In recent years there has been a growing sense of urgency to develop and deploy effective missile defenses against a range of long and short range ballistic missile threats. Although many might believe this to be relative new to U.S. national security objectives, such interest been ongoing since the 1960s, and current technologies being investigated date to the early 1980s. This effort has been challenging technically and politically controversial. Some $100 billion has been spent since the mid-1980s. This report provides a brief overview of U.S. efforts to date

Hildreth, Steven A.

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1 For a broader review of current U.S. missile defense programs, policies and issues, see CRSReport RL31111, Ballistic Missile Defense: Current Issues for Congress, by Steven A. Hildreth.Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of CongressCRS Report for CongressReceived through the CRS WebOrder Code RS22120April 22, 2005Ballistic Missile Defense: Historical OverviewSteven A. HildrethSpecialist in National DefenseForeign Affairs, Defense, and Trade DivisionSummaryIn recent years there has been a growing sense of urgency to develop and deployeffective missile defenses against a range of long and short range ballistic missilethreats.  Although many might believe this to be relative new to U.S. national securityobjectives, such interest been ongoing since the 1960s, and current technologies beinginvestigated date to the early 1980s.  This effort has been challenging technically andpolitically controversial. Some $100 billion has been spent since the mid-1980s. Thisreport provides a brief overview of U.S. efforts to date.1  It may be updated.IntroductionSince the mid-1980s, many decision makers and others have demonstrated seriousinterest  in deploying  ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems capable of protecting theUnited States from missile attack.  Several events in the last decade contributed tostrengthen these views.  The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 heightened concernsabout the possibility of an accidental or unauthorized launch of ballistic missiles from theremnants of that nation.  The Persian Gulf War in 1991, with Iraq’s use of Scud missiles,proved to many that the growing threat posed by ballistic missiles had to be addressed.The proliferation of ballistic missile technologies, including sales from nations such asChina, Russia, and North Korea to nations such as Iran, Syria, and Pakistan became moreworrisome to many.  Finally, many also argue that some U.S. adversaries, such as NorthKorea, are developing longer-range missiles that might reach targets in the United States.But interest in missile defense stretches back much further than the 1980s.  In fact,efforts to counter ballistic missiles have been underway since the dawn of the missile ageat the close of World War II.  Numerous programs were begun, and only a very few sawcompletion.  Technical obstacles have proven to be tenacious, and systems integrationchallenges have been more the norm, rather than the exception.  Since 1985, the UnitedCRS-2States has spent about $100 billion on missile defense efforts, and only very recentlydeployed a small-scale national-level missile defense, which has yet to be testedsuccessfully in its deployed configuration.This short report  provides a brief  overview of the history of the missile defenseefforts undertaken to defend the United States.  It begins with a brief summary of theprovisions of the 1972 ABM Treaty, which shaped most of this history, and a short reviewhistory of U.S. programs leading to the program. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) TreatyNegotiations with the Soviet Union on the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treatybegan in November 1969.  Early in the negotiations the United States proposed that thetreaty limit Russia to one deployment site around Moscow (which it was already building)and permit the United States to deploy four sites around ICBM fields, which was the U.S.program at the time (construction had already begun on a site near Grand Forks, ND).The Soviets rejected this proposal, insisting that any agreement include equal limits oneach nation.  They had the same reaction when the United States proposed that the treatypermit either nation to deploy one site at its capital or two sites at ICBM fields.Eventually, the Nixon Administration agreed to accept parity in ABM deployments; eachnation could deploy two sites, one around its capital and one around an ICBM field.  Thispermitted the continued construction of each nation’s existing ABM site.Signed in May 1972, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty prohibited thedeployment of ABM systems for the defense of the nations’ entire territory.  It permittedeach side to deploy limited ABM systems at two locations, one centered on the nation’scapital and one at a location containing ICBM silo launchers.  When it became clear thatneither nation would complete a second site, the two sides agreed, in a 1974 Protocol, thateach would have only one ABM site, located either at the nation’s capital or around anICBM deployment area.  Each ABM site could contain no more than 100 ABM launchersand 100 ABM interceptor missiles.  The Treaty also specified that in the future any radarsthat provided early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack had to be located on theperiphery of the national territory and oriented outward.  The Treaty banned thedevelopment, testing, and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobileland-based ABM systems and ABM system components (these included interceptormissiles, launchers, and radars or other sensors that can substitute for radars).  The Treatyplaced no restrictions on the development, testing, or deployment of defenses againstshorter range missiles. Although the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in2002, the treaty shaped U.S. efforts to that point.History of NMD in the United StatesSentinel and Safeguard Programs.  The United States has pursued researchand development in anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems since the early 1950s.  In themid-1960s it developed the Sentinel system, which would have used ground-based,nuclear-armed interceptor missiles deployed around a number of major urban areas toprotect against Soviet missile attack.  Many analysts recognized that such protectionwould be limited, in part because the Soviet Union could probably saturate the systemwith offensive warheads and just a few warheads could achieve massive damage againstCRS-3a “soft” target like a city.  In response,  supporters argued that the system could providea “thin” defense of U.S. cities against an attack by an anticipated Chinese intercontinentalballistic missile (ICBM) force.In 1969, the Nixon Administration renamed the system “Safeguard,” and changedits focus to deployment around offensive (i.e., nuclear-tipped ICBMs) missile fields,rather than cities, to ensure that these missiles could survive a first strike to ensureretaliation against the Soviet Union.  Many in Congress objected to the program, citingits costs, technical uncertainties, and the risk of accelerating the arms race.  Congressalmost stopped the program in 1969, when the Senate voted 50-50 to approve anamendment halting construction.  Safeguard continued, however, when Vice PresidentAgnew broke the tie with a vote for the program.  Nevertheless, sentiment against ABMdeployments and in favor of negotiated limits on ABM systems, was growing.The United States completed its nuclear interceptor ABM site near Grand Forks,North Dakota.  It operated for nine months in 1974 and 1975, then was shut down becauseit proved to be not cost-effective.  The facilities at that location, however, continued tocount under the ABM Treaty because it had not been dismantled according to a post-Treaty agreement reached with the Soviet Union.  Russia continues to this day to operateits ABM site around Moscow.  U.S. research and development into ABM systems, especially for ICBM protection,continued, albeit at lower budget levels through the late 1970s.  By the time of the CarterAdministration, however, spending on missile defense programs began to rise again,primarily as a means to defend the newest generation of U.S. ICBMs — the MX missilesystem.The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).  The Reagan Administration continuedto increase funding for defenses against ICBMs begun under the Carter Administration.But, in March 1983, President Reagan announced an expansive, new effort to developnon-nuclear ballistic missile defenses that would protect the United States against a full-scale attack from the Soviet Union.  Although the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)remained a research and development effort, with little testing and no immediatedeployments, President Reagan and the program’s supporters envisioned a large-scaledefensive system with thousands of land-, sea-, air-, and space-based sensors andinterceptors.  This global defensive “shield” would employ both non-nuclear interceptormissiles and more exotic laser or x-ray devices designed to destroy incoming missiles.With these technologies, the United States would replace deterrence with defense in itseffort to protect itself from Soviet attack.  However, as cost estimates and technicalchallenges increased, the Reagan Administration scaled back its objectives for SDI.  Itannounced that it would begin with a “Phase I” deployment of land-based and space-based sensors and interceptors.  This system would not provide complete protection fromSoviet attack, but would, instead, disrupt the attack enough to call into question theattack’s effectiveness.  Phase I of SDI would, therefore, according to their arguments,enhance deterrence, while the United States continued to seek a way to replace deterrencewith defense.  Although Congress largely supported BMD research and development, itgenerally opposed plans for significant BMD deployments at that time.The Reagan Administration and the program’s supporters recognized that many ofthe technologies pursued under SDI would not be allowed by the ABM Treaty when theyCRS-4entered the testing or deployment phases.  Therefore, the Reagan Administration outlineda new interpretation of the ABM Treaty that it hoped would allow for the testing of space-based and exotic missile defense technologies.  Many in Congress at that time objectedto this re-interpretation of the ABM Treaty, with Senator Sam Nunn mounting aparticularly comprehensive defense of the traditional interpretation of the Treaty.Throughout this period, Congress tendered strong support for the ABM Treaty.  TheReagan Administration also opened new negotiations with the Russians, known as theDefense and Space talks, in an effort to reach agreement on modifications to or areplacement for the ABM Treaty.Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS).  The first BushAdministration responded to the costs and technical challenges of Phase I and thechanging international political environment with a further contraction of the goals forSDI.  Instead of seeking to protect the United States against a large-scale attack, theUnited States would seek to deploy a defensive system that could provide GlobalProtection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS); a more modest version of the original SDIvision.  This new focus recognized that the demise of the Soviet Union had reduced thelikelihood of a large-scale attack, but also the increased likelihood of a small accidentalor unauthorized attack.  In addition, this type of ballistic missile defense would havesought to protect the United States, its forces, and allies against an attack by other nationswho had acquired relatively small numbers of ballistic missiles.The Bush Administration envisioned a GPALS system that would have included upto 1,000 land-based interceptors and perhaps another 1,000 space-based interceptors,along with space-based sensors.  The Administration recognized that this system wouldhave exceeded the limits in the ABM Treaty.  It therefore held negotiations with theRussian government in 1992 in an effort to identify a more cooperative and flexibleregime to replace the ABM Treaty.  The Clinton Administration suspended thesenegotiations in 1993, when it also scaled back U.S. objectives for a national missiledefense program. Meanwhile, some in Congress, notably Senator Nunn, had argued sincethe late 1980s for the deployment of a more limited NMD system, that would comply withthe ABM Treaty, to protect against limited or accidental attacks.National Missile Defense Technology Development.  The ClintonAdministration restructured BMD programs to reflect the results of the 1993 Bottom UpReview, a DOD-wide review of U.S. military plans and programs.  At the time, it decidedto emphasize missile defense deployment geared toward short-range missile threats, andto focus national level efforts on technology development.  Secretary of Defense Aspinnoted at the time that these program changes reflected an assessment that the regionalballistic missile threat already existed, while a ballistic missile threat to the United Statesper se might emerge only in the future.  This raised questions about the need for an NMDsystem in the near- to mid-term, particularly as compared with the need for robust theatermissile defense efforts.  The Department of Defense also determined that these programswould still be conducted in compliance with the 1972 ABM Treaty.Key legislation was passed during this time. The Missile Defense Act of 1995 (inP.L. 104-106 — National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996) declared it thepolicy of the United States to: (1)  develop as soon as possible affordable andoperationally effective theater missile defenses; (2) develop for deployment a multiple-sitenational missile defense system that is affordable and operationally effective againstCRS-5limited, accidental, and unauthorized ballistic missile attacks on the United States, andwhich can be augmented over time as the threat changes to provide a layered defenseagainst limited, accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile threats; (3) initiatenegotiations with Russia as necessary to provide for the national defense systemsenvisioned by the act; and (4) consider, if those negotiations fail, the option ofwithdrawing from the ABM Treaty.The Clinton Administration adjusted its efforts and adopted a new  strategy fornational missile defense.  In 1996, the Clinton Administration adopted a 3+3 strategy, toguide development and potential deployment.  Under this strategy, the United Stateswould develop a national missile defense system to defend the United States againstattacks from small numbers of long-range ballistic missiles launched by hostile nations,or, perhaps, from an accidental or unauthorized launch of Russian or Chinese missiles.The strategy envisioned continued development of NMD technologies during the firstthree years (1997-2000), followed by a deployment decision (in 2000) if the system weretechnologically feasible and warranted by prospective threats. If a decision to deploy anNMD system were made, the plan then was to deploy it within the second three yearperiod (2000-2003).  Development and deployment was to be conducted within the limitsof the ABM Treaty.  This approach was later modified to allow a longer lead time forpossible deployment (possibly 2005), and according to the Pentagon at that time, toreduce the amount of program risk.  Ultimately, in September 2000, President Clintondecided not to authorize deployment of a national missile defense at that time.  He statedthat he could not conclude “that we have enough confidence in the technology, and theoperational effectiveness of the entire NMD system, to move forward to deployment.”National Missile Defense Acquisition.  President George W. Bush enteredoffice prepared to advance ballistic missile defense deployment as a key national securityobjective. The Bush Administration substantially increased funding for missile defenseprograms and laid the foundation for withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty, whichoccurred in June 2002.  Much of the Bush Administration’s argument centered around adifferent strategic environment from 1972: Soviet forces no longer threatened the UnitedStates and the greater threat came from the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weaponsof mass destruction.  Special concern was focused on rogue states and terrorism.  TheRussian government gave little opposition to the Administration’s decision to withdrawfrom the treaty, and potential allied criticism in Europe was muted.Also in 2002, the President announced his decision to deploy a limited ballisticmissile defense system against long-range missiles by the fall of 2004.  Although this goalwas met with the deployment of five ground-based interceptors in silos in Alaska, on-going testing problems have not yet demonstrated the capability of that deployed system.Current plans are to continue deployment of those interceptors in Alaska, California, andeventually elsewhere at sites not yet announced.  Throughout, Congress has been highlysupportive of the Bush Administration’s efforts. History of TMD in the United StatesU.S. efforts to develop effective defenses against shorter range ballistic missilethreats to U.S. forces deployed overseas grew out of the Army’s Patriot air defensesystem, which began in the 1960s.  As Patriot developed further in the 1980s, someargued for its potential also as a theater missile defense capability.  Although the PentagonCRS-62 CRS Report 91-456F, The Patriot Air Defense System and the Search for an AntitacticalBallistic Missile Defense, by Steven A. Hildreth and Paul C. Zinsmeister, June 3, 1991.3 Hearings before the House Government Operations Sub-committee on Legislation and NationalSecurity, April 7, 1992, on Patriot Performance in Desert Storm.4 CRS Report RL31946, Iraq War: Defense Program Implications for Congress, by RonaldO’Rourke (section on Ballistic Missile Defense, pp. 51-53).and the SDI Organization initially were not supportive of the effort at first, Congressincreasingly argued successfully for Patriot’s development of an anti-tactical missile(ATM) defense. By the time of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the Patriot ATM hadexperienced a remarkably successful test record.2  Acquisition of Patriot missiles forDesert Storm was accelerated after Iraq invaded Kuwait.  On the battlefield, however,Patriot’s success, or lack of it in Desert Storm, still remains a subject of controversydespite most public perceptions of unequivocal success.3Nonetheless, Congress and the Department of Defense determined subsequently thatthe Patriot concept to defend against shorter range ballistic missile threats to U.S. forcesoverseas warranted further support.  The Patriot system had been upgraded several timesby the time of the recent war against Iraq.  On the battlefield, Patriot was considered moresuccessful than in 1991, but with some mixed results.4  Congress and the Pentagoncontinue to support development of highly effective TMD systems.

Ballistic Missile Defense:  Historical Overview

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Ballistic Missile Defense: Historical Overview

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