The U.S. Army has begun an ambitious program intended to transform itself into a strategically responsive force dominant in all types of ground operations. As planned, its Objective Force will eventually meld all ongoing initiatives into a force based on a high-tech Future Combat System. This short report briefly describes the program and discusses issues of feasibility, viability, and affordability of potential interest to Congress

Bruner, Edward F.

This report briefly describes the modernization program for the U.S. military forces and discusses issues of feasibility, viability, and affordability of potential interest to Congress

UNT Digital Library

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of CongressCRS Report for CongressReceived through the CRS WebOrder Code RS20787Updated March 11, 2004Army Transformation and Modernization:Overview and Issues for CongressEdward F. BrunerSpecialist in National DefenseForeign Affairs, Defense, and Trade DivisionSummaryThe U.S. Army continues an ambitious program intended to transform itself intoa strategically responsive force dominant in all types of ground operations.  As planned,its Future Force will eventually meld all ongoing initiatives into a force based on a high-tech Future Combat System (FCS).  Its Current Force is beginning to provide a newcombat capability, based on current-technology armored vehicles, for the mid-intensitycombat operations that seem prevalent in today’s world.  Its current “legacy force” ofexisting systems is being modernized and maintained to ensure effective light and heavyforce capabilities until the Future Force is realized.  This short report  briefly describesthe program and discusses issues of feasibility, viability, and affordability of potentialinterest to Congress.  It will be updated as events warrant.BackgroundModernization is not a new issue or objective for U.S. military forces, but it hastaken on new urgency because of: the post-Cold War downsizing and procurementreductions, the new global environment and unexpected requirements, and the  promiseof a “revolution in military affairs” (RMA) suggested by rapid developments incomputers, communications, and guidance systems.  The last notable surge inmodernization culminated during the “Reagan build-up” of the 1980's.  Weapons anddoctrines developed and fielded in that era made fundamental contributions to UnitedStates successes in the Cold War, the Gulf War, and Kosovo.  For the Army, suchweapons included the M1 Abrams tank, M2 Bradley armored fighting vehicle, Apacheattack helicopter, Blackhawk utility helicopter, and Patriot air defense system.  During post-Cold War downsizing, the Army greatly decreased purchase of newequipment and largely deferred development of a next generation of weapons, withnotable exceptions being  R&D for a  howitzer, the Crusader, and a reconnaissanceCRS-21 Both have now been cancelled.  See CRS Report RS21218 and CRS Report RS20522. 2 See General Gordon R. Sullivan and Colonel James M. Dubik.  War in the Information Age,Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, June 6, 1994, 23 pp.3 On defense-wide transformation, see CRS Report RL32238, February 24, 2004, 40 pp.helicopter, the Comanche.1  Much older equipment was retired.  Modernization wasapproached through  upgrading and inserting new technologies into previously acquired“legacy,” systems.  Information technology was seen as the most immediate, promisingaspect of RMA.  It exploited Desert Storm successes such as pinpoint targeting andnavigation, while addressing problems such as friendly fire casualties.  A major initiativewas launched in the 1990's to create Army Force XXI, based on the  “digitization” of thebattlefield, now dubbed “network-centric warfare.”  Modern computers andcommunications systems would connect all weapons systems and give U.S. soldiers andcommanders advantages in situational awareness and speed of decisions.2   One heavy,mechanized division at Fort Hood, TX was so equipped in  2001 and was battle tested inIraq in 2003.  Other units were at least partially equipped and trained with this capabilitybefore commitment in Iraq.Even before Desert Storm, the “battlefield” was changing as the Army was calledupon to respond to numerous, lengthy operations short of war rather than occasionally todefeat a large army.  Near-term readiness became a problem as fewer troops were askedto cover more missions, and operation and maintenance (O&M) funds were diverted fromfixing aging equipment and facilities to pay for unbudgeted deployments such as Bosnia(funds eventually replaced in part by emergency supplemental appropriations).  Theproblem of rapidly projecting heavy forces had been highlighted beginning with the longbuildup required for Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1990-91.  In 1999, it was suggestedthat an Army task force inserted into Albania for potential action in Kosovo was tooheavy for rapid air insertion and the unimproved roads and bridges found there.  TheArmy  determined that a new capability was needed in addition to mobile, light forces andheavy, lethal forces – a medium, lethal force.Army Transformation3In October 1999, the Army announced its priority program to transform into a forcethat could better meet future requirements to be both rapidly deployable and lethal.  Thefirst step was near-term fielding of a new unit, first called the Interim Brigade CombatTeam but now called the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), based on a wheeledarmored vehicle much lighter than the standard M2 Bradley.   For the long-term, the Armyis developing a Future Combat System (FCS) based on new technologies that would equipvery mobile formations with lethality and survivability equal or greater than that ofpresent heavy units.  Until the FCS is fielded, the Army believes it must also continue tomaintain and  upgrade legacy weapons systems (e.g., M1, M2, etc.) and equipment inunits that can meet any potential foe across the spectrum of conflict.  These Legacy,Interim, and Objective Forces would eventually meld into the transformed ObjectiveForce of the future.  In Summer of 2003, the new Army Chief of Staff emphasized thatthe Army was at war and transforming.  The Current Force would incorporate usabletechnology and other ideas being developed for the Future Force without waiting, movingtowards the Future Force while fighting the Global War on Terrorism.  He also began aCRS-34 See HASC Hearing, “Operation Iraqi Freedom Force Rotation Plan,” January 28, 2004; and,CRS Report RS21754, March 2, 2004, 6 pp., for details.5 Kim Burger. “GM-GDLS Team Awarded $4 Billion Interim Armored Vehicle Contract,” Insidethe Army (Special Report), November 17, 2000, p. 1.6 Projected dates first provided by Army Transformation Office, ODCSOPS, on March 15, 2001,reaffirmed by the Army Objective Force Task Force on December 8, 2002.short term reorganization of the active Army from 33 to 48 combat brigade modules usingexisting resources and a temporary increase of 30,000 in soldier end strength.4 Stryker Force.  The Army is fielding a new capability based on the SBCT.  Thisunit is designed for maximum strategic and operational mobility in that its equipment canbe airlifted inter-theater in all U.S. cargo aircraft, including the comparatively small C-130 Hercules.  All vehicles weigh less than 20 tons.  The goal is that a SBCT could becompletely moved to a combat zone within 96 hours.  It is an infantry brigade of about3,500 soldiers with the armored mobility needed to fight on a mid-intensity battlefield.Particular strengths are an included reconnaissance and intelligence battalion and“network-centric” command, control, and communications (C3) systems.  The effortbegan early in 2000 at Fort Lewis, WA, where two existing  brigades were converted,using temporary, borrowed equipment.  In November, 2000 the Army selected the Light Armored Vehicle III (LAV III), builtby General Motors Defense and General Dynamics Land Systems, as its “interim armoredvehicle” under a six year contract worth $4 billion.5  Some 2,131 LAV III’s, now calledStrykers, will be procured.  They will include two vehicle variants, an infantry carrier witheight additional configurations and a mobile gun system with a 105 mm cannon.  Thevehicle can negotiate flat surfaces at 62 mph, convert to 8-wheel drive off-road, and self-recover with its winch if needed.  As of early 2004, the first Stryker Brigade wasconducting stability operations in a sector of Iraq.  Plans also include procurement of theJoint Lightweight 155 mm Howitzer for the Brigade’s included field artillery — an Army-Marine program, with an estimated cost of about $1.1 billion, aiming for Army initialoperating capability (IOC)  at the end of 2004.Future Force.  For the long-term, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agencyand the Army began work on some 25 critical technologies for incorporation into R&Dof new systems to be selected as early as 2006, with fielding to begin  by 2008 and IOCby 2010.6  A key component is expected to be a Future Combat System (FCS) that could,as one capability,  assume the role currently held by the Abrams tank.  It is intended to beas transportable and mobile as the Stryker, with lethality and crew survivability equivalentto or greater than that of today’s tanks.  The FCS may, however, bear little or noresemblance to today’s tanks and could feature advanced technologies such as roboticsand electric guns and facilitate new operational doctrines.  The FCS currentlyencompasses some 18 subsystems and the network to tie them together.  Boeing Companyand Science Applications International Corp. were selected as the lead system integrator. As of September 2002, the Army had budgeted $20 billion to develop FCS.  Future Forceunits will also incorporate ongoing developments in information technology.  Theyshould  respond to all requirements from stability operations to high-intensity conflict.CRS-47 Erin Q. Winograd. Congressionally mandated report completed, Inside the Army, January 13,2003, p. 1.8 Defense News, October 23, 2000.Current Force.  Until the Future Force exists, the  Army  must be prepared to fightwith legacy equipment, whether on low or high-intensity battlegrounds.  According toArmy planners, programs to replace and/or upgrade older equipment must continue ifforces other than or additional to 6 new Stryker Brigades are to be ready for combat.  Theongoing program to replace old trucks will continue.  Older models of the Abrams tankand the Bradley fighting vehicles will continue to be rebuilt and upgraded.  The currentforce will have many M1A2 SEP (for Systems Enhancement Package) and M1A1D tanksand M2A3 and M2A2ODS with applique Bradley’s.  Inserting these vehicles into the forcewill aid the whole Army in converting to a  digitized force.   Although modernization ofthe current force is important, the Army  sacrificed many previously desired programs tofree funds for transformation priorities.  Examples are a dedicated Command and Controlvehicle, the Grizzly Breacher engineer vehicle, and the Wolverine assault bridge vehicle.Issues for CongressThe 107th and 108th Congresses gave strong support to Army modernization andtransformation initiatives.  At the same time, Congress showed caution by pressing arequirement to compare the wheeled LAV III with similar tracked vehicles already ininventory.  The Army believes its evaluation demonstrated that buying Stryker was moredesirable than converting the M113A3 APC.7  Whether the 108th Congress will continueto support Army transformation as a high priority will depend on its evaluation of issuessuch as those discussed below.Desirability.  All Services have felt pressures to “transform,” or at least adapt tocurrent circumstances and experiences with the post-Cold War world.  These includeopportunities and challenges from a rush of technological advances,  unexpected numbersand types of missions (particularly peacekeeping and urban warfare requirements), newthreats from potential enemies with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and, for  theArmy, criticism that it was not “nimble” enough during 1999 allied operations in Kosovo.The broadest long-term question is whether current transformation plans will yieldthe military force capabilities  the United States requires 20 years from now.  Should theyinclude a power projection Army capable of fighting equally well across the full spectrumof ground combat; or, should other services or entities assume some parts of that mission? Will Army plans over-stress DoD airlift assets, or would more reliance on fast sealift yieldgreater flexibility and economies?    Internally, has the Army sought the right approach totransformation with its emphasis on medium-weight formations? Does the Army’s planstrike the right balance in allocating resources between modernizing the current legacyforce and developing and fielding the Future Force? For the short term, it is projected that some amount of modernization for currentforces is needed to prevent further aging and degradation.   The average age of the M1tank fleet is now 11.9 years and an estimated 11.7 years for support vehicles.8  Many ofthese vehicles may not be able to remain in service beyond 2030 without some form ofservice life extension.  Deciding  the proper allocation of resources is made more complexCRS-59 See charts presented by Ronald O’Rourke to  House Armed Services Committee, Subcommitteeon Military Procurement in hearings on Navy shipbuilding programs, February 29, 2000.10 See Kim Burger, “Army Pushing to Speed Interim Armored Vehicle Delivery Schedule:Contract protest might upset program pace,” Inside the Army, December 11, 2000, p. 8; and, 11 Inside the Army, “Sufficient resources’ needed to test FCS,” January 26, 2004, p. 1.12  Inside the Army, “Integration of Army Systems brings Interim Vehicle Cost to $6 Billion: LAVIII will require $9 billion over lifetime,” December 4, 2000, p. 1.and “Acquisition Board ReviewsPlan to Buy Three More Stryker Brigades,” February 23, 2004, p.2.13 Christopher Jehn, CBO Testimony before the Subcommittee on Military Procurement, HouseArmed Services Committee, September 21, 2000.  CBO estimates for a sustaining procurementbudget in billions of dollars above that appropriated in FY2000: Army, 5; Navy and MarineCorps, 12; and Air Force, 17.by the large numbers and diverse types of vehicles and weapons systems in the Army,which makes it difficult to gather and present desirable data, that is both comprehensiveand aggregated, on equipment age, condition, and potential combat effectiveness.  TheNavy, in managing a fleet of about 315 ships, may have an easier job describing the levelof investment  needed to maintain a fleet of a given size over time.9  Congress mayconsider recommending that the Army attempt to develop some aggregate portrayal of itsfleet capitalization status and implications of various funding strategies.Feasibility.  The Army plan for transformation is considered aggressive.  But, byusing largely off-the-shelf materiel, the “interim Stryker force is fairly low risk for meetingtechnology objectives.  After an initial slip of 16 months, a contractor’s protest, and initialhesitation by the incoming Bush Administration, deliveries of Strykers are now supportingthe fielding of 6 SBCTs, to be completed by May 2010.10 Plans for the Future Force involve higher risk in both technology and time.  It ispossible that  integration of all the specific FCS technologies into a leap-ahead system willexperience some problems.  The goal of fielding the first unit of this system of 18 systemsby 2010 is very ambitious.11  Previous system-development efforts of this kind have oftenencountered technical problems, schedule problems, or both.  The need for the Comanchehelicopter, for example, was identified in 1979 and it had not yet entered production whencancelled in 2004.  The original target date proposed for  FCS, 2023, may be more realisticbut it also raised concerns regarding duration of development.  Congress will likelyinfluence the priority and speed with which the FCS becomes reality.Affordability.  Some question the Army’s ability to finance its transformation plan,particularly given an inability in recent years to finance many procurement programs atdesired rates.  Can the Army adequately finance all three elements of its plan at once,while also providing adequate funds for necessary non-transformation priorities such asreadiness and pay and benefits?  The life-cycle cost for equipping 6 brigades with LAVIII’s has been estimated by program officials at $9 billion through FY2032.12  This willonly be part of the total cost to transform and modernize the Army; some have estimatedthat the Army requires a sustained increment of $10 billion annually beyond its averagepost-Cold War expenditures for R&D and procurement.  The Army is not alone inclaiming a need for more investment funds.  Other Services cite even higher numbers.13CRS-614 Edward F. Bruner and Steve Bowman. Crusader XM2001 Self-Propelled Howitzer:Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report RS21218, June 25, 2002, 6 pp.15 For a technical discussion of this argument, see Paul Hornback, “The Wheel Versus TrackDilemma, Armor, March-April 1998, pp. 33-34.16 Winograd. “Stryker Criticism Continues as Army, OSD Work Out SBCT Compromise,” Insidethe Army, December 9, 2002, p. 1.17 Winograd.  “Units’ home stations could change,” Inside the Army, December 23, 2002, p.1.An issue that will confront Congress is whether to fund Army transformation andmodernization efforts at  levels proposed by the Bush Administration, or higher or lower.If Congress ascribes a higher priority to Army transformation, will necessary funds beprovided by adding to overall DoD appropriations, subtracting from DoD programs inother services,  or reducing deployments?During the FY2003 budget cycle, DoD expressed its intent to cut acquisitionprograms that do not meet its definition of “transformational” in favor of those that do.Its prime example was the Army’s Crusader Howitzer program.  DoD cut Crusader andallocated the savings to several other advanced fire support systems in development.Congress reluctantly endorsed the action with the proviso that Crusader expertise be rolledinto the FCS program.  As part of its appropriations responsibilities, the 108th Congressmay choose to enforce DoD’s implied promise to support adequately fire supportthroughout the FCS development program.14Wheels or Tracks and How Many Stryker Brigades?  An early issue toconfront the Army was whether the Interim Force should use tracked or wheeled armoredvehicles, or some combination.15  Traditionally, the U.S. Army has favored tracks for itscombat vehicles;  with their low ground pressure and greater traction, they generallyperform better off roads on difficult terrain.  Wheels generally perform better on roads interms of speed, agility, and quietness.  After reviewing proposals, the Army selected thewheeled LAV III from General Motors, and named it Stryker.  Critics of the decision,including some current and former members of Congress, continue to argue for a reversalor curtailment of the Stryker decision.16   The Army defends its case strongly and DoD hasnot intervened.  The question of whether the FCS will be based on wheels, tracks, or acombination remains open.DoD has, however, raised questions about the ultimate number and stationing ofSBCT’s.  In the past, it requested the Army consider stationing one of the six units inEurope and thhe first one is now on station in Europe.   More recently it suggested thatunits five and six not be funded unless they could be “spiral developed” into much moretransformational formations.  It appears, however, that funding for all 6 SBCT’s will nowbe requested.  The combination of these events and considerations could, however, openprior decisions to station SBCT’s in Hawaii and Alaska to debate and thus create politicalcomplications.17  The 108th Congress may play an important role in resolving the ultimatedisposition of the proposed SBCT Force.

Army Transformation and Modernization: Overview and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of CongressCRS Report for CongressReceived through the CRS WebOrder Code RS20787Updated January 24, 2003Army Transformation and Modernization:Overview and Issues for CongressEdward F. BrunerSpecialist in National DefenseForeign Affairs, Defense, and Trade DivisionSummaryThe U.S. Army continues an ambitious program intended to transform itself intoa strategically responsive force dominant in all types of ground operations.  As planned,its Objective Force will eventually meld all ongoing initiatives into a force based on ahigh-tech Future Combat System.  Its Interim Force is beginning to provide a newcombat capability, based on current-technology armored vehicles, for the mid-intensitycombat operations that seem prevalent in today’s world.  Its Legacy Force of existingsystems is being modernized and maintained to ensure effective light and heavy forcecapabilities until the Objective Force is realized.  This short report  briefly describes theprogram and discusses issues of feasibility, viability, and affordability of potentialinterest to Congress.  It will be updated as events warrant.BackgroundModernization is not a new issue or objective for U.S. military forces, but it hastaken on new urgency because of: the post-Cold War downsizing and procurementreductions, the new global environment and unexpected requirements, and the  promiseof a “revolution in military affairs” (RMA) suggested by rapid developments incomputers, communications, and guidance systems.  The last notable surge inmodernization culminated during the “Reagan build-up” of the 1980's.  Weapons anddoctrines developed and fielded in that era made fundamental contributions to UnitedStates successes in the Cold War, the Gulf War, and Kosovo.  For the Army, suchweapons included the M1 Abrams tank, M2 Bradley armored fighting vehicle, Apacheattack helicopter, Blackhawk utility helicopter, and Patriot air defense system.  During the post-Cold War downsizing, the Army greatly decreased purchase of newequipment and largely deferred development of a next generation of weapons, withnotable exceptions being  R&D for a  howitzer, the Crusader, and a reconnaissanceCRS-21 Christopher Bolkcom. Army Aviation: The RAH-66 Comanche Helicopter Issue, CRS ReportRS20522, updated as developments warrant.2 See General Gordon R. Sullivan and Colonel James M. Dubik.  War in the Information Age,Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, June 6, 1994, 23 pp.helicopter, the Comanche.1  Much older equipment was retired.  Modernization wasapproached through  upgrading and inserting new technologies into previously acquired,or “legacy,” systems.  Information technology was seen as the most immediate andpromising aspect of the RMA.  It exploited Desert Storm successes such as pinpointtargeting and navigation, while addressing problems such as friendly fire casualties.  Amajor initiative was launched in the 1990's to create Army Force XXI, based on the“digitization” of the battlefield, now dubbed “network-centric warfare.”  Moderncomputers and communications systems would connect all weapons systems and giveU.S. soldiers and commanders advantages in situational awareness and speed ofdecisions.2   One heavy, mechanized division at Fort Hood, TX is now so equipped andfirst tested the concept in early 2001.  The post-Desert Storm Army, although smaller, ismore modern and technically capable than its Desert Storm predecessor.Even before Desert Storm, the “battlefield” was changing as the Army was calledupon to respond to numerous, lengthy operations short of war rather than occasionally todefeat a large army.  Near-term readiness became a problem as fewer troops were askedto cover more missions, and operation and maintenance (O&M) funds were diverted fromfixing aging equipment and facilities to pay for unbudgeted deployments such as Bosnia(funds eventually replaced in part by emergency supplemental appropriations).  Theproblem of rapidly projecting heavy forces had been highlighted beginning with the longbuildup required for Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1990-91.  In 1999, it was suggestedthat an Army task force inserted into Albania for potential action in Kosovo was tooheavy for rapid air insertion and also too heavy for the unimproved roads and bridgesfound there.  The Army  determined that a new capability was needed in addition tomobile, light forces and heavy, lethal forces – a medium, lethal force.Army Transformation In October 1999, the Army announced its priority program to transform into a forcethat could better meet future requirements to be both rapidly deployable and lethal.  Thefirst step is near-term fielding of a new unit, first called the Interim Brigade CombatTeams but now called the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), based on a wheeledarmored vehicle much lighter than the standard M2 Bradley.   For the long-term, the Armyis developing a Future Combat System (FCS) based on new technologies that would equipvery mobile formations with lethality and survivability equal or greater than that ofpresent heavy units.  Until the FCS is fielded, the Army believes it must also continue tomaintain and  upgrade legacy weapons systems (e.g., M1, M2, etc.) and equipment inunits that can meet any potential foe across the spectrum of conflict.  All three of theabove efforts would eventually meld into the transformed Objective Force of the future.Interim Force.  The Army  plans to field a new capability based on the SBCT.This unit is designed for maximum strategic and operational mobility in that its equipmentcan be airlifted inter-theater in all U.S. cargo aircraft, including the comparatively smallC-130 Hercules – also used intra-theater.  All vehicles weigh less than 20 tons.  The goalCRS-33 Kim Burger. “GM-GDLS Team Awarded $4 Billion Interim Armored Vehicle Contract,” Insidethe Army (Special Report), November 17, 2000, p. 1.4 Projected dates first provided by Army Transformation Office, ODCSOPS, on March 15, 2001,reaffirmed by the Army Objective Force Task Force on December 8, 2002.is that a SBCT could be completely moved to a combat zone within 96 hours.  It is aninfantry brigade of about 3,500 soldiers with the armored mobility needed to fight on amid-intensity battlefield.  Particular strengths are an included reconnaissance andintelligence battalion and “network-centric” command, control, and communications (C3)systems.  The effort began early in 2000 at Fort Lewis, WA, where two existing  brigadeswere converted, using temporary, borrowed equipment. In November, 2000 the Army selected the Light Armored Vehicle III (LAV III), builtby General Motors Defense and General Dynamics Land Systems, as its “interim armoredvehicle” under a six year contract worth $4 billion.3  Some 2,131 LAV III’s, now calledStrykers, will be procured.  They will include two vehicle variants, an infantry carrier witheight additional configurations and a mobile gun system with a 105 mm cannon.  Thevehicle can negotiate flat surfaces at 62 mph, convert to 8-wheel drive off-road, and self-recover with its winch if needed.  Plans also include procurement of the Joint Lightweight155 mm Howitzer for the Brigade’s included field artillery --  an Army-Marine program,with an estimated cost of about $1.1 billion, aiming for Army initial operating capability(IOC)  at the end of 2004.Objective Force.  For the long-term, the Defense Advanced Research ProjectsAgency and the Army began work on some 25 critical technologies for incorporation intoR&D of new systems to be selected as early as 2006, with fielding to begin  by 2008 andIOC by 2010.4  A key component is expected to be a Future Combat System (FCS) thatcould, as one capability,  assume the role currently held by the Abrams tank.  It isintended to be as transportable and mobile as the Stryker, with lethality and crewsurvivability equivalent to or greater than that of today’s tanks.  The FCS may, however,bear little or no resemblance to today’s tanks and could feature advanced technologiessuch as robotics and electric guns and facilitate new operational doctrines.  The FCScurrently encompasses some 19 subsystems and the network to tie them together.  BoeingCompany and Science Applications International Corp. were selected as the primecontractor team to integrate all systems.  As of September 2002, the Army had budgeted$20 billion to develop FCS.  Objective Force units will also incorporate ongoingdevelopments in information technology and  systems such as the Comanche helicopter.The resulting Army should be responsive to requirements ranging from operations shortof war to high-intensity conflict.Legacy Force.  Until the Objective Force exists, the current Army based on legacyequipment must be prepared to fight whether called to  low-intensity or high-intensitybattlegrounds.  According to Army planners, programs to replace and/or upgrade olderequipment must continue if forces other than or additional to 5-6 new Stryker Brigades areto be ready for combat.  The ongoing program to replace old trucks with new willcontinue.  Older models of the Abrams tank and the Bradley fighting vehicles willcontinue to be rebuilt and upgraded.  The legacy force will largely consist of M1A2 SEP(for Systems Enhancement Package) and M1A1D tanks and M2A3 and M2A2ODS withapplique Bradley’s.  Inserting these vehicles into the force will aid the Army in convertingCRS-45 Erin Q. Winograd. Congressionally mandated report completed, Inside the Army, January 13,2003, p. 1.6 Defense News, October 23, 2000.to a  digitized force.  One heavy division at Fort Hood has made this conversion, and, withall combat vehicles electronically connected, seems more combat effective than previousdivisions.  Although modernization of the legacy force is important, the Army  sacrificedmany previously desired programs to free funds for transformation priorities.  Examplesare a dedicated Command and Control vehicle, the Grizzly Breacher engineer vehicle, andthe Wolverine assault bridge vehicle – the latter continued to be funded by Congress fromthe Army’s Unfunded Priorities List, although funds were requested for FY2003.Issues for Congress The 107th Congress continued strong support for Army modernization andtransformation initiatives.  At the same time, Congress showed caution by pressing arequirement to compare the wheeled LAV III with similar tracked vehicles already ininventory.  The Army believes its evaluation demonstrated that buying Stryker was moredesirable than converting the M113A3 APC.5  Whether the 108th Congress will continueto support Army transformation as a high priority will depend on its evaluation of issuessuch as those discussed below.Desirability.  All Services have felt pressures to “transform,” or at least adapt tocurrent circumstances and experiences with the post-Cold War world.  These includeopportunities and challenges from a rush of technological advances,  unexpected numbersand types of missions (particularly peacekeeping and urban warfare requirements), newthreats from potential enemies with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and, for  theArmy, criticism that it was not “nimble” enough during 1999 allied operations in Kosovo.The broadest long-term question is whether current transformation plans will yielda desirable outcome, i.e, what military force capabilities will the United States require 20years from now?  Should they include a power projection Army capable of fighting equallywell across the full spectrum of ground combat; or, should other services or entitiesassume some parts of that mission?   Will Army plans over-stress DoD airlift assets, orwould more reliance on fast sealift yield greater flexibility and economies?    Internally,has the Army sought the right approach to transformation with its emphasis on medium-weight formations? Does the Army’s plan strike the right balance in allocating resourcesbetween modernizing the current legacy force and developing and fielding the Interim andObjective Forces?  It is expected that DoD will fully address these issues for the first timein its FY2004 budget request. For the short term, it is projected that some amount of modernization for existinglegacy forces would be needed if policymakers decide to prevent further aging anddegradation.   The average age of the M1 tank fleet is now 11.9 years and an estimated11.7 years for support vehicles.6  Many of these vehicles may not be able to remain inservice beyond 2030 without some form of service life extension work.  Deciding on theproper allocation of resources is made more complex by the large numbers and diversetypes of vehicles and weapons systems in the Army, which makes it difficult to gather andpresent desirable data, that is both comprehensive and aggregated, on equipment age,CRS-57 See charts presented by Ronald O’Rourke to  House Armed Services Committee, Subcommitteeon Military Procurement in hearings on Navy shipbuilding programs, February 29, 2000.8 See Kim Burger, “Army Pushing to Speed Interim Armored Vehicle Delivery Schedule:Contract protest might upset program pace,” Inside the Army, December 11, 2000, p. 8.9 Kim Burger, “Integration of Army Systems brings Interim Vehicle Cost to $6 Billion: LAV IIIwill require $9 billion over lifetime,” Inside the Army, December 4, 2000, p. 1.10 Christopher Jehn, CBO Testimony before the Subcommittee on Military Procurement, HouseArmed Services Committee, September 21, 2000.  CBO estimates for a sustaining procurementbudget in billions of dollars above that appropriated in FY2000: Army, 5; Navy and MarineCorps, 12; and Air Force, 17.condition, and potential combat effectiveness.  The Navy, in managing a fleet of about 315ships, may have an easier job describing the level of investment  needed to maintain a fleetof a given size over time.7  Congress may consider recommending that the Army attemptto develop some aggregate portrayal of its fleet capitalization status and implications ofvarious funding strategies.Feasibility.  The Army plan for transformation is considered aggressive.  But, byusing largely off-the-shelf materiel, the Interim Force is fairly low risk for meetingtechnology objectives.  After an initial slip of 16 months and a contractor’s protest,deliveries of Strykers are now supporting the fielding of SBCTs.8 Plans for the Objective Force involve higher risk in both technology and time.  Sinceall the specific technologies to form the FCS have not yet been chosen, it is possible thattheir integration into a leap-ahead system will experience some problems.  The goal ofhaving this system ready to produce by 2008 is very ambitious.  Previous system-development efforts of this kind have often encountered technical problems, scheduleproblems, or both.  The need for the Comanche helicopter, for example, was identified in1979; a contractor was selected for development in 1991; and, it is not yet ready forproduction.  The original target date proposed for the FCS, 2023, may be more realisticbut it has also raised concerns regarding duration of development.  Congress , through itseventual levels of support, will influence the priority and speed with which the FCSbecomes reality.Affordability.  Some question the Army’s ability to finance its transformation plan,particularly given an inability in recent years to finance many procurement programs atdesired rates.  Can the Army adequately finance all three elements of its plan at once,while also providing adequate funds for necessary non-transformation priorities such asreadiness and pay and benefits?  The life-cycle cost for equipping 6 brigades with LAVIII’s has been estimated by program officials at $9 billion through FY2032.9  This willonly be part of the total cost to transform and modernize the Army; some have estimatedthat the Army requires a sustained increment of $10 billion annually beyond its averagepost-Cold War expenditures for R&D and procurement.  The Army is not alone inclaiming a need for more investment funds.  Other Services cite even higher numbers.10An issue that will confront Congress is whether to fund Army transformation andmodernization efforts at  levels proposed by the Bush Administration, or higher or lower.If Congress ascribes a higher priority to Army transformation, will necessary funds beCRS-611 Edward F. Bruner and Steve Bowman. Crusader XM2001 Self-Propelled Howitzer:Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report RS21218.12 For a technical discussion of this argument, see Paul Hornback, “The Wheel Versus TrackDilemma, Armor, March-April 1998, pp. 33-34.13 Winograd. “Stryker Criticism Continues as Army, OSD Work Out SBCT Compromise,” Insidethe Army, December 9, 2002, p. 1.14 Winograd.  “Units’ home stations could change,” Inside the Army, December 23, 2002, p.1.provided by adding to overall DoD appropriations, subtracting from DoD programs inother services,  or reducing deployments?  In ascribing priorities that will ultimatelydetermine the shape of U.S. military forces in the future, Congress will utilize normalprocedures such as hearings and committee meetings.During the FY2003 budget cycle, DoD expressed its intent to cut acquisitionprograms that do not meet its definition of “transitional” in favor of those that do.  Itsprime example was the Army’s Crusader Howitzer program.  DoD cut Crusader andallocated the savings to several other advanced fire support systems in development.Congress reluctantly endorsed the action with the proviso that Crusader expertise be rolledinto the FCS program.  As part of its appropriations responsibilities, the 108th Congressmay choose to enforce DoD’s implied promise to support adequately fire supportthroughout the FCS development program.11Wheels or Tracks and How Many Stryker Brigades?  An early issue toconfront the Army was whether the Interim Force should use tracked or wheeled armoredvehicles, or some combination.12  Traditionally, the U.S. Army has favored tracks for itscombat vehicles;  with their low ground pressure and greater traction, they generallyperform better off roads on difficult terrain.  Wheels generally perform better on roads interms of speed, agility, and quietness.  After reviewing proposals, the Army selected thewheeled LAV III from General Motors, and named it Stryker.  Critics of the decision,including some current and former members of Congress, continue to argue for a reversalor curtailment of the Stryker decision.13   The Army defends its case strongly and DoD hasnot indicated that it would intervene.DoD has, however, raised questions about the ultimate number and stationing ofSBCT’s.  In the past, it requested the Army consider stationing one of the six units inEurope.  More recently it has suggested that units five and six not be funded unless theycould be “spiral developed” into much more transformational formations.  It appears thatfunding for the fourth SBCT will be requested.  The combination of these newconsiderations could, however, open prior decisions to station SBCT’s in Hawaii andAlaska to debate and thus create political complications.14  The 108th Congress may playan important role in resolving the ultimate disposition of the proposed Interim Force.

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Army Transformation and Modernization: Overview and Issues for Congress

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