For decades, the UN has failed to mediate a settlement in Cyprus because of a general and profound weakness: it is unable, outside of unity and resolve on the Security Council, to offer direct incentives to parties in conflict that would shape their calculus towards conflict resolution, or to control the actions of third parties in ways that would incentivize conflict resolution or prevent disincentives. Within this vacuum, the UN has alternated its mediation strategy during the past two decades in Cyprus between two different forms, meditration (Annan Plan, 2002-04) and mediation-lite (2008-2015), before reverting to a more conventional mediating role in the lead-up to the Crans-Montana conference in 2017. Meditration and Mediation-lite both failed, with the fortunes of the peace process during each of these periods being shaped importantly by domestic politics within the contesting camps and the balance of power between them. The article elaborates on the conceptual distinction between meditration and mediation-lite. It makes the case for a conventional mediation between these two extremes, but argues that even this has limitations that stem from the UN’s general weaknesses
