O lema central desta intervenção diz respeito ao partenariado transatlântico, ligação estratégica entre os Estados Unidos e a Europa e o seu
empenhamento na segurança europeia, com mútuos benefícios e objectivos
comuns. Destacam-se algumas áreas de referência, nomeadamente: a situação na
Bósnia, que representa o muior desafio para a segurança da Europa no pós-
guerra fria, o alargamento da NATO aos países do Leste Europeu, a nova
agenda transatlântica, as conversações para a integração da Rússia na Arquitectura
Europeia, e o fortalecimento da OSCE no apoio à democracia e direitos
humanos

Bagley, Elizabeth Frawley

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A POLÍTICA EXTERNA DOS EUA NO CONTEXTO DO MUNDO EURO-ATLÂNTICO Conferência incluída no Programa do Curso de Defesa Nacional (CDN96), proferida pela Embaixadora dos Estados Unidos cm Portugal, no IDN em Lisboa, cm 17 de Janeiro de 1996, Sumário: o lema central desta intervenção diz respeito ao partenariado transatlân-tico - ligação estratégica entre us Estados Unidos c a Europa e o seu empenhamento na segurança europeia - com mútuos bencl'ícios e objectivos comuns. Destacam-se algumas áreas ue referência, nomeadamente: a situaçã6 na Bósnia, yue representa o muior desafio para a segurança da Europa no pús--guerra fria; () alargamento da NATO aos países Jl) LC,'itc Europeu: a nova Agenda transatlântica; as conversações para a integração da Rússia na Arquitec-tUfa Europeia; c, o fortalecimento Ja OSCE no apoio à democracia e direitos humanos. Eli;:.ahcrh Frawley Bugley A POLÍTICA EXTERNA DOS EUA NO CONTEXTO DO MUNDO EURO-ATLÂNTICO Thank you very much for inviting me to speak to you today. U.S. Ambassadors have addressed the InstiWlo da Deresa Naciunal for several years and this is the second time I have had the privilege. I appreeiate the opportunity to continue the tradition. The perennial subject of this talk - the role of the U.S. in European secu-rity - is always important, but even more so in 1996 with both U.S. and Portuguese troops engaged in Bosnia, and with the eurrent restructuring of the European security architecture. [ will also touch on a relaled theme, a lwist on the usual formulation, and that is the role of Europc in U.S. security afrairs. Looking back over the year since [ last spoke to the Institulo, [ belieye I no longer have to try to convince you of the American eommitment to European security, the importance of an active U.S. rolc and the absolute need ror a transatlantic partnership. A brief review ar some of the themes I covered last year and developments since then illustratc my poinl: - [n Bosnia, we were well into the thirJ winter of war without a clear road to a solution in sight. Divisions hetwecn the U.S. and some allies on what to do were extremely frustrating, leading some commentators to proclaim the irrelevance of NATO to security challenges even on its doorstep. The horrors of the mortar attack in Tuzla anJ Serb atrocities afler the fali of Srebrenica were still ahead of us. NATO began to adapt to meet the new conditions in Europe. Enlargement of the Alliance was accepted in principie, PFP was engaged, and a sludy of the implications of enlargement was launched. NATO's relations wilh Russia, criticai for building stability and security on the continent, were frayed largely because of Russian misunderstandings about NATO enlargement. Historically-based 115 NAÇÃO E DEFESA differences in approach to the cont1iet in Bosnia also contributed to Russian suspicions about NATO's motives. The CSCE became the OSCE and emerged from the Budapest summit empowered and energized for new tasks. And finally, in an area of great importanee to Portugal, the eompletion of a new Lajes Agreement designed to meet the new eonditions and challenges in our bilateral seeurity relations remained tanlalizingly jusl out of reach. As 1 speak to you now, I have a dramatically positive review to make of these areas. I do not mean lo suggest that we have reaehed final resolution on these issues: that is not lhe nature of international relations. However, I can point tu very promising developments in some difficull areas. ln my opinion, and Wilh no small pride. I would argue lhat Ihey prove strong U.S. engagement in Europe and demonstrate beyond qucslion whal lhe lransallantic parlnership can accomplish for lhe mutual bendil of Europe and lhe U.S. 116 - ln Bosnia, lhe situation remains ditticult and uangerous, but wc in lhe international cornrnunity have recollciled many af our uivisions ano rediscovered comlTIon purpose in mceling the greatest European sccurity challengc of lhe post-cold war era. The Daylon Agreemenl has pr6vided lhe rramework ror an cou to lhe worst armcd conflicl in Europc in hal[ a century. Ano, significantly, Russia and many olher former Warsaw Pacl adversaries will participalc wilh NATO forces in [FOR as valuable partners in implemcnting the peace. - NATO enlargement is on track. proceeding in a dcliberatc and transparent manner. The prucess 01' completing the enlargement study dariticd responsibilities as wcll as benetits to prospective new members and NATO mcmber nations alike. The enlargemcnl process enters lhe next phase lhis year, in which the Alliance will hold intensive consullalions wilh prospective new members. - The OSCE is poised lo move inlo its rightful place as a major building block of European security. in parI because of its participation in lhe peace process in Bosnia. Having cstablishcd its expertise in Bosnia in the areas 01' human rights monitoring. refugce care and organil.ing elections, the OSCE\; evolving institutional strength complements NATO's defense struclures as anolher huilding hlock for general European security. POLITICA EXTERNA DOS EUA Tilese notable develapments over the past 12 manths resonale with the elements Df Presidem Clinton's comprehensive strategy for European seeurity and transatlantie relations which I will enumerate later. The fundamental objective 01' our policy is to increase stabi lity and prosperity lhroughout the Nonh Atlantic area and Europe. The new chances for peace in the Middle East and Northem Ireland also owe much to the steady US. course over the past few years. The projection 01' steady, engaged leadership is the fundamental goal of the Clinton administration's foreign policy. This leadership, indispensable to U.S.-European cooperation, combines a c1ear assessment of V.S. national security interests with the traditional concems 01' lhe American people for a strong moral component in U.S. foreign policy. And those interests are intimately tied to stability and prosperity in Europe, as they have been for nearly ali 01' lhis century. The role I am describing, however, does not imply leadership solely for its own sake, ar dominance. It means an active partnership with Europe for the mutual benefll 01' bOlh sides 01' the Atlantic. As Assistant Secretary Richard Holbrooke noted in his seminal «Foreign AI'fairs» article last year, lhe U.S. is a European power, nol ;n Europe but slill an indivisihlc part of it. We ignore lhis fundamental fact only at the peril ar the secllrily 01' bolh sides 01' .the Atlantic. I would also like to underline one olher aspeet 01' this pannership that may nol always be well understood in Europe. Active U.S. engagemenl in Europe is suslained in the formation 01' a heallhy, functioning partnership with Europe. We could not have generated or mainlained the kind of commilmenl and elTon we displayed in the past months without lhe cooperation 01' a strong Europe. «A superpower,» President Clinton said in his address to the nation on the Bosnia peace force, «cannot do everything everywhere and cannot do it alone.» So we require the continued reliahle parlnership 01' the Alliance and other European states which share our values and inlcrests to hclp us accomplish our common objectives. What is our principal shared common objective? It remains very much as it was last year: to exlend and enhanee stabilily, security and prosperity in the North Atlanlic area and Europe. From lhe U.S. vantage point, this consists 01' four key elements: 1st the continued adaptalion and evolulion of NATO; 2nd the ac!ivation 01' the Ncw Transallantic Agenda; 1/7 NAÇÃO E DEFESA 3rd the integratian af Russia into European security and economic architecture; and 4th the engagement af a strengthened OSCE. ADAPTATION AND EVOLUTION OF NATO The process of change in NATO, underway since the London Summit in July 1990, is considerably more advanced than is generally understood. It began with changes in NATO strategy and proceeded through ehanges in struetures to meet new security conditions. The evolution of NATO is clearly visible today in the careful path toward enlargement, the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), where politicai consultations are held with the enemies of just a few years ago, and Partnership for Peace (PFP), which is successfully developing the palteros and habits of military cooperation with former adversaries. PFP in particular has been a great success with 25 partners, including Russia, and is an important feature of the European security landscape. PFP will help prepare potential new members of NATO for the responsibilities as well as the privileges of AlIiance membership. It will also prepare nations that will not join NATO to cooperate with the AlIiance in maintaining European security; PFP training has made participation in' !FOR possible for a number of countries. TIIE NEW TRANSATLANTIC AGENDA One of the most important new developments in our policy is the New Transatlantic Agenda signed at the December U.S.-EU Summit in Madrid. ln a very real sense, however, the Agenda is not as new as its expression in the Madrid document. ln the early 60's, President Kennedy foresaw a «deelaration of interdependence» that awaited a more perfecI union in Europe. It is based on our common recognition that economic prosperity and opportunity are the foundation of security, and has gained impetus from the encouragement and support the U.S. continues to give to the process of European integration. TheAgenda, with its long-term economic, politicai and cultural dimensions, is the answer to doubts that arose in some quarters after the cold war as to whether the U.S. and Europe stil! shared common interests and whether the U.S. was stil! interested in and engaged with Europe. lt has become increasingly 118 POLtrlCA EXTERNA DOS EUA c1ear that the foundation of comrnon interests and values remains unshaken and serves as a tremendous asset in facing new ehallenges sueh as the dangers of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and intemational crime. Last year, a number of highly-respected European ligures publicized various ideas for a broad, struetured transatlantie partnership to carry us forward into the next century. Seeretary of State Christopher responded on behalf of the U.S. in a June 2 speeeh in Madrid in whieh he proposed a comprehensive strategy for European seeurity with a new emphasis on politicai, economie and global cooperation. The Agenda also eommits us to work together against international crime, terrorism and drug trafficking and to work together for the environment and the promotion of global trade and investment. The remarkable aehievement of the December signing underscores yet again the lirm .nd deepened ties of interdependence and partnership between the U.S .• nd Europe. The ehallenge now is implementation, and we will meet that ehallenge logether. INTEGRATlNG RUSSIA INTO THE EUROPEAN ARCHITECTURE I have already touehed on this importanl aspeet of our poliey, but I would Iike to emphasize how important il is that wc solve ane of Europe's endllring security chaHenges by finding a posilive role for Russia lO play in European affairs. ln faet, more progress has been made than is oflen recognized. Russia has joined PFP and partieipates actively in the NACC. lt has obtained mueh of its "special relationship" with NATO in lhe 16 plus one formal. Russia was a member of the Bosnia eontaet group, and - perhaps most importantly - has eontributed troops to the Bosnia peaee force. Russia still is not fully convinced that it has nothing to fear from a natural process of NATO enlargement, but we have sueeeeded in a substantial way in providing Russia with a voiee befitting its importance to European security. STRENGTHENING THE OSCE The member nations of the OSCE provided il with new struetures and support at last Deeember's Budapest Summit to boost its role in maintaining security in the most eomprehensive sense. The OSCE is the forum in whieh the U.S. and Canada join the countries of Europe and the former Soviet Union in 119 NAÇÃO E DEFESA addressing their seeurity eoneems, eontributing to a sense of stability and belonging to a eommunity of like-minded demoeratie nations. We expeet that the OSCE will be indispensable in supporting democraey and human rights throughout the region. Considering that Europe's major ehallenges now do not emanate from opposing military bloes, hut rather from ethnie and nation.listie tensions, territorial disputes, migration flows, organized crime and environmental damage, the OSCE's eomplementary role to NATO's provision of military seeurity is clear. The new strength of the OSCE in its cooperation with other bloeks of the European arehiteeture will be clear in the multifaceted role iI wi II play in implementing the peace in Bosni. in essential arcas such as human rights monitoring, organizing elections, reconstruetion and aiding refugees. Portugal, as host of this year's OSCE Summit, is taking a leading role in working with the Swiss ehairman to ensure an outcome th.t will serve to reinforee the vital role af the OSCE in European security. WHERE THEORY MEETS PRACTICE The foregoing is the strategie foreign and security policy of the Clinlon Administration. We believe it is coherent, logical and essential to our own interests and in the interests of those to whom we are so closely linked. But as poliey, it is I.rgely • guide; lheory as opposed to action. What [ wauld likc 10 suggest to you now is that we. together with our European allies, actually have a testing ground where many 01' the hypotheses of our policies will be tesled by aetions. The testing ground is -Basilio. We did not choose Bosni. as sllch a testing ground; tragically, it presented itself to uS. But iI is no accident thal extraordinary U.S. politicaI, diplomatic and military efforts have been foellssed on thal tragic conflicl. We recognize, as the underlying fundamental truth in ali of the poliey pronoullccments I have outlined for you, that there is no stability for the U.S. if there is instability in Europe. What Winston Churchill said in a different conlext - with regard to the founding of NATO - remains timelessly true: the new warld must be kept engaged to redress the imbalances af the old. The harsh and tragie testing ground af Bosnia reminds us af another fact that we must keep in mind: there are 110 gains without risks. It is a highly arguable hypothesis that earlier aetion by NATO and lhe U.S. could have had the sarne positive effect of ereating an opportunity for peaee; many conditians /20 POLíTICA EXTERNA DOS EUA on the ground and subsequenlly in lhe polilical relalions of the parties had to change first. But it is absolutely certain that withuut the leadership to take the risks, to seize the opportunities, and to actively engage and promote the dialogue, the Bosnian confiict would have conlinued to tester, making an approach to more complete European stabilily impossible. ln the broadest historical sense, I believe that what we are witnessing in the creation of a New Transatlantic Agenda and a European security architecture is nothing less than lhe reassertion by Europe as a whole of the global role that many European nations - and not least Portugal - have played individually in various epochs. The evolving European role on the world slage will be vastly strengthened both by cooperation and unity within its own union and the reciprocai benefits of mutual suppart and solidarity with lhe U.S. The burden ofworld leadership will pose new challenges and responsibilities. Bosnia has taught us, however, the costs of inaction. Solving the new issues we face won't be easy, but lhe U.S. and Europe will do it because it is the right way for them to move into lhe 21 st cenlury wilh grealer securily and opporlunity for ali of our peoples. Our hopes for lhe future as we meel lhese challenges remind me of the words 01' Irish poet and Nobel prizewinner Seamus Hcaney, which Presidenl Clinton quoled during his rccent visil to Ireland. I lhink thcy are particularly relevant as wc reflect 00 our common hopes and gaals, and on the servi ce. 01' our men and women in Bosnia: Histor.y says, don 'f flope cm this sitie of lhe grave. But then, aI/ce iII a lifefime, lhe longed-for tida! WClve (d justice can rise IIp mui hope and hisfor.v rhyme. So hope já,- a grea{ sea change 011 the far side (~r revenge. Believe lhar u furfher shore is reachable from here. Believe in mirades anel cures and healing wells. /2/ NAÇÃO E DEFESA I believe with President Clinton that we - ali of us - are indeed at a stage in our lives where hope and history do rhyme. Now it is our responsibility and our duty to seize this moment and to secure the fragile peace which we together have helped to forge. Elizabeth Frawley Bagley /22 

A política externa dos EUA no contexto do mundo Euro-Atlântico

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A política externa dos EUA no contexto do mundo Euro-Atlântico

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