PhDThe present work has examined the thesis that the current framework for the regulation
of SMP under EU law on electronic communications does not address the oligopoly
problem in full. Under the SMP framework for electronic communications, joint
dominance is considered a very rare occasion that may arise in symmetrical duopolies;
there are strong doubts on whether the existing framework is capable in practice of
addressing more complex issues associated with oligopolies in electronic
communication markets. Wholesale international roaming is presented as a case study
in support of this submission. Under the SMP framework for electronic
communications, the Commission thinking has been too much dominated by the
concept of single dominance. In view of the increasing number of oligopolistic markets
in the post-liberalisation era, the framework needs to be revised to encompass wider
market definitions, which will be able to catch oligopolistic situations also. The
application of the collective dominance test of Annex II of the Framework Directive
and the Guidelines on the assessment of market power will have to be updated in
accordance with the Impala judgment. Also, the Guidelines should be revised to
address also particulars of the application of remedies in oligopolistic markets and
remedies of a quasi-contract type, like the imposition of penalties that may be used for
the finance of the roll-out of new networks should be examined as an alternative to
access obligations
