Congressional oversight of policy implementation and administration, which has occurred throughout the U.S. government experience under the Constitution, takes a variety of forms and utilizes various techniques. These range from specialized investigations by select committees to annual appropriations hearings, and from informal communications between Members or congressional staff and executive personnel to the use of extra congressional mechanisms, such as offices of inspector general and study commissions. Oversight, moreover, is supported by a variety of authorities—the Constitution, public law, and chamber and committee rules—and is an integral part of the system of checks and balances between the legislature and the executiv

Kaiser, Frederick M.

This report provides information about the Congressional Oversight of implementation and administration has occurred through out the history of United States government under the constitution

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Congressional Research Service ò The Library of CongressCRS Report for CongressReceived through the CRS Web97-936 GOVUpdated January 2, 2001Congressional OversightFrederick M. KaiserSpecialist in American National GovernmentGovernment and Finance DivisionSummaryCongressional oversight of policy implementation and administration, which hasoccurred  throughout the U.S. government experience  under the Constitution, takes avariety of forms and utilizes various techniques. These range from specializedinvestigations by select committees to annual appropriations hearings, and from informalcommunications between Members or congressional staff and executive personnel to theuse of extra congressional mechanisms, such as offices of inspector general and studycommissions. Oversight, moreover, is supported by a variety of authorities—theConstitution, public law, and chamber and committee rules—and is an integral part ofthe system of checks and balances between the legislature and the executive.  This reportwill be updated as events require.Organization and OperationsCongressional oversight refers to the review, monitoring, and supervision of federalagencies, programs, activities, and policy implementation.  Congress exercises this powerlargely through its standing committee system.  However, oversight, which dates to theearliest days of the Republic, also occurs in a wide variety of congressional activities andcontexts.  These include authorization, appropriations, investigative, and legislativehearings by standing committees; specialized investigations by select committees; andreviews and studies by congressional support agencies and staff.Congress’s oversight authority derives from its “implied” powers in the Constitution,public laws, and  House and Senate rules.  It is an integral part of the American system ofchecks and balances.CRS-21 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (London: Parker, Son, andBourn, 1861), p. 104.2 Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1885), p. 297. Principles and Purposes  Underlying the legislature's ability to oversee the executive are democratic principlesas well as practical purposes.  John Stuart Mill, the British Utilitarian philosopher, insistedthat oversight was the key feature of a meaningful representative body: “The proper officeof a representative assembly is to watch and control the government.”1  As a young scholarand future President, Woodrow Wilson—in his 1885 treatise, CongressionalGovernment—equated oversight with lawmaking, which was usually seen as the supremefunction of a legislature.  He wrote, “Quite as important as legislation is vigilant oversightof administration.”2 The philosophical underpinning for oversight is the Constitution’s system of checksand balances among the legislature, executive, and judiciary.  James Madison, known asthe “Father of the Constitution,” described the system in Federalist No. 51 as establishing“subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange theseveral offices in such a manner that each may be a check on the other.”Oversight, as an outgrowth of this principle, ideally serves a number of overlappingobjectives and purposes:! improve the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of governmental operations;! evaluate programs and performance;! detect and prevent poor administration, waste, abuse, arbitrary and capriciousbehavior, or illegal and unconstitutional conduct;! protect civil liberties and constitutional rights;! inform the general public and ensure that executive policies reflect the publicinterest;! gather information to develop new legislative proposals or to amend existingstatutes;! ensure administrative compliance with legislative intent; and! prevent executive encroachment on legislative authority and prerogatives.In sum, oversight is a way for Congress to check on, and check, the executive.CRS-33 Article I, Sec. 8 and Article II, Secs. 2 and 4.4 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 177 (1927); see also Watkins v. United States, 354U.S. 178, 187 (1957), and Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959).Powers and Prerogatives The U.S. ConstitutionAlthough the Constitution grants no formal, express authority to oversee orinvestigate the executive or program administration, oversight is implied in Congress’simpressive array of enumerated powers.3 The legislature is authorized to appropriatefunds; raise and support armies; provide for and maintain a navy; declare war; provide fororganizing and calling forth the national guard; regulate interstate and foreign commerce;establish post offices and post roads; advise and consent on treaties and presidentialnominations (Senate); and impeach (House) and try (Senate) the President, Vice President,and civil officers for treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.Reinforcing these powers is Congress’s broad authority “to make all laws which shallbe necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all otherpowers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in anyDepartment or Officer thereof.”The authority  to oversee derives from these constitutional powers.  Congress couldnot carry them out reasonably or responsibly without knowing what the executive is doing;how programs are being administered, by whom, and at what cost; and whether officialsare obeying the law and complying with legislative intent.  The Supreme Court haslegitimated Congress’s  investigative  power, subject to constitutional safeguards for civilliberties.  In 1927, the Court found that,  in investigating the administration of theDepartment of Justice, Congress was considering a subject “on which legislation could behad or would be materially aided by the information which the investigation was calculatedto elicit.”4StatutesThe “necessary and proper” clause of the Constitution also allows Congress to enactlaws that mandate oversight by its committees, grant relevant authority to itself and itssupport agencies, and impose specific obligations on the executive to report to or consultwith Congress, and even seek its approval for specific actions.Broad oversight mandates exist for the legislature in several significant statutes.  TheLegislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (P.L. 79-601), for the first time, explicitly calledfor “legislative oversight” in public law.  It directed House and Senate standing committees“to exercise continuous watchfulness” over programs and agencies under their jurisdiction;authorized professional staff for them; and enhanced the powers of the ComptrollerGeneral, the head of Congress’s  investigative and audit arm, the General AccountingOffice (GAO).  The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-510) authorized eachstanding committee to “review and study, on a continuing basis, the application,administration and execution” of laws under its jurisdiction; increased the professional staffCRS-4of committees; expanded the assistance provided by the Congressional Research Service;and strengthened the program evaluation responsibilities of GAO.  The CongressionalBudget Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344) allowed committees to conduct program evaluationthemselves or contract out for it; strengthened GAO’s role in acquiring fiscal, budgetary,and program-related information; and upgraded GAO’s review capabilities.Besides these general powers, numerous statutes direct the executive to furnishinformation to or consult with Congress.  For example, the Government Performance andResults Act of 1993 (P.L. 103-62) requires agencies to consult with Congress on theirstrategic plans and report annually on performance plans, goals, and results.  In fact, morethan 2,000 reports are submitted each year to Congress by federal departments, agencies,commissions, bureaus, and offices.  Inspectors general (IGs), for instance, report theirfindings about waste, fraud, and abuse, and their recommendations for corrective action,periodically to the agency head and Congress.  The IGs are also instructed to issue specialreports concerning particularly serious problems immediately to the agency head, whotransmits them unaltered to Congress within seven days.  The Reports Consolidation Actof 2000 (P.L. 106-531), moreover, instructs the IGs to identify and describe theiragencies’ most serious management and performance challenges and briefly assessprogress in addressing them.  This new requirement is to be part of a larger effort byindividual agencies to consolidate their numerous reports on financial and performancemanagement matters into a single annual report.  The aim is to enhance coordination andefficiency within the agencies; improve the quality of relevant information; and provide itin a more meaningful and useful format for Congress, the President, and the public.In addition, Congress creates commissions and establishes task forces to study andmake recommendations for select policy areas that can also involve examination ofexecutive operations and organizations. There is a long history behind executive reports to Congress.  Indeed, one of the firstlaws of the First Congress—the 1789 Act to establish the Treasury Department (1 Stat.66)—called upon the Secretary and the Treasurer to report directly to Congress on publicexpenditures and all accounts.  The Secretary was also required “to make report, and giveinformation to either branch of the legislature ... respecting all matters referred to him bythe Senate or House of Representatives, or which shall appertain to his office.”Separate from such reporting obligations, public employees may provide informationto Congress on their own.  In the early part of  the 20th century, Congress enactedlegislation to overturn a “gag” rule, issued by the President, that prohibited employeesfrom communicating directly with Congress (5 U.S.C. 7211 (1994)).  Other“whistleblower” statutes, which have been extended specifically to cover personnel in theintelligence community (P.L. 105-272), guarantee the right of government employees topetition or furnish information to Congress or a Member.House and Senate Rules Chamber rules  also reinforce the oversight function.  House and Senate rules, forinstance, provide for “special oversight” or “comprehensive policy oversight,”respectively, for specified committees over matters that relate to their authorizingjurisdiction.  In addition, House rules direct each standing committee to require itssubcommittees to conduct oversight or to establish an oversight subcommittee for thisCRS-5purpose.  House rules also call  for each committee to submit an oversight agenda, listingits prospective oversight topics for the ensuing Congress, to the House Committee onGovernment Reform, which compiles and prints the agendas.The House Government Reform Committee and the Senate Governmental AffairsCommittee, which have oversight jurisdiction over virtually the entire federal government,furthermore, are authorized to review and study the operation of government activities todetermine their economy and efficiency and to submit recommendations based on GAOreports.  In addition, House rules require that the findings and recommendations from theGovernment Reform Committee be considered by authorizing panels, if presented to themin a timely fashion.Activities and AvenuesOversight occurs through a wide variety of congressional activities and avenues.Some of the most publicized are the comparatively rare investigations by selectcommittees into major scandals or into executive branch operations gone awry.  Cases inpoint are temporary select committee inquiries into: China’s acquisition of U.S. nuclearweapons information, in 1999; the Iran-Contra affair, in 1987; intelligence agency abuses,in 1975-1976, and “Watergate,” in 1973-1974.  The precedent for this kind of oversightactually goes back two centuries: in 1792, a special House committee investigated theignominious defeat of an Army force by confederated Indian tribes.  By comparison tothese select panel investigations, other congressional inquiries in recent Congresses—intoWhitewater, access to Federal Bureau of Investigation files, White House Travel Officefirings, and campaign financing—have relied upon standing committees.The impeachment proceedings against President Clinton in 1998 in the House andin 1999 in the Senate also generated considerable oversight.  It not only encompassed  thePresident and the White House staff, but also extended to the office of independentcounsel, prompted by concerns about its authority, jurisdiction, and expenditures.Although such highly visible endeavors are significant, they usually reflect only asmall portion of Congress’s total oversight effort.  More routine and regular review,monitoring, and supervision occur in other congressional activities and contexts.Especially important are appropriations hearings on agency budgets as well asauthorization hearings for existing programs.  Separately, examinations of executiveoperations and the implementation of programs—by congressional staff, support agencies,and specially created commissions and task forces—provide additional oversight.Selected ReferencesJoel D. Aberbach, Keeping Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1990).Frederick M. Kaiser, “Congressional Oversight of the Presidency,” Annals, vol. 499, Sept.1988,  pp. 75-89.David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations,1946-1990 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991).CRS-6Walter J. Oleszek, “Legislative Oversight,” Congressional Procedure and the PolicyProcess (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2001),  pp. 274-297.Arthur M. Schlesinger and Roger Bruns, eds., Congress Investigates: A DocumentedHistory, 1792-1974, 5 vols. (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1975).Charles Tiefer, “Congressional Oversight of the Clinton Administration and CongressionalProcedure,” Administrative Law Review, vol. 50, Winter 1998, pp. 199-216.U.S. Congress, House Committee on House Administration, “Oversight,” History of theHouse of Representatives, 1789-1994, H.Doc. 103-324, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess.(Washington: GPO, 1994), pp. 233-266.U.S.  General Accounting Office, Investigators’ Guide to Sources of Information, GAOReport OSI-97-2 (Washington: 1997).   CRS ProductsCRS Report RL30240 (1999), Congressional Oversight Manual (1999). CRS Report 97-382 (1997), Government Performance and Results Act: Implications forCongressional Oversight, by Frederick M. Kaiser and Virginia A. McMurtry. CRS Report 95-464 (1995), Investigative Oversight, by Morton Rosenberg.CRS Video programs (1999), VB 60016, Constitutional Context of Oversight;VB60019,Fiscal Oversight; VB60015, Oversight: A Key Congressional Function; VB60017,The Rules and Tools of Oversight; VB60018, Sources of Oversight Assistance.

Congressional Oversight

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