Hook, Sidney

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MARX AND FREUD : OIL AND WATERBY SIDNEY HOOKNO comparison in modern thought is more strikingly incongru-ous than the attempt recently made by certain 'literary psy-chologists' of radical penchant to assimilate the doctrines of KarlMarx to those of Sigmund Freud. The latest and most dashingeffort to read into Alarx's work an anticipation of current psycho-analytic myth has been made by Max Eastman in his book onMarx, Lenin and the Science of Revolution, a chapter of which hasbeen restated in an article on ]\Iarx and Freud in the July issue ofthe New Masses. In this short paper I shall try to make two thingsclear: (1) that the theory of psychoanalysis represents the crass-est violation of fundamental principles of scientific method, and(2) that the salient ideas of Marx cannot intelligibly be translatedinto Freudian terms.(1) The most formidable objection to the doctrine of psycho-analysis is that it has absolutely no concepEon of the meaning ofscientific evidence. All of its generalizations are in the nature ofhypothetical explanations after the fact. Instead of being basedon controlled experiment they are merely expressions of facileguesses and capricious analogies. The psychoanalyst as distinctfrom the experimentalist can conceive of no possible evidencewhich might disprove his claims. In other words psychoanalysis isbeyond the check of scientific experiment since no matter whatthe results of the experiment turn out to be, its theories permit itto interpret them as confirmatory evidence. Like the theologicalnotion of the will of God, since it 'explains' the absence of a certainfact as well as its presence, it is scientifically useless. To give asimple illustration. I dream that disguised as Santa Claus I comeMARX AND FREUD : OIL AND WATER 21down the chimney-flue of the house in which a decrepit great-auntof mine Hves. The analysis runs that I have had a suppressed sexdesire for my great aunt (who was fifty years old when I wasborn) and am trying to emulate my great-uncle (whom I neverknew). Proof: by a process of 'free' association under the 'expert'guidance of a follower of Freud I hit upon this explanation andsolemnly declare that I have an intuitive conviction that it is so.However, if my powers of recall are feeble, the doctor generallywill suggest the above explanation (if he knows his case-books).Whereupon I burst into laughter and tell him he is either a fool ora faker. Yet the analysis is still valid, responds the doctor, andif anything even stronger than if I had given it direct introspectiveconsent, since my feeble powers of association and my reaction tohis diagnosis simply show how strong the power of my resistanceis,—show that my 'censor' is working full blast trying to save ap-pearances. In other words I am damned if I confess and damnedif I don't. Examples may be drawn from Eastman's own article.He says, "The economic interpretation of history is nothing but ageneralized psychoanalysis of the social and political mind." And inface of the opposition the theory has met, he continues, "One mightinfer this (i. e. its truth—S. H.) from the spasmodic and unreason-able resistance it meets on the part of its patient". Later on he triesto psychoanalyze the current psychoanalytic interpretation of revo-lutionary thinking on the ground that as practitioners the psycho-analysts stand to lose money if the revolutionists have their way.All this is merely argument ad homineni and as scientific method isnothing short of puerile. Proceeding in the same way one couldexplain every phenomenon in the universe. After the event hashappened one can always account for discrepancies in the resultsby introducing subsidiary hypotheses. But just because sciencedoes not read the world backward, the element of prediction (with-in the limits of error) is a necessary condition of an adequate sci-entific theory. Bound up with this formal objection is the chargethat psychoanalysis has no definite canons of evaluation in siftingalleged confirmatory evidence and in establishing correlations be-tween symbol and meaning.This brings us to material considerations. The basic fallacyof psychoanalytic theory is its confusion of motive with stimulus.An unconscious stimulus may be present and may be used to explain22 THE OPEN COURTan immediate reaction or a dela}ed response, but to speak of ariunconscious motive is a contradiction in terms. Motive is a cog-nitive or knowledge term. (There is no such thing as unconsciousor immediate knowledge or inference.) If this is denied, the psy-choanalyst is bound in all consistency to endow the Unconsciouswith greater logical acumen (the Unconscious makes no mistakes)than our ordinary consciousness possesses. Together with the factthat the Unconscious automatically expresses its repressed desiresin a complicated symbolism beyond the power of most minds on aconscious level, we seem to be confronted with another version ofthe discredited reminiscence theory of knowledge which is as farremoved from the instrumental theory of knowledge as anythingcan possibly be.As far as the peculiar behavior of psychic aberrants is con-cerned it may be more plausibly explained as due to the influencewhich certain early habit formations and conditioned reflexes ex-ercise upon later life. Here, at least, is where Watson is talkingsense. But to fall back upon reference to the causal efiiciency ofthe unconscious merely represents an uncritical reliance upon ametaphor. Under the cover of the metaphor it converts the affec-tive tones of the fringe of consciousness into cognitive attitudesand purposes 'effecting hidden ends unseen'.From the point of view of scientific psychology—there is nota particle of evidence that any of the elaborate Freudian mechan-isms, such as the censor and the processes of displacement, etc.,exist in consciousness. In fact, the use of the term force in Freud'swritings—force of repulsion, force of resistance, force of repres-sion—should arouse suspicion even in the minds of those who donot forswear animism with such blustering vehemence as doesEastman, that Freud's psychology is literary rather than scientific,and smells of the pipe and the armchair rather than of the labora-tory. At this point, people are sure to interpose with mention ofFreud's clinical cures. The cures are not disputed any more thanthe cures wrought by Coue, Christian Science and the miraclemakers. All fakers claim to be justified by occasional cures. Butthe question is what is the relation between the theory defendedand the practice followed. If the cure is the result of a techniquewhich can be verified by other experimenters, then its citation isrelevant. But Freud has not established any direct connection be-MARX AND FREUD : OIL AND WATER 23tween his romantic psychology and his cHnical successes. In addi-tion, it should be pointed out that Freud's alleged cures may bemore plausibly explained on the basis of a more sober neuro-physi-ological theor}'. It is interesting to note that a great many psycho-analysts—notably Brill—hold that the great value of their theoryis prophylactic rather than remedial. But in the absence of logi-cal evidence one statement is just as gratuitous as the other.In view of the above, I do not think it too rash to say thatFreud is working his way back to the old fashioned notion of thesoul—the ghost that haunts the mansions of the mind—and thatdoctrinally his views are quite compatible with the biological vital-ism and mysticism of Bergson and Driesch. But we will leave thattheme to be developed some other time.(2) If it is rank confusion to call the psychology of Freudscientific, it is sheer intellectual violence to convert the social ob-jectivism of Alarx into an anticipation of the mystical subjectivismof Freud. Eastman is able to draw the connection because hemistakenly believes that historical materialism is a theory whichattempts to account for individual motives rather than for certainsocial forces and factors. His conception of historical materialismboils down despite his frantic efforts to escape from the position,to the theory that the economic interests of men are primary, andunconsciously control their activity. This is palpably false. i\Iarxwould never have been able to explain his own life-time of revo-lutionary activity on the basis of this vulgar theory of self-interest.Nor would Eastman himself. Surely such a theory can neverplausibly account for the misguided idealism of many workers whobelieve that the best way they can serve their country is by layingdown their lives for it. The intense national patriotism of theworking class is not an ideology "indulged in by people controlledby their own unconscious class interests." Xo, according to thefollowers of Alarx, it is the result of a systematic and perniciouspropaganda carried on through the instrumentalities of the press,the church and the school—that unholy trinity of capitalist civil-ization. The process is social and objective. The ideas a mancarries in his head are not a function—conscious or unconscious—of the cash he carries in his pocket. Eastman's remarks ignoreone of the most patent facts in all history—ignorance of what one'strue interests are. And what these true interests are,, is not to be24 THE OPEN COURTfound by holding one's nose and prying into the unconscious butby critical analysis and experience in the class struggle. Eastmanby implication denies this and again falls back upon the 'infallibleunconscious' as the source which inspires and determines the con-duct of men. He has some inkling of the difficulty when he quali-fies his statement by saying it is true "on the broad average andin the long run". But strictly speaking these words state the dif-ficulty instead of solving the problem which confronts his theory.In another sense these words contradict his primary assertion forunless one knows the point of view from which the 'average' isdetermined and how far the 'run' extends, one might very well saythat the direct impact of objective economic conditions sets thelimits between which unconscious activities function.In view of Eastman's continuous invective against the Hegeliandialectic as both mystical and mysterious, it is instructive to tabu-late the mystical and mysterious elements in his own thinking.They enter into his outlook; (a), through the belief that apparentlypure unmotived association of elements in a dream or in everydayhuman experience, must of necessity be an expression of desireswhich have previously been repressed; (b) through the belief thatthe unconscious motives of all the members of a certain class canbe traced to the same repressions; (c) through the belief that thecompensating expression of these repressed desires by a sort of pre-established harmony give rise to a common class interest. All ofthese views are implied in what he says but not an iota of proof isoffered in substantiation. To ridicule Hegel and yet stand com-mitted to these propositions is straining at a gnat and swallowinga whole drove of camels.Without developing in detail the positive argument on the basisof which the above criticisms and interpretations of Marxism aremade, I suggest the following. Historical materialism takes itspoint of departure from the objective existence of an economicclass struggle. In the interests of the struggle, ideas and doctrinesare used as instruments in bringing the issue to a successful com-pletion. The anticipated efficacy and adequacy of these ideas infurthering class interests explain their acceptance and use but notnecessarily their genesis or origin. No social factor can whollyexplain the mechanics of individual creation. But only social fac-tors can explain why once these ideas have seen the light, theyMARX AND FREUD : OIL AND WATER 25have been accepted. They are accepted (or rejected) not becausethey are in the personal interest of any one individual but becausethey are instrumentaHties which are used to accelerate (or retard)the tendencies of the economic environment in the direction of asocial ideal. Conscious allegiance to a social ideal expresses thesocial idealism of the revolutionist. This social ideal is not a merepossibility of the given nor is it a foregone certainty. It is groundedin objective tendencies which set the limits of the type and rangeof instruments which may be effectively used. jMarxism then turnsout to be a self-critical theory explaining its own acceptance on thebasis of its own principles. It appears in the main as a huge judg-nient of practice in Dewey's sense of the phrase and its truth orfalsity (instrumental adequacy) is an experimental matter.But it is a far cry from this to the suppressions of Freud.There is enough superfluous baggage in the socialist campwithout adding the rotting corpse of a prurient 'bourgeois' (to usea favorite epithet of Eastman's) psychology, if ever there wereone, to infect the rest of the doctrine.

Marx and Freud : Oil and Water.

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Marx and Freud : Oil and Water.

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