Leidecker, Kurt F.

OpenSIUC

THE MEAXIXG OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE UPANISHADSBV KURT F. LEIDECKESIF one were to name one outstanding characteristic of Upanishadicphilosophy, one's choice would properly fall on the identifica-tion of knowing with being. This equation, whether in an out-spoken or implied term, may be met with on every hand through-out the Upanishads. Deussen. who has done the most importantwork on the Upanishads, regarded the atman hralunan equation,that is. the equation between the individual self and the universalspirit, as the basic thought in this literature. Yet the above namedidentification is more primitive, pervasive, and commoner. Theatman braJimau idea, perhaps, is but a particular case of this modeof thought which gees back to earlier literature. In the Upanishads,however, the coalition of knowledge and existence finds a morerational expression and is exploited philosophically.In the Brnhmanas and the Aranyakas already we frequentlyread : ya ez'<r]n veda, "he who knows this." And not solely to in-dicate the end of a paragraph is it repeated : 'yea. he who knowsit!' The word is too weighty, too sincere, to be comparable to ourlightly thrown out T know." All the depth of human experienceand emotion stirred to the very bottom speaks out of it. Dear andgratifying it must have sounded to those who had the first-handknowledge and could now relate it to the eager student ; quicken-ing and fascinating to the cela in his first lessons whereby he was toaspire to the great experience in communion with his venerableteacher : challenging and warning to those who never were allowedto gain possession of the liberating knowledge.One might rightfully raise the question as to why the ancientHindus insisted on knowledge and in how far knowledge for themcontrasted with action. The first of these inquiries will never be572 THE OPEN COURTwholly satisfied. The social and liistorical background is too scantyto j)ermit a conc!usi\e judgment. Certain it is, that the knowledgeso fre(|uently referred to relates to the \'edic complex of knowl-edge. Whether this complex wholly or partly owes its origin toa deliberate attempt to set uj) a barrier between the Aryans andthe original inhabitants, or whether it has grown up independentlyof such or similar considerations, must remain a matter of dis-pute. Yet even in pre-Upanishadic literature we find this complexin a stage of transformation, reshaping and supplementing. Thisya cvam vcda refers at times to individual experiences which arenot wholly in line with the great bulk of tradition. Moreover, theUpanishads are known to obliterate the distinctions between caste,age, and sex. From all that it is highly improbable that the yacz'ani I'cda is designed intentionally as an impediment for any otherbut the intellectual class. This consideration leads, by inference, tothe conclusion at which we shall arive in a different way later, thatthe knowledge referred to is not a knowledge by description butone of ac(iuaintance and, furthermore, not of intellectual faiuiliar-ity, erudition or learning, but of insight, exj:)eriencf', and living.Anquetil Duperron, the first to make known the Upanishadsin Europe through his Latin rendering of the Persian translationof some Upanishads, struck the keynote and the spirit of thesetreatises aright when he prefixed to his work this motto: "Quis-qiiis Dcum intelligit, Dciis fit." lie took it from the Upanishadsthemselves which say, for instance, in Miuidaka 3.2.9. yo brahmavcda brahma cva bharati, 'he who knows Bralinia becomes Brahma.'However, the Latin formulation sounds religious, whereas theL'jjanishads are ])riniarily philosophically oriented. Thus theircharacteristic is, perhajxs, better formulated more broadly as:'Quidris scio, idem sum; whereof the Mundaka passage is but anillustration.The fourth Rrfdimana of the first Adhyaya of the Tlrhad-aranyaka Upanishad teaches throughout that knowledge is self-distinguishing being, or that being is self-distinguishing by know-ing. The primeval dtman, or self, perceiving nothing but himself,came to know this and hence the world-all arose. In this Brfdimanathere are at least three versions of the creation of the world, and itis pervaded with very primitive conceptions. However, there isnothing accidental to these treatises and the phraseology is of noTHE MEANING OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE UPANISHADS 573mean importance. If a wish, a mere word, or a conscious act ofjudgment is made responsible for the existence of the cosmic sphere,it is so many different points of view which presuppose a certainphilosophic reflection.It is again this curious relationship between knowing and theexistence of that which is known. There is, furthermore, a realparticipation or sharing in the being of what is known. In the samesection of this ancient Upanishad the promise is that he whoknows the creation as having taken place in that fashion (ya cvai'nI'cda) will be in that very creation.The examples are too plentiful to be worth enumerating. How-ever, mention must be made of the later much discussed correla-tion of one's state of knowledge and one's circumstances at birth.In Kaushitaki Upanishad 1.2 this typical doctrine of reincarna-tion is already well developed. The passage stresses action also asdetermining one's birth.The consecjuence of knowing (znd) are various. The expec-tations of the knower vary from terrestrial joys and possessionsto more celestial and lasting happiness and pleasure or the en-compassing of philosophic truth.It is to Deussen's great credit that he pointed out that the re-lationship which obtains beween the knower of atnian and salva-tion is one of logical implication. This is true beyond doubt andcomes to conscious expression in technical philosophical passages.]^)Ut the great majority of the sections in question may hardly beinterpreted in this way. The explanation is much simpler and hasa primitive root.In the first place, the correlation of knowing and being maybe due to the general affinity of I'ld and sat. The native grammariansdivide the root vid into three classes: (1) vid—jnane; (2) vid—sattayaui : and ( 3 ) znd—labhe. That is, znd has three connotations(philologists say there are three distinct roots), to know, to be, tofind. \Miatever theories we may have about this word, the philo-sophical implication of the correlation between knowing and be-ing is not irrelevant to this philological peculiarity.In the second place, to a person even of moderate philosophictraining the bearing which knowing has on being, in short theepistemological problem, must be jof interest, and a less cool intel-lect is apt to pass rash judgment. To this may come, as a mo-?/-* THE OPEN COURTnicnt of second rate importance, however, tliat tlie class whiclihad 'knowledge' was at the same time that portion of the popu-lation which enjoyed also all earthly comforts.In the third place, knowing, for the I'panishadic philosophers,involves a psycho-])hysical relationship. This is the case notablywhen. es])ecially in the later literature, the word for knowing inthe original text is Udt 7'/V/, hut ind. Philological discusions areusually irrelevant to j)hil()sophical ])roblems, hut wc venture to saythat tliis minimum of philological digression is absolutely necessaryfor an understanding of the Hindu conception of knowledge.It may not solely be due to the fact that the verb jild occursespecially in later literature that the j)hilosophic import (as wcunderstand the word ) is commonly more ob\ious than in z'id.Where the two are found together. \ id has the tendency to charac-terize intellectual knowledge, while jnd ought never to be trans-lated by 'to know' simply. To aid our interpretation of the Hinduframe of mind we therefore should always take it more pregnant-ly as 'to realize' in order to convey a little the profundity attach-ing to the word and its derivatives. Realizing has a depth whichbare knowing does not possess. If we duly take into accout the factsit becomes difficult to understand why some have charged thethinkers of ancient India with intellectualism.It may serve as a good example of the life and character ofthe Upanishad sages and i)hilnso])hcrs if we investigate tirst someof the results of knowing {7'id), and then those of realizing (jrul).These Indian ascetics—as we are liable to picture them to ourselves—appear in f|uite a dilYerent light. They are concerned with satis-faction of all desires when they have attained knowledge of a cer-tain ty])e : they hope for ofTs])ring, cattle, general prosperity, andlongevity ; and in their worldly interest they think even of keepingoff hostile relatives, shciuld one be accjuainted with a certain doc-trine, while fame, honor, greatness, freedom from rivals, and do-minion, as well as praise, service and worship by the ])eople arecommon rewards of knowledge. The Baconian "knowledge ispower" seems weak in comparison with all these assertions.On a more psychological level and more reasonable are thequite numerous descriptions of the knower as shining and glow-ing with lustre, glory, splendour, beauty, and so on. I le is alsosaid to get a firm basis and support, and win the worlds, which againTHE MEANING OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE UPANISHADS 575is equivalent to becoming immortal or imperishable, to leaving thebody behind, overcoming repeated death, reaching the heavenly-world, or however else the phrase may run.Under the head of philosophic knowledge which constitutesliberation in itself will go all those cases in which the knower is be-lieved to become one with the highest reality, be it Ciinian, braJunan,purusa, \'ishnu, Krishna, etc. Expressed references to liberationas caused by knowledge are ever recurring: being saved, beingborn no more, attaining unity, non-duality, identity, bliss, andpeace. Knowing a L^panishad would indicate not an intellectualacquaintance with its contents, but realization in the fullest measure.Knowledge of the type of realizing (jnd) is used preferably ina context that deals with very vital problems. In a large number ofcases it is a matter of liberation, perfection, peace, and immortality—all problems most essential to the Hindu mind, ft is hardly prob-able and possible even that a mere knowing, a bare intellectual re-lationship, should ever have been considered as the only require-ment for moral goodness and everlasting satisfaction.The consequences of 7/7(7 are in many ways similar to those ofof vid. A person having the experience of realization believes him-self to have gone to non-death, having reached amrtyu (immor-tality) already, or at least to have conquered or cut the cord ofdeath, as the expression is. It 'frees from all fetters', liberates,and is instrumental in attaining the three worlds or reaching brah-man. Peace, happiness, and bliss also are a reward, and likewiseindividual perfection, release from all misfortune, dispelling alldilusion (uioJia), as well as obtaining or losing all desires (the twobeing synonymous for Hindu thought, according to the saying"nihil habentcs omnia possidcntcs").In more philosophic passages we have a realizing of or grasp-ing in its full meaning and significance a thing of worth, a fun-damental truth, or a character of reality as such. Elsewhere theverb may be taken to mean recognizing or acknowledging or gaininga deep and vital insight. This insight must be, or cannot otherwisebut be imparted by a teacher by word of mouth.Oldenberg is essentially right when he says that in the Upani-shads one is not concerned with knowledge of the order of cool andsupercilious apprehension, nor with a knowledge of clear-cut, objec-tive conceptions. Not for the reason that they did not know the art57f^ THE OPEN COURTof definition ; Init because they were frank, sincere, and personal intheir attitude.The fervor with wliicli the liinchi considers the acquisition ofrif,dit knowledge from a (jin'u, a teacher, may well be regarded asa religious jiredilection. If so, however, that which is so characteris-tically Hindu is lost. Religion is too vague a conce])t to be ai)])lica-ble to the L'panishads in their entirety.Into this category of interjjretation falls also the contention thatHindu thinking especially with reference to the knowledge prob-lem is essentially magical. It is, in as far as knowledge of whateverkind is reputed to bluntly cause changes in the objective universe.However, leaving alone this unphilosophic and naive view which,to some extent, is current even now, the Hindu definition of philo-sophy has always distinguished itself from our Western definitionsin that it meant, and still means to the Hindus (and. as a matter offact, to the whole ( )rient ) a LchensmichanuHij. In other words,they believe, as many advocates of a philosophy of life even nowdo, that my philosoi)hic \)o\\\i of view colors my relation and at-titude towards the universe. Call this magic, if you like, but youmight in labelling it thus do injustice to those early thinkers towhom the greatest respect is due for their formulating for thefirst time in history the greatest and sublimest of all truths, tat tvamasi.For Leaders —^JOURNAL OF REUGIONTo read The Journal of Religion is to keepin the vanguard of those who are thinkingabout the problems of present day rehgiouslife.This non^sectarian periodical provides forits readers an unprejudiced, critical accountof modern religious thought. It attempts toreveal the inner reality of religion, ratherthan to defend a doctrinal system. It con'sistently avoids cant, dogma, technicalabstruseness; and constantly emphasises theinterrelationship of religious life and socialenvironment.This scholarly journal is indispensable tothe serious reader interested in religion as aliving, spiritual reaUty in society, in history,and in individual experience.The Journal of Religion is edited by ShirleyJackson Case with the cooperation of theDivinity Faculty and Conference of theUniversity of Chicago. It is published quar-terly at the subscription price of $3.00 a year.If you wish to examine The Journal ofReligion a sample copy will be mailed youfree upon request.THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS5750 ELLIS AVE. . . . CHICAGO, ILLINOISTHE LOGIC OF DISCOVERYByROBERT D. CARMICHAELHead of the Department of MathematicsUniversity of IllinoisThe main aspects of the process of discovery are skillfullydiscussed in a manner to interest the non'technical reader.Three of the chapters have previously been published inThe Monist, Scientia and The Scientific Monthly.TABLE OF CONTENTSChapterI The Logic of DiscoveryII What is the Place of Postulate Systems in the Further Prog-ress of Thought?III On the Nature of Systems of PostulatesIV Concerning the Postulational Treatment of Empirical TruthV The Structure of Exact ThoughtVI The Notion of Doctrinal FunctionVII Hypothesis Growing into Veritable PrincipleVIII What is Reasoning?IX Tlie Larger Human Worth of MathematicsIndexPp. 280, cloth. Price ^2.00By the same AuthorA DEBATE ON THE THEORY OF RELATIVITY with an intro-duction by William Lowe Bryan, Indiana University.Favoring the Theory: Robert D. Carmichael, University ofIllinois, and Harold T. Davis, Indiana University.Opposing the Theory: William D. MacMillan, Universityof Chicago and Mason E. Hufford, Indiana University.(First Impression in 1925, Second Impression in 1927.)Cloth, ^2.00THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANYChicago London4'

The Meaning of Knowledge in the Upanishads.

http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4397&context=ocj

The Meaning of Knowledge in the Upanishads.

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

OpenSIUC