Akhvlediani, Tamuna

Angus, Derek C

Baillie, J Kenneth

Brett, Stephen

Bruzzone, Roberto

Carson, Gail

Cobb, J Perren

Council, ISARIC

Dunning, Jake W

Everett, Dean

Farrar, Jeremy

Gao, Zhancheng

Gordon, Anthony

Hayden, Frederick G

Hien, Tran-Tinh

Horby, Peter

ISARIC, Working Grp 3

Kellam, Paul

Khoo, Saye H

Lang, Trudie

Liaro, Piero L

Longuere, Kajsa-Stina

Marshall, John

Merson, Laura

Nichol, Alistair

Openshaw, Peter JM

Rohde, Gernot GU

Ruiz-Palacios, Guillermo

Semple, Malcolm G

Shindo, Nahoko

Tran, Dat

van der Werf, Sylvie

Walsh, Timothy S

Webb, Steve

Yu, Hongjie

Zambon, Maria

Dunning, Jake, W

Rohde, Gernot, G U

Olliaro, Piero, L

Khoo, Saye, H

Horby, Peter, W

Walsh, Timothy, S

Working Group 3, Isaric

Council, Isaric

Hayden, Frederick, G

Angus, Derek, C

van Der Werf, Sylvie

Openshaw, Peter, J M

Hal - Université Grenoble Alpes

Open source clinical science for emerging infections

Dunning, Jake W.

Rohde, Gernot G. U.

Semple, Malcolm G.

Olliaro, Piero L.

Khoo, Saye H.

Cobb, J. Perren

Walsh, Timothy S.

Hayden, Frederick G.

Angus, Derek C.

Openshaw, Peter J. M.

Baillie, J. Kenneth

NARCIS 

Dat, Tran

Tran-Tinh, Hien

University of Liverpool Repository

Comment8 www.thelancet.com/infection   Vol 14   January 2014Emerging infections cause justiﬁ able global concern. Current outbreaks of avian inﬂ uenza A H7N91 and the Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS)2 raise troubling memories of pandemic inﬂ uenza and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). With few mutations,3–5 these or other pathogens could evolve to cause widespread outbreaks. When new threats emerge, well established public health systems rapidly identify cases and evaluate sources, clinicians provide early descriptive case reports, and laboratories develop diagnostics and characterise pathogens. Clinical science is markedly less agile. We lack the tools to answer key questions rapidly. Who is susceptible, and why? What are the mechanisms of disease? What are the sites and dynamics of pathogen replication? How can early cases be identiﬁ ed and stratiﬁ ed? What is the clinical utility of new diagnostics? What treatments might work?Each emerging infection presents these fundamental questions. The method of answering them need not be reinvented from one infection to the next. If clinical scientists across the world were able to agree on methods and cooperate, the results of separate studies from diverse locations and conditions could be collated, allowing clinically useful conclusions to be reached from shared data.The International Severe Acute Respiratory and Emerging Infection Consortium (ISARIC)6 grew from the recognition that we have to do things diﬀ erently, in the light of our experience during the epidemics of SARS, H5N1, and the 2009–10 inﬂ uenza pandemic, but also regional epidemics of enterovirus 71, dengue, viral haemorrhagic fevers, and even during the rapid emergence of drug resistant malaria.7 We must motivate and equip individual investigators and networks around the world to work together to rapidly answer basic questions when new threats emerge. Academic credit and access to data and samples must be given to clinical investigators, who often recruit patients in extremely challenging circumstances. Unlike the existing model that prioritises independence, eﬀ ective collaboration should be rewarded. The core materials needed to enrol patients must be freely available, making it as easy as possible for investigators at the front line.The core materials of clinical research—protocols, information sheets, consent forms, and case report forms—are analogous to the source code of computer software. In open-source software projects contributors receive recognition that builds their reputation within the software community. We propose a similar approach to clinical research, in parallel with the drive towards open access in academic publishing.8 Although community projects have a long history in other ﬁ elds, individual recognition is required for scientists to obtain funding and promotion; to succeed, academic institutions, funders, journals, the clinical science and public health communities, and the public need to be in full support. To develop a consensus set of documentation, we engaged with investigators across countries and disciplines, in collaboration with WHO, in a systematic three-stage process: ﬁ rst, to agree criteria by which to prioritise and stratify studies; second, to identify important unanswered questions relating to pathogenesis, susceptibility, and pharmacology in severe infection; and to allocate studies within a globally scalable framework. In the resulting protocol, research intensity is stratiﬁ ed according to the local costs incurred. The lowest tiers have a minimum requirement for staﬀ  and resources to recruit a case (ﬁ gure), enabling adaptation for use in places with diﬀ ering resource levels, and also in diﬀ erent phases of an outbreak. For example, early in an outbreak there are urgent questions that require Open source clinical science for emerging infectionsTIER 2: Serial biological samples•    Biological samples taken every 2 days during acute illness•    Daily clinical data collectionTIER 1: Single biological sample•    Single sample taken at recruitment (ideally at presentation to health care)•    Initial case report form completed•    Discharge case report form completedTIER 3 (b)•    Sampling of health-care        workersTIER 3 (a)•    Sampling of contacts of        confirmed casesTIER 3 (c)•    Population pharmacokinetics      of antimicrobial/      immunomodulatory       agentsNumber of cases soughtIncreasing local resource requirementsFor the ISARIC protocol see http://www.prognosis.org/isaricFigure: Stratiﬁ ed, modular framework of research studies enabling recruitment in a range of diﬀ erent conditionsCommentwww.thelancet.com/infection   Vol 14   January 2014 9intensive study of a small number of cases; later, when larger numbers of cases present, it will be both more diﬃ  cult and less important to obtain frequent serial samples. ISARIC aims to reach a global consensus behind collection of harmonised clinical data linked with biological sampling protocols that are of value to anyone facing future outbreaks of any emerging infection. Importantly, our recommendations are not to be regarded as ﬁ xed and ﬁ nal, but an initial contribution to an evolving framework of research studies to which anyone, anywhere, may contribute and improve, and which will be openly shared in perpetuity. We regard this consensus as essential but not suﬃ  cient. Here we lay the foundations for more challenging coordinated studies, including clinical trials of pathogen-speciﬁ c therapies with pragmatic endpoints. We encourage clinicians everywhere to develop and share appropriate research protocols and seek approvals for clinical research that can begin immediately as soon as future epidemics threaten. Experience conﬁ rms that the time to act is now. Jake W Dunning, Laura Merson, Gernot G U Rohde, Zhancheng Gao, Malcolm G Semple, Dat Tran, Anthony Gordon, Piero L Olliaro, Saye H Khoo, Roberto Bruzzone, Peter Horby, J Perren Cobb, Kajsa-Stina Longuere, Paul Kellam, Alistair Nichol, Stephen Brett, Dean Everett, Timothy S Walsh, Tran-Tinh Hien, Hongjie Yu, Maria Zambon, Guillermo Ruiz-Palacios, Trudie Lang, Tamuna Akhvlediani, ISARIC Working Group 3, ISARIC Council, Frederick G Hayden, John Marshall, Steve Webb, Derek C Angus, Nahoko Shindo, Sylvie van der Werf, Peter J M Openshaw, Jeremy Farrar, Gail Carson, *J Kenneth BaillieFor the full list of contributors, aﬃ  liations, and acknowledgments, see appendix. SHL has received research grants, travel bursaries, speakers honoraria, and support for HIV & hepatitis drug interaction websites from Merck, Janssen, Gilead Sciences, BristolMyersSquibb, Boehringer Ingelheim, AbbVie, and ViiV Healthcare. JPC is Director of the US Critical Illness and Injury Trials Group, and receives some salary support and contract funding from the US Government’s Oﬃ  ce of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response. The other authors declare that they have no conﬂ icts of interest.1 Gao R, Cao B, Hu Y, et al. Human infection with a novel avian-origin inﬂ uenza A (H7N9) virus. N Engl J Med 2013; 368: 1888–97.2 Zaki AM, van Boheemen S, Bestebroer TM, Osterhaus ADME, Fouchier RAM. Isolation of a novel coronavirus from a man with pneumonia in Saudi Arabia. N Engl J Med 2012; 367: 1814–20.3 Herfst S, Schrauwen EJA, Linster M, et al. Airborne transmission of inﬂ uenza A/H5N1 virus between ferrets. Science 2012; 336: 1534–41.4 Imai M, Watanabe T, Hatta M, et al. Experimental adaptation of an inﬂ uenza H5 HA confers respiratory droplet transmission to a reassortant H5 HA/H1N1 virus in ferrets. Nature 2012; 486: 420–28.5 Li F, Li W, Farzan M, Harrison SC. Structure of SARS coronavirus spike receptor-binding domain complexed with receptor. Science 2005; 309: 1864–68.6 Yong E. Trials at the ready: preparing for the next pandemic. BMJ 2012; 344: e2982.7 Tran TH, Ruiz-Palacios GM, Hayden FG, Farrar J. Patient-oriented pandemic inﬂ uenza research. Lancet 2009; 373: 2085–86.8 Boulton G, Rawlins M, Vallance P, Walport M. Science as a public enterprise: the case for open data. Lancet 2011; 377: 1633–35.Vector control to eliminate artemisinin resistant malaria in the Greater Mekong subregion The emergence of artemisinin resistance in the Greater Mekong subregion threatens to undermine global progress in malaria control.1 Artemisinin derivatives are used in artemisinin-based combination therapy, the predominant ﬁ rst-line treatment for uncomplicated Plasmodium falciparum malaria. Eﬀ orts to contain artemisinin resistance were launched in 2009 and have since been expanded.2,3 The required intervention scale-up is substantial and costly; most of the funds were not available by early 2013. To accelerate progress, the Global Fund announced in February, 2013, that it would contribute US$100 million to help support the emergency response to artemisinin resistance.4 Decisions on how best to allocate these resources are needed, including on how much to emphasise investments in vector control.5,6  The main vectors for malaria transmission are in the Anopheles dirus and Anopheles minimus complexes, occurring predominantly in forested areas. A third vector, Anopheles epiroticus (formerly known as Anopheles sundaicus), occurs mainly in coastal areas. These vectors exhibit substantial outdoor resting and feeding,5,7 which could lead to the assumption that interventions used predominantly indoors, such as longlasting insecticidal nets and indoor residual See Online for appendix

Open source clinical science for emerging infections

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

Hal - Université Grenoble Alpes

NARCIS

University of Liverpool Repository