestinian violence.18Israeli Separation Barrier.  In April 2002, in reaction to Palestinian suicide-bombings, Israel approved the construction of a barrier between Israeli and Palestinian-held territory, largely built inside the Palestinian side of the “Green Line” (the 1967 cease-fire line separating the West Bank from Israel).19  Some Israelis contend their securitydepends on the construction of the barrier, noting decreased suicide bombings in Israelsince the barrier’s construction.  Critics of the barrier see it as de facto Israeli annexationof portions of the occupied West Bank.  President Abbas claims “the removal of the wallwill be among the first issues that our government will address because, without itsremoval, Israel will effectively destroy the Roadmap.”20Israeli-Palestinian Mutual Commitments.  Released on April 30, 2003, theframework (or “Road Map”) envisions a three-stage process comprising reciprocal stepsleading to a viable Palestinian state alongside a secure Israel by 2009.21  President Abbashas expressed support for the Road Map and its implementation.Prisoner Release.  A core domestic issue for Abbas is the release of Palestinianpolitical prisoners.  Abbas has publicly stated “in principle we work for every prisoner tobe released, but what we are looking for is the release of those who have spent many longyears in jail.”22  On December 27, 2004, an  agreement between Egypt, Israel, and the PAculminated with the release of 159 Palestinian political prisoners; on January 3, 2005,Israeli Cabinet ministers approved the release of an additional 900 Palestinian prisonersand on February 21, 2005 the first 500 prisoners were released.  Some experts see thisdevelopment merely as an Israeli gesture of goodwill towards Abbas; others view therelease as a first step toward the wider release of an estimated 7,000 political prisoners.Jerusalem.  Israel claims Jerusalem as its undivided capital, while Palestiniansseek to establish a capital for their state in East Jerusalem.  Abbas repeatedly has calledfor the capital of any Palestinian state be located in the eastern portion of Jerusalem.There are also reports that Israeli internal security forces are preparing for possibleconfrontations between Jewish extremists and Palestinian Muslims near the al-AqsaCRS-623 “Israeli Police Chief in Jordan,” Al-Jazeera News, May 3, 2005.24 “Abbas: Refugees Will Return to Israel,” Associated Press, Jan. 4, 2005. 25 For a more detailed analysis of U.S.-Palestinian aid, see CRS Report RL32260, U.S. ForeignAssistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and FY2005 Funding, byJeremy M. Sharp.26 Congress prohibits direct funding for the PA, but provides for a Presidential waiver if thePresident finds such aid is in US national interest.  See H.R. 4818 (P.L. 108-447), ConsolidatedAppropriations Act, FY2005, Limitation on Assistance to the Palestinian Authority, Sec. 550.27 “Bush Vows to Work for Palestinian State,” CNN, Nov. 12, 2004.28 Conference Report on H.R. 1268, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, theGlobal War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, for the fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 2005, and forother purposes, May 3, 2005.mosque, Islam’s third most venerated site.23  In April 2005, Israeli police arrested Jewishmilitants on suspicion they were planning to attack the al-Aqsa mosque.Refugees.  President Abbas, himself a refugee, has made several unequivocalstatements in support of the right of return for Palestinian refugees, claiming Palestinianrefugees and their descendants from the war that followed Israel’s creation in 1948 havethe right to return to their original homes.24  Some have suggested that Abbas may relaxhis stance on the refugee issue depending on the outcome of other outstanding issues.Issues for CongressU.S. Aid to the Palestinians.25  Since 1993, Congress has authorized over $1.5billion in assistance to the Palestinians, generally distributed via third parties such as theU.S. Agency for International Development and private voluntary organizations.  Fundsare also distributed to Palestinians through the U.N. Relief and Works Agency(UNRWA).  The Executive Branch has granted assistance directly to the PA on threeoccasions: in 1994 $10 million was distributed to the PA through the Holst Fund at theWorld Bank; on July 8, 2003, $20 million was granted to the PA for infrastructureprojects; and on December 8, 2004, President Bush approved $20 million for Palestinianutility payments to Israel.26  P.L. 109-13, May 11, 2005, the Emergency SupplementalAppropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005,states that $200 million should be made available for programs to support thePalestinians.  Experts and policymakers continue to call for greater PA economictransparency to ensure that U.S. assistance not contribute to violence.Israeli-Palestinian Peace.  President Bush has stated that the establishment ofa Palestinian state, living next to a secure Israel, is a top priority for his second term.27The conference report for FY2005 supplemental appropriations designated $200 millionin assistance to Palestinians for economic revitalization and trade, health care, civilsociety, infrastructure, and education.28 

1 The “old-guard” are founding members of the PLO and Fatah, and the “young-guard” aregenerally comprised of key actors in the first Intifada (uprising ), who seek an increased role indeciding the orientation of the national movement.Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of CongressCRS Report for CongressReceived through the CRS WebOrder Code RS22047Updated March 1, 2005Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas:Overview of Internal and External Challenges Aaron D. PinaAnalyst in Middle East AffairsForeign Affairs, Defense, and Trade DivisionSummaryOn January 15, 2005, Mahmoud Abbas (a.k.a. Abu Mazen) was sworn in asPresident of the Palestinian Authority (PA).  Many believe that the Abbas victory marksthe end of an autocratic era dominated by the late Yasir Arafat and the increasedpossibility of improved prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace.  This report detailsAbbas’s policy platform and potential challenges he may face from within and withoutthe Palestinian political landscape as power-sharing becomes a reality.  Domestically,Abbas must address violent anti-occupation elements, calls for economic, judicial, andsecurity reform, as well as a paralyzed economy.  Externally, Abbas faces multipleobstacles in creating a viable Palestinian state based on a secure peace with Israel.  Toaccomplish this, Abbas must address the requirements of the ‘Road Map,’ Palestinianviolence toward Israel, and final status issues, such as Jerusalem, refugees, and politicalborders.  For a more detailed analysis see CRS Report RS21965, Arafat’s Succession,by Clyde Mark and CRS Report RS21235, The PLO and its Factions, by KennethKatzman. This report will be updated as necessary.Palestinian Centers of PowerFatah.  Under Arafat, Fatah became the most prominent political party in thePalestinian territories.  The leading political body within  Fatah is the Central Committee(CC), elected by the general membership.  Fatah’s Revolutionary Council (RC) parallelsthe CC as a decision-making body and does not exclude armed resistance as an option.On November 21, 2004, Fatah nominated Mahmoud Abbas as its presidential candidate.Some analysts claim any credibility that a moderate Abbas may have within Fatah hingeson a compromise between “old-guard” CC Members and the RC “young-guard”.1CRS-22 Available at [http://www.palestine-un.org/plo/frindex.html].3 Arnon Regular, “PA Security Council to Oversee Armed Forces,” Ha’aretz, January 11, 2005.4 “Rice: U.S. Prepared to Train Palestinian Security Forces,” Ha’aretz, February 4, 2005. Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).  The PLO describes itself as “theembodiment of the Palestinian national movement”, and for four decades it wasdominated by Arafat.2  The PLO is organized into three political bodies: PalestineNational Council, a parliamentary body; the Central Council, a 124 memberdecision-making body; and the 18-member Executive Committee, which elects theChairman of the PLO.  After the death of Arafat, the Executive Committee electedMahmoud Abbas as Chairman of the PLO.Palestinian Authority (PA).  The PA, created by the 1993 Declaration ofPrinciples, is an autonomous body charged with administrating the West Bank and Gaza.On January 9, 2005, the PA held Presidential elections and Mahmoud Abbas was certifiedas winner and President-elect.  On December 23, 2004, in West Bank municipalities thatcompleted local elections, Fatah defeated Hamas; on January 27, 2005, Gazan municipalelections were held with Hamas winning substantial victories (77 out of 118 seats).Hamas boycotted the Presidential elections. The first six months of 2005 will see localand municipal elections in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and portions of East Jerusalem.In the summer of 2005, legislative and party elections are expected. Palestinian Presidential ElectionsCandidates Votes (%) Votes (total)Mahmoud Abbas 65.52 501,448Mustufa Barghouti 19.48 156,227 Tayseer Khaled 3.35 26,848Abd Alhalim Ashqar 2.76 22,171Basam Al Salhi 2.67 21,429Assayed Barakeh 1.30 10,406Abd Al-Karim Shbair 0.71 5,717Source Palestinian Central Elections CommissionPositions on Internal Security and Reform ChallengesSecurity Services.  Most analysts agree that the PA security apparatus must bereformed in order to halt violence directed against Israel and provide stability for a futurePalestinian state.  Recently, the PA National Security Council (NSC) was formed as a firststep in consolidating security elements.3  According to the legislation, as President, Abbasis supreme commander of three institutions which consolidate dozens of security services:General Security (civil and preventive services), General Intelligence (unifies PAintelligence organs), and the National Security Council (the basis of a possible armedforce).  Recently, Secretary of State Rice has stated that the “United States is prepared tohelp train Palestinian security forces.”4  Egypt has also offered to train Palestinian securityforces in Gaza.  Many view the new PA cabinet as part of continued reform. On February22, 2005, the Palestinian Prime Minister announced the appointment of Nasser YousefCRS-35 Arnon Regular, “Qureia to revamp cabinet with reform-minded ministers .” Ha’aretz, February22, 2005.6 Dan Diker and Khaled Abu Toameh, Jerusalem Issue Brief, Vol. 3, No. 20, March 3, 2004.7  The Ad Hoc Liaison Committee for the West Bank and Gaza was established to ensure theefficient use of development assistance in support of the peace process and contribute to thedevelopment of Palestinian society. On December 10, 2004 the AHLC concluded meetings withthe U.S. and 14 other donor countries.  At the meeting, the PA was commended for its budgetary,economic, and political reforms and additional meetings are slated for spring, 2005. 8 Palestinian PM Mahmoud Abbas’s speech before Palestinian Legislative Council, April 29,2003.  Negotiations Affairs Department, PLO available at [http://www.nad-plo.org].9 The World Bank, Stagnation or Revival?  Israeli Disengagement and Palestinian EconomicProspects, December 2, 2004.10 President Bush recently his intention to provide $350 million in assistance to the Palestinians,of which $200 million will be included in the FY2005 Supplemental Request. 11 “Palestinians Expect Abbas to Bring Economic Prosperity,” Palestine Chronicle, January 9,2005.  as head of internal security.5  The previous head of security, Mohammad Dahlan, willhead the civil affairs ministry.  Nabil Shaath, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, isnow the Deputy PM, and Dr. Naser al Qidweh (former head of PA Mission to the UN)now heads the foreign affairs ministry.  Many feel that the retention of Salem Fayyad asFinance Minister is a positive step.  Over half of the twenty-four member cabinet are newMembers.Corruption.  The PA has been criticized repeatedly for non-transparency,corruption, and cronyism and Palestinian opinion surveys consistently reveal  publicdispleasure over corruption.6  However, recent international assessments haveacknowledged progress in Palestinian judicial, economic, and political reforms.7  Abbasstated the need to “continue to implement and develop its reform plan.”8  On March 1,2005, Britain hosted a conference on Palestinian reform.  At the conference, the EuropeanUnion pledged to assist with the establishment of new Palestinian institutions; the UnitedStates committed to setting up a security coordinating group; and the World Bank statedits desire to play a crucial role in economic development.Economic Conditions.  One of the most pressing domestic issues Abbas  facesis economic stagnation.  A recent World Bank report warns of “the potentialdisintegration of the Palestinian economy under the sustained pressure of conflict andIsraeli closure policies.”9  Many analysts agree that openly contested, free elections, andongoing reforms may increase the likelihood of international aid to Palestinians,particularly from the United States.10  According to one report, “people voted for Abbasbecause they believed that he would be able to bring them jobs, and improve their livingconditions.”11  Abbas ties economic well-being to judicial reform, transparency, and anend to the Israeli closure regime. [see below] The Palestinian Opposition.  Nationalist groups and some Islamists such asHamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Al-Aksa Martyrs Brigade oppose many PA bilateralagreements with Israel with some continuing to advocate violent resistance to theCRS-412 Arnon Regular, “Top Hamas Man Says Group May Accept Truce with Israel,” Ha’aretz,December 4, 2004.13  “HAMAS, Fatah Exchange Threats Over Abu-Mazin’s Censure of Attacks,” Ha’aretz, January10, 2005.14 Since 2000 over 3,000 Palestinians and nearly 1000 Israelis have been killed.  The total numberof Palestinians injured ranges between 20-35,000 and between 5- 6,000 Israelis. Available at[http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8166.doc.htm].15 “Abbas Says Armed Intifada Has to Stop,” Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), December 14, 2004.16 H.Res. 56 (passed on February 2, 2005) acknowledged that President Abbas disavowsterrorism.  S.Res27 (passed on February 1, 2005) recognized Abbas’s commitments to peacefulcoexistence with Israel.17 Steven R. Weisman and Terence Neilan, “Israeli and Palestinian Leaders Meet for 1st Timein 4 Years,” New York Times, February 8, 2005.occupation.  Yet, some groups, most notably Hamas, have indicated pragmatism andflexibility in recent statements vis-a-vis the PA and Israel.  For example, a leading figurewithin Hamas recently stated Hamas’s interest in joining the Palestinian national politicalprocess.12  Secular groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP),Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the People’s Party (formelyPalestine Communist Party) are often critical of PA policies but  work alongside the PLOin a loose political coalition, voicing dissent within the body politic.  On January 3, 2005,Abbas called on Hamas to stop firing rockets and mortars at Israeli targets. Bycondemning violent resistance to the occupation, many analysts assert Abbas may alienatemilitant portions of the opposition.  One Hamas leader characterized Abbas’s commentsas “a knife in the back of Palestinian resistance.”13 Peace and the ‘Road Map’Violence.  The sustained violence since September 2000 has greatly affected bothPalestinians and Israelis.14  At the June 2003 Aqaba Summit, Abbas stated, “there will beno military solution for this conflict, so we repeat our renunciation of terrorism againstthe Israelis wherever they might be.”15  Since then, Abbas has continually denouncedviolence as a means to achieve independence, instead calling for popular and social meansto end the Israeli occupation.  Congress has noted President Abbas’s denunciation of terror as a means of securinga Palestinian state.16  Israel briefly ended talks with Abbas (January 14-19, 2005) after abombing occurred at a crossing point between Israel and Gaza. This was seen, by some,as indicative of Prime Minister Sharon’s mistrust of Abbas’s commitment to endingviolence and as an effort to push Abbas to act rapidly.  Still others see Abbas as a fullycommitted partner for peace, as evidenced by his deployment of security forces in Gazato halt attacks on Israeli settlements and military personnel.  On February 8, 2005,President Abbas and Prime Minister Sharon discussed Israeli-Palestinian securitymeasures to decrease armed violence.  As a result of the meeting, Prime Minister Sharonand President Abbas agreed, in principle, to a unilateral cease-fire.17  On February 25,CRS-518 Ha’aretz Service, “Rice: Evidence Shows TA Bombing Planned in Syria,” Haa’retz, March 1,2005.19 Arnon Regular, “Abbas Says Wants Road Map Implemented in Full ,” Ha’aretz, January 16,2005.20 The half-way finished barrier (or wall/fence) is comprised of twenty-five-foot-high concreteslabs, razor wire, earthen berms, towers, electrified fencing, and military roads.21 Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas’s speech before Palestinian Legislative Council,April 29, 2003.  Negotiations Affairs Department, PLO, available at [http://www.nad-plo.org].22 Available at [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm]23  “Abbas, Qurei Urge Release of All Palestinian Detainees,”  Palestine Media Watch, December28, 2004.2005, a bomb killed at least five Israelis in Tel Aviv.  Secretary of State Rice cited firmevident that Islamic Jihad, headquartered in Syria, were involved in the attack.18Israeli Closures.  In the spring of 2002, Israel implemented a series of village,town, and city closures and curfews. Many claim that restricting the flow of Palestiniangoods and people within and between the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel, hampersPalestinian economic activity and may increase militancy.  Others cite Israel’s need toensure its citizens protection by drastically limiting the movement and supplies ofPalestinian militants. In his presidential inaugural address, Abbas stated “our hand isoutstretched to the Israeli partner to make peace, not with words but with deeds, and putan end to closures, arrests and the building of the fence.”19 [see below]Israeli Separation Barrier.  In April 2002, in reaction to Palestinian suicide-bombings, Israel approved the construction of a barrier between Israeli and Palestinian-held territory, largely built inside the Palestinian side of the “Green Line” (the 1967 cease-fire line separating the West Bank from Israel).20  Some Israelis contend their securitydepends on the construction of the barrier, noting decreased suicide bombings in Israelsince the barrier’s construction.  Critics of the barrier see it as de facto Israeli annexationof portions of the occupied West Bank.  President Abbas claims “the removal of the wallwill be among the first issues that our government will address because, without itsremoval, Israel will effectively destroy the Roadmap.”21Israeli-Palestinian Mutual Commitments.  Released on April 30, 2003, theframework (or “Road Map”) envisions a three-stage process comprising reciprocal stepsleading to a viable Palestinian state alongside a secure Israel by 2009.22  President Abbashas expressed support for the Road Map and its implementation.Prisoner Release.  A core domestic issue for Abbas is the release of Palestinianpolitical prisoners.  Abbas has publicly stated “in principle we work for every prisoner tobe released, but what we are looking for is the release of those who have spent many longyears in jail.”23  On December 27, 2004, an  agreement between Egypt, Israel, and the PAculminated with the release of 159 Palestinian political prisoners; on January 3, 2005,Israeli Cabinet ministers approved the release of an additional 900 Palestinian prisonersand on February 21, 2005 the first 500 prisoners were released.  Some experts see thisCRS-624  “Abbas: Refugees Will Return to Israel,” Associated Press, January 4, 2005. 25  David Remnick, “Checkpoint,” The New Yorker, February 7, 2005.26 For a more detailed analysis of U.S.-Palestinian aid See, CRS Report RL32260, U.S. ForeignAssistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and FY2005 Funding, byJeremy M. Sharp.27 Congress prohibits direct funding for the PA, but provides for a Presidential waiver if thePresident finds such aid is in US national interest.  See H.R. 4818 (P.L. 108-447), ConsolidatedAppropriations Act, FY2005, Limitation on Assistance to the Palestinian Authority, sec. 550.28 See CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by Carol Migdalovitz.29 “Bush Vows to Work for Palestinian State,” CNN, November 12, 2004.development merely as an Israeli gesture of goodwill towards Abbas; others, view therelease as a first step toward the release of the estimated 7,000 political prisoners.East Jerusalem.  Israel claims Jerusalem as its undivided capital, whilePalestinians seek to establish a capital for their state in East Jerusalem.  Abbas repeatedlyhas called for the capital of any Palestinian state be located in the eastern portion ofJerusalem.Refugees.  President Abbas, himself a refugee, has made several unequivocalstatements in support of the right of return for Palestinian refugees, claiming Palestinianrefugees and their descendants from the war that followed Israel’s creation in 1948 havethe right to return to their original homes.24  Some have suggested that Abbas mayconcede portions of the refugee issue.25 Issues for CongressU.S. aid to Palestine.26  Since the Oslo Accord of 1993, Congress has authorizedover $1.5 billion in assistance to the Palestinians, generally distributed via third partiessuch as the U.S. Agency for International Development and private voluntaryorganizations.  Funds are also distributed to Palestinians through the U.N. Refugee WorksAgency.  The Executive Branch has granted assistance directly to the PA on threeoccasions: in 1994 $10million was distributed to the PA through the Holst Fund at theWorld Bank; on July 8, 2003, $20 million was granted to the PA for infrastructureprojects; and on December 8, 2004, President Bush approved $20 million for Palestinianutility payments to Israel.27 Israeli-Palestinian Peace.28  Some analysts suggest the Bush Administrationinitially sought a less visible role than the Clinton Administration in Israeli-Palestinianaffairs.  Recent developments such as the death of Arafat and election of Abbas, Israeliplan for unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and U.S. commitments to broaderMiddle East democratization are often cited as factors for renewed U.S. emphasis on thepeace process.  After his successful re-election, President Bush stated that theestablishment of a Palestinian state, living next to a secure Israel, is a top priority.29