Gallis, Paul E.

UNT Digital Library

1 This section is based primarily on interviews of U.S. and European officials, summer-fall 2002.Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of CongressCRS Report for CongressReceived through the CRS WebOrder Code RS21354March 1, 2005The NATO Summit at Prague, 2002 Paul GallisSpecialist in European Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade DivisionSummaryIn November 2002, the NATO allies met in Prague at the “Transformation” summitin an attempt to define part of the alliance’s mission to combat against terrorism and theproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  They pledged to obtain the militarycapabilities to accomplish that mission.  Not all allies agree on the implications of suchpolicies.  The allies also named seven states as eligible for membership.  This report willnot be updated.  See also CRS Report RL32342, NATO and the European Union, andCRS Report RS21659, Prague Capabilities Commitments.The “Transformation” SummitOn November 21-22, 2002, the NATO allies met in a “Transformation” summit inPrague.  They sought to culminate allied efforts to change from a military alliance gearedfor conflict against the Soviet Union to a more flexible alliance with new capabilities fornew threats.  They opened the door to democratic candidate states and agreed to aforward-looking program for partnership countries able to contribute to security.The Bush Administration, with the support of then Secretary General GeorgeRobertson, had been the driving force for a changed NATO.  The Administration soughtto use the summit to revitalize the alliance by clearly stating NATO’s mission, securingpledges of capabilities to accomplish that mission, and embracing enlargement.  Someallies resisted aspects of the Administration’s design for NATO.Mission and Capabilities1During the Cold War, NATO’s mission was to provide collective defense against theSoviet threat in Europe. Some allies’ military structures remain geared for this threat, eventhough Russian conventional forces are weak and in disarray.  The Bush Administrationwishes to redefine the principal threats as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction. Administration officials believe that the United States is “at war” todayCRS-22 NATO Communiqué, Paragraph 5, Reykjavik, May 14, 2002.3 Rumsfeld press conference, Brussels, Dec. 18, 2001.against the sources of these new threats and that the allies must be prepared to engageadversaries in North Africa, the Middle East, and Asia to ensure security. The Europeans, in contrast, with few exceptions, do not believe that they are at war,and any policy of moving outside the NATO Treaty area of Europe remains acontroversial one.  Most European allies believe that terrorism can be subdued, notthrough military action, but primarily through elimination of its underlying causes andthrough law-enforcement measures.At NATO’s May 2002 ministerial meeting in Reykjavik, the allies agreed that “tocarry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can movequickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, andachieve their objectives.”2  The European allies had resisted such a clear statement ofmoving “out-of-area” until the Reykjavik meeting, and few have dedicated the resourcesto develop the mobile forces necessary to achieve such an objective.  Some BushAdministration officials are now describing NATO’s mission as global, most prominently,Defense Secretary Rumsfeld.  In December 2001, when asked what NATO’s area ofoperations should be, he responded: “The only way to deal with the terrorist networkthat’s global is to go after it where it is.”3For some allies, Reykjavik did not supply a definitive word on NATO’s mission andreach.  Above all, French, German, and Belgian officials have been wary of out-of-areamissions; in raising doubts, they tend to cite the Administration’s new doctrine of “pre-emptive” or “preventive” action against terrorist or WMD threats.  They do not wishNATO to become the instrument of U.S. policy against such threats, unless guidelines fortaking NATO out-of-area are more clearly agreed.  For example, Paris contends that aU.N. resolution should be required for any such out-of-area NATO action.  The Germans,and some other allies, believe that the principal threats to European security remain on thecontinent, primarily in the Balkans, where instability, in their view, may yet again resultin refugee flows and ultra-nationalist ideas and conflicts. Berlin believes that “collectivesecurity,” in the form of robust peace operations, should remain NATO’s principalobjective.  The Iraq war of 2003, undertaken primarily on the mistaken assumption thatIraq was producing WMD, has further damaged U.S. leadership of the alliance.However, in 2002, the Bush Administration took several actions in an attempt toensure that the summit would move the alliance towards its own view of mission andcapabilities:! It led efforts to replace the Defense Capability Initiative of 1999, whichlisted 58 capability goals that NATO should obtain, with a “PragueCapabilities Commitment” (PCC). The PCC lists pledges by memberstates to acquire a smaller list of  key capabilities: strategic airlift, air-to-air refueling, precision-guided munitions, secure communications, andspecial forces.  President Bush called heads of government and askedthem to make specific pledges at Prague to purchase selected capabilities.CRS-3! At Prague, there was announcement of a NATO Response Force (NRF),composed of 20,000 men kept in a high-readiness status, for high-intensity conflict, and able to reach its destination within 7-30 days of aNATO decision to use it. The NRF would be an “insertion force,” partlyU.S. but mostly European in composition, for rapid movement primarilyagainst terrorist and WMD threats.The Prague Capabilities Commitment and the NATO Response Force are closelyrelated in political terms.  The Administration is calling upon allies to spend more ondefense for capabilities to equip the NRF, as well as capabilities for larger, mobile forcesthat might follow after the insertion of the NRF.  Administration officials described thesetwo initiatives to the allies as a test of allied will to revitalize NATO.  Implicit in theseinitiatives is a view that only governments with sharply improved capabilities will playa role in “coalitions of the willing” against adversaries, and that only such governmentswould therefore have an important voice in allied decision-making.The allies have accepted these two Administration initiatives in general terms,although with a number of reservations. Some allies, such as Germany, contend that EU-imposed budget strictures prevent their spending appreciably more on defense.  Many alsocontend that U.S. restrictions on technology transfer impede the purchase of such itemsas precision-guided munitions and ground surveillance radar.The NRF is now operational and has approximately 18,000 troops.  The PCC,however, remains a work in progress.  There has been some progress in purchasing orleasing sea lift and even more progress in developing a chemical/biological/radiologicaldefense battalion.  Yet there remain serious shortfalls in aerial refuelers and air lift.Reforming the NATO Command Structure.  The Administration was movedforward with an initiative to reduce the number of NATO commands and to streamlinethe ones that remain.  Most controversial was the transformation of SACLANT (SupremeAllied Command Atlantic, in Norfolk) from a strategic command to a “functional”command.  The Europeans have long desired maintaining the two strategic commands,one in Europe (SACEUR) and one in the United States, in part as a political symbol oftransatlantic linkage.  The Administration wished to modify SACLANT to a commandthat would work on conceptual issues, such as developing new doctrines and new forces,devising experimental training for such forces, and then putting them into the field.Ultimately, the allies accepted this proposal, and the new command is now operational.Enlargement of NATO MembershipThe alliance viewed enlargement as a secondary issue for the summit.  At Prague,NATO issued invitations for membership to Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovenia,Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.Each candidate had pursued an individual Membership Action Plan (MAP)since1999 to improve democratic structures and military capabilities and procedures.Some Administration officials contended that the Baltic states, across the board, had madethe most progress and that Slovakia had made considerable strides in militaryimprovements.  Slovakia’s September 2002 elections returned to power key elements ofan existing reform government.  Slovenia had made significant strides in political andCRS-44 “Ukraine fails to reassure West on Iraq,” Washington Post, Nov. 6, 2002, p. A13.economic structures, but public support for NATO membership had wavered.  Bulgaria,with minimal resources, had embraced key concepts of NATO military procedures, butit had a government that was increasingly unpopular and was following an uncertaincourse of political and economic reform.  Corruption also remained endemic there.Romania was the most controversial candidate.  Bucharest had made strides in militaryreform and provided bases and overflight rights for the conflict in Afghanistan, butcorruption affected policies of its government from border control to procurement togovernment hiring.Compared to the three previous successful candidates (Poland, the Czech Republic,and Hungary), the new candidate states had less well-developed political and economicstructures and militaries with a longer road to travel to reach NATO standards.  At thesame time, new members normally require a decade or more to approach those standards.Officials in allied states have tended to describe the Prague round of enlargement as a“political” rather than a strategic round, undertaken above all to enhance stability inEurope by securing governments in NATO, where their paths to strong democracy can beencouraged.  In the end, NATO accepted the seven states’ candidacies and welcomedthem to full membership on March 29, 2004.Building PartnershipsThe allies were in general agreement that Partnership for Peace (PfP) and otherprograms meant to improve cooperation with non-member states had been successful, andshould be extended and enhanced.  Strengthening partnerships was the third goal of thesummit.The NATO-Russia Council was formed in May 2002.  Most progress has been madeon the issue of joint peacekeeping arrangements between NATO and Russia, with lessprogress over such issues as stemming proliferation.  Some allied governments believethat the Russians wish to use the Council to revive an earlier era, in which Washingtonand Moscow were the two principal interlocutors in resolving key matters of Europeansecurity.  U.S. officials believe that NATO should give the Russians time to be“educated” in the ways of working with an alliance of independent, sovereign states.Meetings of the NATO-Ukraine working group have often been difficult.  The alliesviewed Kiev as having made little progress on the road to democratic and military reform.The Bush Administration believed that, in violation of U.N. sanctions, the now-departedKuchma government may have sold a Soviet-era early-warning system, called“Kolchuga,”4 to Iraq, a step that led to the suspension of some U.S. aid.  The alliespointedly did not invite Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma to the summit.  However,with the election of a reform-minded government in December 2004, NATO is assertivelyinviting Kiev to review its interest in membership.From a strategic viewpoint, the Administration believes that partnership programswith Central Asian states have borne fruit in the Afghan conflict, where Uzbekistan,above all, has provided important support.  U.S. officials now speak of extending thealliance one day into Central Asia.CRS-5Debate over the Alliance’s FutureIn the background of discussions at the summit were concerns over the alliance’sfuture.  Some Administration officials sharply criticized the allies for their failure todevelop forces to respond to today’s threats and for the cumbersome decision-makingprocedures that seem to impede steps to make NATO more flexible.Some allies continue to have very different views of the threat to European and alliedsecurity.  While some states, such as France, Germany, and Italy, see a growing threatfrom terrorism and proliferation, they believe that the United States is narrowly obsessedwith such issues, and that political, diplomatic, and law-enforcement initiatives canmanage much of the current threat.  They do agree with the Administration that lawenforcement measures are a key element in combating terrorism and proliferation, butthink that military instruments are less effective.  They believe that the Administration isoften impulsive in confronting current dangers.  They strongly object to President Bush’sdoctrine of “pre-emptive” or “preventive” action, and almost uniformly oppose usingNATO assets in the name of such a doctrine.  The Administration’s strong support for theSharon government in Israel in the view of some Europeans, have unduly antagonized theIslamic world, and are political abrasions undermining allied solidarity.  Some Europeanofficials talk of following the French practice of developing “hedging strategies,” in theevent that U.S. policies in the Middle East, viewed by the Europeans as overly aggressive,should fail.  Building an EU force to handle crisis management, or developing betterrelations with Iran, are examples of such strategies.

The NATO Summit at Prague, 2002

https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs7320/m1/1/high_res_d/RS21354_2005Mar01.pdf

The NATO Summit at Prague, 2002

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

UNT Digital Library