This article presents a critical analysis of the approach of the U.S. Supreme Court to recusal motions
aimed at one of the Justices of the Court. The catalyst was the controversy arising from the weekend
duck-hunting trip of U.S.Vice-President Richard Cheney and Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia,
after which Justice Scalia denied a motion to recuse himself from a pending case in which his hunting
partner, Mr Cheney, was a party. This startling decision is final and conclusive since the Supreme
Court refuses to intervene in such decisions. Such an approach by the Court is untenable and contrasts
starkly with that of the House of Lords, which did not shrink from disqualifying Lord Hoffmann on
grounds of bias in the Pinochet case. A comparative study of comparable common law jurisdictions
exposes the U.S. Supreme Court as an island of isolation over this issue. It also provides accessible
solutions that are disarming in their simplicity. The particular responses that are commended in this
article are formalized self-regulation and substitution
