This report provides an overview of the effects and countermeasures of the improvised explosive devices (EIDs) in Iraq

Wilson, Clay

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Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Iraq: Effects and Countermeasures

1 Albert Eisele, “Improved Explosives Becoming More Deadly in Iraq,” The Hill, March 28,2005, [http://www.hillnews.com/thehill/export/TheHill/News/Iraq/explosives1.html].2 Loren B. Thompson, Iraq: Stop the Bombers, Win the War, Lexington Institute, June 10, 2005,at [http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense.asp?aid=616]. Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of CongressCRS Report for CongressReceived through the CRS WebOrder Code RS22330November 23, 2005Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq: Effects and CountermeasuresClay WilsonSpecialist in Technology and National SecurityForeign Affairs, Defense, and Trade DivisionSummaryImprovised explosive devices (IEDs) are responsible for many of the more than2,000 deaths and numerous casualties suffered by U.S. and coalition forces since theinvasion of Iraq.1  The bombs have been hidden behind signs and guardrails, underroadside debris, or inside animal carcasses, and encounters with IEDs are becomingmore numerous and deadly.  The threat has expanded to include vehicle-borne IEDs,where insurgents drive cars laden with explosives directly into a targeted group ofservice members.  DOD efforts to counter IEDs have proven only marginally effective,and U.S. forces continue to be exposed to the threat at military checkpoints, or wheneverriding in vehicles in Iraq.  DOD reportedly expects that mines and IEDs will continueto be  weapons of choice for insurgents for the near term in Iraq, and is also concernedthat they might eventually become more widely used by other insurgents and terroristsworldwide.  This report will be updated as events warrant.BackgroundImprovised explosive devices, or IEDs, now cause about half of all the Americancombat casualties in Iraq, both killed-in-action and wounded.2  The Iraqi insurgents makevideos of exploding U.S. vehicles and dead Americans and distribute them via the Internetto win new supporters. Outside Iraq, foreign radicals see the images as confirmation thatthe Americans are vulnerable.  IEDs are also killing hundreds of Iraqis as insurgents alsostrike police stations, markets, and mosques.  The latest innovation involves theaggressive use of vehicular bombs, two-thirds of which are driven by suicide bombers. CRS-23 Definition from Global Security.org, at [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/ied.htm].4 James Glanz, Jim Dwyer, Looting Spree Gutted Ammo Dump, San Francisco Chronicle, October28, 2004.  Byron York, Remember Al Qaqaa?, National Review Online, February 28, 2005,[http://www.nationalreview.com/york/york200502280821.asp].5 Daniel Goure, The Power in a Single Picture, October 14, 2004, Lexington Institute,[http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense.asp?aid=432].6 Daniel Goure, Better than an Abrams, May 28, 2004, Lexington Institute,[http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense.asp?aid=38]. 7 Daniel Goure, The Power in a Single Picture, October 14, 2004, Lexington Institute,[http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense.asp?aid=432].An Improvised Explosive Device is a “homemade” mine designed to cause death orinjury by using explosives that are hidden and set off using a variety of triggermechanisms.  IEDs can utilize commercial or military explosives, or homemadeexplosives, and often the IED builder has had to construct them with the materials athand.3  IEDs could also possibly be used in combination with toxic chemicals, biologicaltoxins, or radiological material, but so far this has not been reported in Iraq.Some observers speculate that munitions for constructing IEDs may be coming froma large supply of unexpended Iraqi military ordnance that was gathered and stockpiled insecret locations throughout Iraq.  In April 2003, Iraqi looters stormed the Al Qaqaamilitary weapons site and possibly carried off nearly 400 tons of powerful conventionalexplosives, after the site was first abandoned by Iraqi forces and then left unsecured byU.S. forces.  It is not known exactly when the munitions may have vanished from the site,and it is possible that Iraqi forces may have removed and relocated some explosivesbefore the invasion.4Insurgents have constructed IEDs powerful enough to kill soldiers inside 22-tonBradley Fighting Vehicles.  In one incident in 2004, after a Bradley ran over a large IED,the armored bottom plate of the vehicle was reportedly found some 60 yards from the siteof the explosion.5  In contrast, military units equipped with the 19-ton Stryker medium-weight armored vehicle, have reportedly suffered a lower number of catastrophic vehiclelosses due to enemy attack.  With a maximum speed of more than 60 mph, the Stryker candash past ambushes and roadside IEDs that might catch the slower moving Abrams tankand Bradley.6  Between December 2003 and October 2004, news reports show thatStrykers deployed in Iraq have successfully withstood 56 attacks by IEDs.  Even whenvehicles were rendered inoperable by the attacks, there was reportedly no loss of lifeamong the Stryker crews.7Triggering methods for IEDs may include using a cell phone, a garage door opener,or a child’s remote-control toy, or may even be as simple as running over a rubber hoseto produce enough air pressure to activate a switch for a mine. At other times, theinsurgent may remain concealed and trigger an IED manually. The following techniquesdescribe how insurgents can design and deploy IEDs to amplify the damage:! Coupling.  Coupling is a method of linking one mine or explosive deviceto another, usually with detonating cord.  This technique is often used toCRS-38  Global Security.org, at [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/ied.htm]9  John Anderson, Steve Fainaru, Jonathan Finer, “Bigger, Stronger Homemade Bombs Now toBlame for Half of U.S. Deaths,” The Washington Post, October 26, 2005, p. A1.10  GAO-05-737, July 2005, Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve Use of Private SecurityProviders.11  John Anderson, Steve Fainaru, Jonathan Finer, “Bigger, Stronger Homemade Bombs Now toBlame for Half of U.S. Deaths,” The Washington Post, October 26, 2005, p. A1.defeat countermeasure equipment.  A heavy mine roller will pass over theinitial, unfused device and set off the second fused device. This in turndetonates the overpassed device underneath the clearing vehicle.! Boosting.  Buried mines, or other explosive devices are stacked on topof one another. The topmost explosives are non-metal, and only thedevice buried deepest from the surface is fused.  This reduces theprobability of detection, and it increases the force of the blast. ! Daisy chaining.  IEDs may be linked together along a roadway with tripwire or detonating cord. When the initial mine is detonated, the othermines also detonate.8 ! Shaped Charges.  A cylindrical container is closed off at one end,packed with explosive, and capped by a conical piece of metal thatbecomes a molten projectile when the device is detonated.  The shapedcharge concentrates blast energy to punch through armor plating, andthen propels the molten metal into the vehicle’s cabin.9Some friendly fire incidents may also be occurring because of tensions owing toinsurgents’ use of vehicle-borne IEDs.  For example, private security contractors drivingvehicles in Iraq have reported that from January to May 2005, they may have beenmistakenly fired upon by U.S. forces at least 20 times as they approached U.S. militaryconvoys and checkpoints.10CountermeasuresThe U.S. military has increased the quality of armor used for vehicles in Iraq,including up-armoring the High-Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV,or Humvees).  However, as an apparent response to use of more heavily armored vehicles,insurgents have developed even more powerful IEDs, along with more sophisticatedmethods for deploying and triggering them.11The Army has also established an anti-IED task force directed by Brigadier GeneralJoseph L. Votel to analyze methods for neutralizing IEDs.  Because insurgents in therecent past have quickly adapted their tactics to avoid new U.S. countermeasures, thegroup will also study ways to eliminate sites where IEDs are manufactured in Iraq.  The Pentagon is also searching for new technologies to help find and neutralizeIEDs.  Microwave blasts, radio-frequency jammers, and chemical sensors are among theCRS-412 Sgt. Stephen D’Alessio, 2nd Marine Division, Marines schooled in new bomb protection, July7 ,  2 0 0 5 ,  [ h t t p : / / w w w . m a r i n e s . m i l / m a r i n e l i n k / m c n 2 0 0 0 . n s f / 0 /b89628064c45144e85257056003871f1?OpenDocument].13 Christopher Castelli, “General: Ability to Prematurely Detonate Enemy Bombs Badly Needed,”Inside the Navy, August 22, 2005, at [http://www.insidedefense.com].14  Loren B. Thompson, Iraq: Stop the Bombers, Win the War, June 10, 2005, Lexington Institute,[http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense.asp?aid=616]. 15 Sebastian Sprenger, “U.S., NATO Research Could Help Troops Detect IED Threats fromAfar,” Inside the Pentagon, May 26, 2005.  Noah Shachtman, “Improvised Bombs Baffle Army,”Wired News, January 26, 2005 [http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,66395,00.html].16 Noah Shachtman, “Improvised Bombs Baffle Army,” Wired News, January 26, 2006,[http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,63036,00.html?tw=wn_story_related].different methods being explored and deployed in this effort.  Examples of electronicjamming systems mounted on military vehicles include the IED CountermeasuresEquipment (ICE) and the Warlock, which use low-power radio frequency energy to blockthe signals of radio controlled explosives initiators, such as cell phones, satellite phones,and long range cordless telephones.12  The Army has recently ordered thousands of theseradio-frequency jammer devices.  However, experts reportedly caution that the jammersmay only be partially effective because they must be set to operate within the rightfrequency range in order to stop an IED.Some experts believe that a more effective IED countermeasure might be achievedthrough technology that can detect IEDs from afar, and then create a pulse ofelectromagnetic energy to prematurely detonate them, or burn out and destroy theircircuitry.  Researchers at the Naval Surface Warfare Center’s Dahlgren Laboratory inVirginia are working on such a solution, called Neutralizing Improvised ExplosiveDevices with Radio Frequency (NIRF).  The device, according to a source familiar withthe project, produces a very high-frequency field at very short range that can neutralizean IEDs electronics.  The Pentagon reportedly will deploy NIRF in Iraq later this year.13Military contractors are also working on a ways to create a protective area aroundmoving convoys.14 A Pentagon microwave project, code-named PING, is alreadydeployed in Iraq, and reportedly has been successful at helping locate insurgent weaponscaches.  The machine, which fits inside a Humvee, sends out electromagnetic waves thatcan penetrate a building’s interior to detect IEDs.  Other sensors, such as the Laser-Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy system (LIBS), are being developed to detect traces ofexplosives used for IEDs from as far away as 30 meters.15The “Talon” is a bomb-disposal Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV), or robot, thatcomes equipped with a mechanical arm to pick up and inspect dangerous objects, such assuspected IEDs. More than a hundred of the remote-control robots are now being used inIraq and Afghanistan, with an equal amount on order. Another robot, called the “PackBot”has also been used by the Army to clear bombs and explore suspected terrorist hideouts.16Threat data about IEDs, including technical details on how insurgents build thedevices, is tightly controlled by DOD.  Also, proprietary rights must be protected for thosecompanies who produce IED countermeasures, which limits the distribution to otherCRS-517 Michael Moss, “Many Missteps Tied to Delay Of Armor to Protect Soldiers,” The New YorkTimes ,  March 7, 2005, at [http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2005/050307-armor-missteps.htm].18 Anne Plummer, “Deadly Threat of Explosive Devices in Iraq Prompts Secrecy Debate,” Insidethe Pentagon, November 18, 2004, vol. 20, no. 47.19 Michael Moss, “Many Missteps Tied to Delay Of Armor to Protect Soldiers,” The New YorkTimes, March 7, 2005, at [http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2005/050307-armor-missteps.htm].20 Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of Critical Items during Currentand Future Operations, GAO-05-275, April 8, 2005.companies of some reports that evaluate the effectiveness of anti-IED systems in battleand during testing.17  As a result, some industry observers say they are not getting accessto all the information they need to find solutions to counter IEDs.  Some observers alsocomplain that if information on how enemies build IEDs is released, other insurgentscould possibly learn how to construct even more of the devices.  But others say there isalso a strong likelihood that release of technical information will prompt industry to findmore solutions that will make the IEDS weapons less deadly.18  Acquisition of CountermeasuresAccording to press reports, approximately 10,000 Humvees now in Iraq that werenot armored for combat conditions are currently re-enforced using steel plates that mightnot withstand the increasingly powerful explosives being used by the insurgents.19  Arecent GAO report also indicated that acquisition delays may have increased thevulnerability of U.S. forces to the IEDS threat, stating “... specific problems delayedDOD’s acquisition of three important items we reviewed (Interceptor body armor, lithiumbatteries, and up-armored High-Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles).  DOD’sacquisition decision did not maximize available capacity to produce up-armoredHigh-Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles and add-on armor kits nor did it giveCongress visibility over the basis for its acquisition solution.  These acquisitionchallenges impeded DOD’s ability to respond to rapidly increasing demands.  Tominimize acquisition delays in the future, we recommend the Army and Defense LogisticsAgency assess the industrial-base’s capacity to meet updated requirements for criticalitems within the time frames required by operational plans and provide visibility toCongress over acquisition of critical items that emerge during contingencies.”20 Actions taken by DOD to minimize future acquisition delays reportedly includeadhering to Army Regulation 700-90, originally dated December 2004, describing policyfor the Army’s Industrial Base Process which requires that the Army publish hardwarepriorities, war reserve stocks, and industrial preparedness measures that support warreplenishment objectives and the Army’s Critical Items List.  The Army has alsoimplemented a “Rapid Fielding Initiative” (RFI) to ensure that soldiers have the latestavailable equipment.  Information on the acquisition of critical go-to-war items is reportedto Congress annually through the Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress.CRS-621 Jen DiMascio, “Pentagon Transfers $160 Million to Buy Protection Equipment,” Inside theArmy, January 17, 2005.22  Glenn Maffei, “Defense Officials Worry Insurgents Will Change IEDS Tactics, Tech,” Insidethe Army, May 9, 2005.23  Jen DiMascio, “Congress OKs $129.7 Million Transfer to Fund IEDS Countermeasures,”Inside the Army, May 30, 2005.24  Glenn, Maffei, “Order Made for Final “Warlock” Batch to Tackle IEDS Problem in Iraq,”Inside the Army, July 25, 2005.Funding for CountermeasuresThe Joint IEDS Defeat Task Force has reportedly spent $378 million since 2003 tobuy electronic jammers to counter IEDs.  However, funding to purchase anti-IEDSelectronic jammers has reportedly traditionally come through congressional plus-ups andreprogramming actions, and not through ordinary line-item funding in the fiscal yearbudget.21   On April 30, 2005, the Army was granted “rapid acquisition authority” by DefenseSecretary Donald Rumsfeld, meaning that the traditional DOD acquisition process couldbe set aside, allowing a manufacturer of a special, man-portable IEDS jammer device tobe chosen within only a 15 day time period.22  The Pentagon plans to purchase 10,000 ofthe devices, at $1,000 each.  On May 24, 2005, Congress approved a transfer of $129.7million from the Iraqi Freedom Fund to purchase mobile, multiband Warlock jammerswhich can detect threats concealed on people and in vehicles, and to support R&D anddeployment for other anti-IEDS devices.23  On July 13, 2005, a reprogramming actiontransferred $10 million out of Iraqi Freedom Fund for two new anti-IEDS systems: $3.5million for 50 Small, Lightweight Advanced Modular Digital Electronic ProtectionSystems (SLAM-DEP), which incorporates existing jammer technology into a wearablevest, and $6.5 million to purchase 187 low-cost, expendable robots designed for explosiveordnance disposal.24The Senate version of the Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year2006 (S. 1043), passed on November 15, 2005, authorizes $500,000,000 of the IraqFreedom Fund solely  for support of the Joint IEDS Task Force.  The House version ofthe National Defense Authorization Act (HR.1815), passed on May 25, 2005, containsno similar provision.The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2006, as amended by the Senate(H.R. 2863.EAS), earmarks $750,000,000 from the Iraq Freedom Fund for the Joint IEDDefeat Task Force.  The version passed by the House (H.R. 2863.EH) contains no similarprovision.

Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq: Effects and Countermeasures

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Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq: Effects and Countermeasures

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