Elkins, Zachary

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What Do Constitutions Say about Citizenship?Citizenship	clauses	can	vary	in	interesting	ways,	but	one	of	the	most	important	and	characteristic	differences	has	to	do	with	jus soli	versus	jus sanguinis	provisions.		The	provision	of	jus	soli (right	of	the	soil)	entitles	those	born	in	the	territory	to	citizenship,	while	jus	sanguinis (right	of	blood)	entitles	those	with	national	parentage.		The	division	of	jus	soli from	jus	sanguinis makes	sense	historically,	since	there	are	very	few	conditions	other	than	blood	and	soil	that	have	alone	been	sufficient	to	grant	citizenship.		Since	1789,	43	percent	of	the	626	constitutions	in	our	sample	have	offered	a	path	to	citizenship	in	which	birth	in	territory	is	sufficient,	and	in	42	percent	descent	alone	is	sufficient.		Constitutions,	of	course,	can	provide	for	both	paths:	almost	all	countries	that	offer	jus	soli	(89	percent	of	jus	soli	constitutions)	also	offer	jus	sanguinis.		Effectively,	then,	the	question	is	whether	countries	offer	jus	soli	or	not.		If	they	do,	we	can	think	of	them	as	comparatively	inclusive.Two	historical	facts	concern	us	here	regarding	jus	soli.		First,	the	right	of	jus	soli	is	in	relative	decline.		According	to	our	data,	roughly	60	percent	of	constitutions	throughout	most	of	the	1800s	provided	the	right;	only	35	percent	do	so	now,	a	decline	that	started	at	the	beginning	of	the	twentieth	century.		Second,	a	large	majority	of	constitutions	that	provide	(and	have	provided)	the	right	are	from	the	Americas.What	do	they	look	like?	Article	23	of	the	Honduran	constitution	of	1982	is	typical	of	the	unconditional	version	of	the	right:Hondurans by birth are:  1.   Those born in national territory, except those of diplomatic agents fair	number	of	drafters	make	the	distinction	between,	on	the	one	hand,	nationals,	subjects,	and	“Brazilians”	(all	understood	as	members),	and	on	the	other	hand,	citizens	(members	with	voting	rights).	Here	and	below	I	refer	to	data	that	I	have	been	collecting	with	my	collaborators	on	the	Comparative	Constitutions	Project.		According	to	our	data,	about	one-fifth	(22	percent)	of	the	world’s	constitutions	since	1789	have	distinguished	between	the	two	classes	(or	at	least	referred	to	both	terms).1		Another	71	percent	of	constitutions	use	either	“citizen”	or	some	variation	of	“national/Brazilian”	(but	not	both	“citizen”	and	“national/Brazilian”).		Generally,	those	that	refer	to	citizens	without	mentioning	nationals	(such	as	the	drafters	of	the	U.S.	Constitution)	seem	to	mean	simply	membership	in	the	state.		Citizens,	in	this	non-Aristotelian	sense,	are	entitled	to	a	passport,	but	they	may	not	be	entitled	to	vote.		A	final	two	percent	of	constitutions	use	the	term	“subject.”	Clearly,	this	term	is	meant	to	refer	to	membership	only.		My	concern	in	this	essay	is	simply	with	the	idea	of	membership,	not	membership	with	political	privileges.Whether	it	is	about	citizens	or	nationals,	a	discussion	of	some	class	of	national	identity	is	one	of	the	few	topics	that	are	common	to	nearly	every	constitution.		Roughly	96	percent	of	constitutions	since	1789	say	something	about	either	citizenship	or	status	as	a	national,	and	a	full	70	percent	provide	the	criteria	for	eligibility	for	one	or	the	other	designations.		What	is	more,	fewer	than	half	(44	percent)	of	those	constitutions	that	do	not address	these	criteria	include	a	clause	indicating	that	the	criteria	are	to	be	specified	by	ordinary	law.		These	latter	drafters	seem	to	acknowledge,	perhaps	apologetically,	that	such	criteria	are	something	that	readers	should	have	expected	to	read	in	the	document.When	Constitutions	Shape	National	Identityby		ZaChary elkins	 |	 Department	of	Government,	University	of	Texas	at	Austin	 |	zelkins@austin.utexas.eduSome	of	the	most	intriguing	clauses	in	national	constitutions	are	those	that	define	the	nation	and	its	members.		I	mean	the	kind	of	emphatic	statements	typically	prefaced	by	the	stem	words,	“Brazilians	are	those	who…,”	followed	by	a	host	of	criteria.		Compared	to	other	sources	of	national	identity,	these	clauses	are	not	particularly	subtle.		Indeed,	it	is	hard	to	imagine	a	more	prominent	source	(the	constitution)	or	a	clearer	definition	of	membership	than	these	provisions.		Of	course,	the	purpose	of	these	citizenship	clauses	is	to	bestow	membership	privileges	on	some	but	not	others.		And,	just	as	obviously,	these	clauses	can	vary	in	their	exclusivity.		By	international	standards,	citizenship	rules	in	Latin	American	constitutions	have	historically	been	remarkably	inclusive.		What,	if	anything,	is	the	effect	of	such	inclusivity?		I	suspect	that	this	citizenship	tradition	has	had	an	appreciable	effect	on	the	degree	of	national	unity.		Clearing Some Conceptual UnderbrushLet	us	first	wrestle	to	the	ground	the	concept	of	“citizen,”	as	well	as	its	synonyms	and	its	related	terms.		The	relevant	“semantic	field”	(Sartori	1984)	includes	the	terms	“national”	and	“subject,”	as	well	as	the	titular	designation	(e.g.,	“Brazilian”)	and	its	equivalents.		A	basic	distinction	has	to	do	with	whether	the	term	refers	simply	to	membership	in	the	state’s	community	or	to	something	more	than	membership—membership	plus	some	set	of	political	rights,	principally	voting	rights.		The	latter	sense	is	what	Aristotle	had	in	mind	by	politai,	which	is	often	translated	as	“citizen”	in	English	and,	indeed,	has	defined	that	concept	for	many.		Many	constitutional	drafters	maintain	this	Aristotelian	sense	of	the	term.		Actually,	a	debates9ConsequencesThese	decisions	likely	have	real	consequences,	some	welcome	and	some	unwelcome.		One	could	argue	that	a	more	demanding	set	of	citizenship	requirements	might	lead	citizens	to	value	membership	more,	an	attachment	that	could,	in	turn,	imply	a	deeper	commitment	to	society	and	participatory	governance.		Certainly,	those	who	push	for	a	more	“consensual”	(effectively	meaning	not	automatically	granted)	citizenship	take	that	view	(Schuck	and	Smith	1986).		However,	there	is	another	consideration	having	to	do	with	national	unity.		Citizens	of	multiethnic	Latin	American	countries	with	inclusive	citizenship	rules	tend	to	live	together	in	comparable	harmony.		As	one	indicator,	across	seven	multiethnic	countries	in	Latin	America	included	in	the	World	Values	Survey,	citizens	of	various	ethnicities	express	the	same	high	level	of	national	attachment	when	asked	to	respond	to	survey	questions	such	as	“How	proud	are	you	to	be	an	Brazilian?”	This	is	not	so	in	other	countries.		Whatever	the	validity	of	these	sorts	of	survey	items,	this	is	a	remarkable	finding	that	deserves	further	scrutiny.It	is	hard	to	say	whether	jus	soli	has	fostered	such	remarkable	unity	in	these	countries	or	whether	other	correlated	factors	are	more	relevant.		Still,	a	jus	soli	effect	on	national	unity	makes	sense.		Granting	membership	to	otherwise	alienated	and	marginalized	individuals	and	their	children	is	a	simple	but	fundamental	gesture.		It	tells	the	individual	and	members	of	their	ethnic	community	that—whatever	perceived	and	real	ostracism	and	discrimination	they	face—they	are	full-fledged	members	of	society.		It	is	also	a	gesture	that	validates	long-cherished	principles	of	inclusion	and	opportunity.		As	foreigners who are in Chile in the service of their government, and of the children of transient foreigners.  However, all may apply for Chilean nationality.  Common	law	is	thought	to	exclude	these	categories	of	people	(diplomats,	transients,	and	foreign	armies)	by	convention,	but	in	fact	the	exact	conditions	attached	to	jus	soli	are	at	the	heart	of	the	debate	over	birthright	citizenship	in	the	United	States.		There,	advocates	of	a	more	restrictive	policy	have	pushed	a	limited	reading	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	that	would	exclude	children	of	undocumented	immigrants.		Still,	these	various	examples	of	jus	soli	provisions	put	the	Americas	in	stark	relief	with	the	rest	of	the	world,	for	which	jus	soli	is	no	longer	common.		None	of	this	is	to	suggest	any	sort	of	homogeneity	with	respect	to	citizenship	clauses	in	the	Americas,	which	admittedly	can	vary	substantially.		Consider	two	contrasting	bookends,	Haiti	1805	and	Bolivia	2009,	the	oldest	and	most	recent	constitutions	from	the	region,	respectively.		Contemporary	Latin	Americanists	will	be	familiar	with	Bolivia’s	plurinational	constitution	of	2009,	which	not	only	invites	any	and	all	to	adopt	Bolivian	identity	but	also	encourages	multiple	national	identities.		Haiti’s	revolutionary	constitution	of	1805	sets	a	startling	tone,	though	in	keeping	with	its	revolutionary	beginning:Article 9: No person deserves to be a Haitian who is not a good father, good son, a good husband, and especially a good soldier.  Article 11: Every citizen must possess a mechanic art. 2.   Those born abroad of a Honduran mother or father  3.   Those born aboard boats and planes of Honduran nationality and those born aboard merchant ships in Honduran waters  4.   An infant of unknown parentage found in the territory of Honduras The	Honduran	law	gives	right	of	membership	not	only	to	those	born	on	soil	but	also	to	those	born	on	Honduran	sea	or	air	(jus mari and	jus caeli,	perhaps)—an	exceedingly	generous	version	of	jus	soli.		On	the	other	hand,	some	jus	soli constitutions	require	a	period	of	residence	prior	to	granting	membership	(call	this	jus soli et domicilium).		For	example,	Article	22,	subsection	v	of	the	Portuguese	constitution	of	1822	states:	Portuguese citizens by birth include:  v.   The sons of a foreign father, who [the sons] are born and acquire residence in the kingdom and who upon gaining the age of majority declare that they wish to be Portuguese.  This	version	of	jus	soli	is	similar	to	the	current	law	in	Germany,	a	country	that	has	long	been	associated	with	jus	sanguinis policies.		The	German	Nationality	Law,	as	revised	in	2000,	allows	the	children	of	legally	resident	immigrants	to	apply	for	citizenship	by	their	twenty-third	birthday.		More	commonly,	jus	soli policies	exclude	those	working	in	the	diplomatic	corps	of	another	country	and	those	in	transit,	as	in	Article	10	of	Chile’s	1980	constitution:	Chileans are:  1.   Persons born in the territory of Chile, with the exception of children of lasaforum  winter 2013 : volume xliv : issue 110Instituciones	de	representación	y	calidad		de	la	democracia:	Agenda	de	estudiopor	leTiCia m. ruiZ rodríGueZ	 |	 Universidad	Complutense	de	Madrid	 |	 leticiamaria.ruiz@cps.ucm.es debatesterceros	países	u	organismos	internacionales).		La	amplitud	de	estos	objetivos	dificulta,	en	algunos	casos,	que	las	instituciones	cumplan	con	unos	estándares	mínimos	en	todas	estas	dimensiones	de	la	calidad	de	la	democracia.		Pero,	a	la	vez,	este	reto	apremia	y	anima	a	que	la	academia	y	los	policymakers	continúen	su	reflexión	sobre	el	funcionamiento	de	las	instituciones	democráticas.		Aquí	se	proponen	tres	ámbitos	de	estudio	que,	bien	por	su	novedad,	su	impacto,	o	su	desatención,	respectivamente,	reclaman	la	atención	de	la	agenda	de	los	estudiosos	de	las	instituciones.En	primer	lugar,	el	intento	de	incorporación	de	la	sociedad	civil	a	las	instituciones	de	representación	constituye	una	novedad	que	la	convierte	en	materia	de	análisis	obligado.	Los	presupuestos	participativos	y	las	revocatorias	de	mandato	entrarían	dentro	de	esta	categoría	si	bien	con	resultados	dispares	y,	en	lo	que	se	refiere	a	las	revocatorias	de	mandatos,	generando	una	gran	controversia.		Se	trata	de	un	mecanismo	que	algunos	países	han	incluido	para	destituir	a	las	autoridades	y	que	ha	comenzado	a	ser	utilizado	en	el	ámbito	local	(Argentina,	Colombia,	Ecuador,	Perú	y	Venezuela	son	algunos	ejemplos	de	países	con	esta	normativa).		El	espíritu	que	inspiró	la	introducción	de	esta	figura	combinaba	el	objetivo	de	adquirir	mayores	niveles	de	accountability	y	de	prevención	de	abusos,	así	como	el	acercamiento	de	la	política	al	ciudadano.		Además	de	valorar	el	grado	de	cumplimiento	de	estas	metas,	merecería	la	pena	analizar	otros	daños	colaterales	como	la	inestabilidad	política	que	pueden	generar,	el	uso	de	recursos	desmedidos	para	afrontar	coyunturas	electorales	adicionales	y	sobrevenidas,	así	como	la	utilización	de	dicha	figura	de	forma	interesada	por	parte	de	algunos	grupos	de	poder	con	fines	no	necesariamente	democráticos.		Hasta	la	fecha	este	tema	ha	sido	abordado	Se	ha	vuelto	una	rutina	afirmar	que	en	América	Latina	las	instituciones	de	representación	han	recibido	una	notable	atención	desde	las	transiciones	y	democratizaciones	que	comenzaron	treinta	años	atrás.		No	es	tan	frecuente,	por	el	contrario,	reconocer	que	en	el	proceso	de	acumulación	de	conocimiento	ha	habido	una	cierta	incapacidad	para	su	aplicación	en	las	sucesivas	reformas.Además	de	la	tendencia	a	las	“mesas	separadas”	entre	académicos	y	policymakers,	el	inevitable	desacompañamiento	entre	la	realidad	y	su	análisis	tampoco	ha	ayudado.		Un	ejemplo	sirve	para	ilustrar	este	hecho.		La	crisis	de	representación	que	el	mundo	andino	vivió	en	la	década	pasada	apenas	había	sido	anticipada	por	los	estudiosos	de	instituciones.		Sin	embargo,	una	profunda	reforma	de	las	instituciones	de	representación	fue	uno	de	los	buques	insignia	de	los	nuevos	gobiernos	de	Ecuador	y	Bolivia.		Para	evitar	futuras	faltas	de	anticipación,	es	necesario	un	esfuerzo	sostenido	por	definir	una	agenda	de	investigación	sobre	instituciones	actual	y	relevante.	Un	nuevo	eje	atraviesa	los	debates	sobre	reformas	institucionales	pendientes	en	la	región:	la	calidad	de	la	democracia.		Si	trasladamos	la	concepción	de	calidad	de	la	democracia	de	Levine	y	Molina	(2011)	al	estudio	de	las	instituciones,	vemos	que	son	varias	las	dimensiones	que	éstas	han	de	perseguir.		En	este	sentido,	las	posibles	reformas	habrán	de	profundizar	en	la	consecución	de	instituciones	más	participativas	e	inclusivas,	con	una	composición	que	dependa	de	procesos	electorales,	sometidas	al	control	ciudadano	y	soberanas	con	respecto	a	presiones	domésticas	de	grupos	variados	(como	los	militares	o	grupos	económicos	del	país)	y	externas	(como	las	que	puedan	ejercer	constitutional	drafters	tinker	with	citizenship	clauses,	the	relatively	costless	benefits	of	inclusion	seem	worth	securing.Endnote1	 All	data	come	from	the	Comparative	Constitutions	Project	(CCP).		At	this	point,	CCP	investigators	have	examined	85	percent	of	constitutional	systems	once	(i.e.,	by	one	coder),	75	percent	twice	(by	two	coders),	and	59	percent	three	times	(by	two	coders,	with	any	discrepant	codings	reconciled	by	one	of	the	principal	investigators).		In	this	paper	we	use	cases	from	each	of	the	three	groups.		If	there	are	cases	with	two	codings	that	have	not	been	reconciled,	we	select	one	of	the	codings	randomly.ReferencesSartori, Giovanni, ed. 1984.		Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analysis.	Beverly	Hills,	CA:	Sage	Publications.Schuck, Peter H., and Rogers M. Smith. 1986.		Citizenship without Consent: Illegal Aliens in the American Polity.	New	Haven,	CT:	Yale	University	Press.	11

When Constitutions Shape National Identity

https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/2152/74352/3/elkins%20lasa%20forum%202012.pdf

When Constitutions Shape National Identity

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