Rendell & Whitehead's minimalist definition of culture does not allow for the important gaps between cetaceans and Inimans. A more complete analysis reveals important discontinuities that may be more instnictive
for comparative purposes than the continuities emphasized by the authors

Ripoll, T

Vauclair, J

English

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Can culture be solely inferred from the absence of genetic or environmental factors ?

Cognitive Sciences ePrint Archive

Commenentary/Rendell& Whitehead: Culture in whales and dolphins
Can culture be inferred only f om the absence
of genetic and environmenta+ctors?
Thierry Ripolla and Jacques Vauclairb
aDepartment of Psychology, Laboratory of Cognitive Psychology, F-13621
Aix-en-Provence Cedex 1, France; bDepartment of Psychology, Center for
Research in Psychology of Cognition, Language, and Emotion, F-13621 Aix-
en-Provence Cedex 1, France.
ripoll@newsup.univ-mrs.f r vauclair@up.univ-aix.fr
Abstract: Rendell & Whitehead's minimalist definition of culture does not
allow for the important gaps between cetaceans and Inimans. A i rmre com-
plete analysis reveals i mportant discontinuities that may be more i nstnic-
tive for comparative purposes than the continuities emphasized by the au-
thors.
Although Rendell and Whitehead ( R&W) choose a rather straight-
forward definition for culture, we think that this concept is insuf-
ficiently discussed in the target article. I-lowmer, i nstead of de-
bating about whether cetaceans have or have not a culture, we
would rather like to concentrate in our commentary on the possi-
ble differences between cetacean culture and human culture.
A distinction is made by linguists and cognitive psychologists
between performance an(f competence ( Chouiskv 1 965). While
performance refers to observable behatviors (e.g., spoken l angrr,tgr~
as we hear it), competence refers to the set of rules and operations
that make performance possible. This distinction can also he use-
ful to critically examine R&\Ys approach because these aritlnors
seem to allude only to performance in discussing animal cultirre.
We would like to focus on the interest of'bringing up such dis-
tinctions in relation to culture in order to fully understand flic
nature and consequences of attributing it form of'culture to ceta-
ceans.
«ie start bypointing out some of the features that are associated
with culture, in its full human sense. First of all, a single process
of information transmission such as imitation cannot solely define
culture. In this respect, and not,vithstannling the conrtroversics
surrounding the definition of imitation (e.g., Calef 1 99S1o, mariv
animal species and even invertebrates such as octopuses (Fiorito
& Scotto 1992) show evidence of fast learning by observing eon-
specifies performing a specific action. Now, would i t be sufficient
to state from this finding that octopuses have a culture? Certainly
not. Concerning the definitions of'cultural behaviors (e.g., J WI':s
Table 1), we note that all these definitions rely oil scene sort cof so-
cial behavior (learning, modification, etc.), \with or without reler-
ence to its likely mechanism (narnelv, sonny. form of' imitative be-
havior). But surprisingly, the proposed definitions eleo not i rreritienr
competencies or processes related to culture for the or;ganrisinns
possessingit.Inhurnans, some crucial features appearto1w linked
to culture either as necessary components or its l oy-prodiict.s.
Thus, language and more generally symbolic and iritcritienial syr
terns probably constitute the main features of l nunan cidturc. Bert
culture is hard to conceive outside a process of accrimulaticm s urd
complexification of knowledge over generations (e.g., Donald
1991; Tomasello & Call 1997). A starting point of'cultrrrc is the es-
tablishment of social rules that have a commonly defïrned i unl cenn-
ventionalized medium for which language is likely to be the best
candidate. Moreover, it is likely that culture is organized as an ain-
tonornous system and thus presents similarities with lirrgrristic or-
ganization. Each relation within this system is tied to other rela-
tions. In humans, this system has become independent from
biology in such a way that the constraints acting f'Or stabilization
or for changes in a given culture are internal; and these f eatures
no longer require a parallel evolution of natural or genetic crivi-
ronments.
Let us briefly consider what could be equivalent i n cetacean
culture to the devices we just mentioned. First, according to
R&W's minimalist definition, culture appears as soon as the be-
havioral repertoire is sufficiently broad to respond to envircnr-
mental changes. From then on, a given species can develop spe-
cific traditions because learning abilities are, flexible enough to
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2001) 24:2
	
355
Commentary/Rendell& Whitehead:Culture ilnwhales and dc
make these behaviors possible. Is tlic e xi sterice of such flexibility
sufficient to lead to culture or eycn t o protoculture ? We think it is
not. In efhcct, cetaceans apparently have neither built artifacts nor
accumulated cultural trains over aCncrations. It is thus likeh . that
the social repertoire of dolphins or %\ hales have not changed over
millions ,ears because of this lack of accnnmlation whereby cul-
ture at ti me t + 1 would depend oil cidture at ti me t.
Second, we would like to challenge t he idea that inter-group
variations not based on environmental or on genetic factors should
automatically yield culture. A more eeonomical explanation could
be provided lrv the authors for all examples concerning cultural
behaviors. For example, acoustic yariatioiis obsei-veelin hiimphack
whales can be explained without reference to necessary environ-
mental or/and genetic changes (a .sin i i l ar argumcut could he made
for the sponging by dolphins ill the target article). They could sim-
ply reflect the play of random processes associated with the plas-
ticity of learning mechanisms. Thus, whales at the beginning of the
breeding season might produce various songs that end up con-
verging toward a unique interpretation \vithin the group. In this
respect, the case of robots is interesting, since robots can also learn
simply by interacting with other robots (e.g., Picault & Drogoul
2000). It could be said front the observed change in their learning
abilities that robots in the B group have a different "culture" from
that of'robots in the A group. However, using the concept of cul-
ture in such a context would be purely metaphorical.
Third, we think that the interesting question to ask is why
cetaceans which possess advanced cognitive abilities, a complex
social life, long lifetimes, and extended mother-infant relations,
have not developed a true culture, iln the sense we referred to ear-
lier?
Three main functions can be idea tified in relation to cultural be-
havior of humans. The first function concerns the ability to cope
with different environments (relations to the world). The second
function controls social regulations (through language and other
media), while the third deals with the relations between the rep-
resentations built by our i ndividual and the universe (as expressed
by several systems of shared values such as an aesthetic, and reli-
gion that Darwin (1871) called `;spiritual agencies." It seems that
only the first function is present inl cotaceans and that its role is
minimal: a dolphin borer in captivity could probably survive in a
more natural environment. The sec n d and third functions are
surely not fulfilled. If there are indeed some good evidence that
dolphins can understand acoustic or gestural commands, it has not
yet been shown that this kind of understanding is equivalent to hu-
man language (Vauclair 1996).
In brief, we think that considering the specificity of'human cul-
ture lead to interpreting this concept when it is used in cetaceans
in a more restricted and precise sense compared to the one used
by R&W iln effect, cultural manifestations in cetaceans or in other
animal species can only be punctual and express responses to en-
vironmental constraints. Because these cultural components are
reactions, they cannot serve (as it is the. case for humans) as stim-
uli for prompting other cultural elements. If animal culture obvi-
ously reflects a behavioral flexibility associated with sophisticated
learning abilities, a cultural behavior is not embedded in a system.
Consequently, because of the predominance of environmental
pressures, there is no cultural drift ais these pressures lead to main-
taining behavioral stability; in this respect, animal culture is highly
reliant on environmental features.
356
	
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2001) 24:2


Can culture be solely inferred from the absence of genetic or environmental factors ?

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