Democracy, according to a large body of research, contributes to human development by improving citizens\u27 lives (Prezeworkski et al. 2000; Gerrign et al. 2012; McGuire 2010; Baum and Lake 2003; Gerring et al. 2015). Broad evidence demonstrates that democracies provide higher standards of living, on average, for their citizens than authoritarian countries (Boix 2001; Brown and Hunter 2004; Brown and Mobarak 2009; Besley and Kudamatsu 2006; Lake and Baum 2001). But what is it about democratic practice that enhances the quality of its citizens\u27 lives? Proponents argue that democratic practices such as competitive elections, checks and balances, and protection of individual rights contribute to government\u27s responsiveness to citizens\u27 demands, which in turn improves the quality of government performance and citizens\u27 well-being (Rueschemayer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992; Przeworkski et al. 2000; Fox 2015; Sen 1999; Diamond 1999; Gerring et al. 2015; O\u27Donnell 1998). But many new democracies are beset by weak party systems, low voter knowledge, entrenched clientelistic practices, fragmented states, and partial protection of the rights formally guaranteed by new constitutions. These limitations often combine to hinder the ability of democratically elected governments to improve basic human development (Przeworski et al. 1999; O\u27Donnell 1998; Weyland 1996; Cleary 2010). And yet, some new democracies are new improving and expanding public goods provisions, which enhances citizens\u27 basic social well-being and helps them to develop basic capabilities (Sen 1999; Gerring et al. 2015). In this article, we identify three casual pathways that establish a close link between democracy and human capabilities to provide a more robust accounting of how specific features of democratic regimes lead to specific improvements in human development. It is important to note that we control for elections\u27 potential influence on local poverty rates, but we argue that elections are too distant from ongoing policy cycles to impact poverty directly. Instead, we present evidence for specific institutions and policies\u27 role for reducing local poverty in Brazil. We also control for economic growth, which represents the dominant explanation for poverty reduction in Brazil and around the world
